Suchergebnisse

Controversy and confusion pervade the law of armed conflict. Its most basic rules may seem ambiguous, vague, incomplete, or inconsistent. The prevailing view of customary international law confronts serious problems, in principle and in practice, when applied to the customary law of armed conflict. Legal indeterminacy, in its different forms, might be reduced or resolved in light of the object and purpose of the law of armed conflict, or by taking into account other relevant rules of international law. Unfortunately, the purpose of the law of armed conflict is itself the subject of deep disagreement. So is the relationship between the law of armed conflict and other branches of international law, most notably the law of inter-State force and human rights law. This article examines different forms of legal indeterminacy and different legal techniques available to address them, using concrete controversies to illustrate abstract ideas. It defends one view of the purpose of the law of armed conflict and its relationship with other rules of international law. The purpose of the law is not to balance a constraining principle of humanity against an authorizing principle of military necessity. Instead, the purpose of the law is simply to protect persons and objects to the greatest extent practically possible, that is, without depriving other rules of international law, which authorize certain uses of armed force, of practical effect. Finally, it shows that the law of armed conflict contains a number of clues for its own interpretation, some of them hidden in plain sight, including a recurring pattern of general protections with limited exceptions.

Few areas of international law are as consequential as the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). At its very core, it entails an endeavor to regulate death and destruction both for those who participate in a conflict and for those who are simply affected by the conflict. LOAC is also of continued relevance. The number of armed conflicts around the world does not seem to be on the wane, and thus there is no shortage of situations in which LOAC remains applicable. Just as the law retains its consequence and relevance, the study of LOAC retains its importance. Old questions warrant revisiting, as the nature of conflicts change, new treaties are adopted, and the law continues on its path of development and interpretation. New questions also arise--as contemporary armed conflicts provide complexities that have not always been present in past conflicts--from conflict classification to the individual weapon in the hands of the infantryman.

Warfare is changing - and rapidly. New technologies, new geopolitical alignments, new interests and vulnerabilities, and other developments are changing how, why, and by whom conflict will be waged. Just as militaries must plan ahead for an environment in which threats, alliances, capabilities, and even the domains in which they fight will differ from today, they must plan for international legal constraints that may differ, too. This volume considers how law and institutions for creating, interpreting, and enforcing it might look two decades ahead - as well as what opportunities may exist to influence it in that time. Such assessment is important as the U.S. and other governments plan for future warfare. It is also important as they formulate strategies for influencing the development of law to better serve security, humanitarian, and other interests. This volume examines not just specific questions, such as how might a particular technology require adaptive interpretation of existing law, but also grand ones, such as whether law is capable at all of keeping up with these changes. ; https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1335/thumbnail.jpg

This conversation developed from a panel titled "Interrogating the Militarized Masculine: Reflections on Research, Ethics and Access" held at the May 2013 International Feminist Journal of Politics conference at the University of Sussex, UK.

This chapter contains an overview of the modern law of armed conflict (international humanitarian law) in all its main aspects, from the scope of application of the law through methods of warfare, weapons and targeting operations, to protection of victims and issues of enforcement and implementation.

Already a controversial topic, legal debate and broader discussions concerning the amount of human control required in the employment of autonomous weapons—including autonomous cyber capabilities—continues. These discussions, particularly those taking place among States that are Parties to the 1980 Certain Conventional Weapons Convention, reveal a complete lack of consensus on the requirement of human control and serve to distract from the more important question with respect to autonomy in armed conflict: under what conditions could autonomous weapons "select" and "attack" targets in a manner that complies with the law of armed conflict (LOAC). This article analyzes the specific LOAC rules on precautions in attack, as codified in Article 57 of Additional Protocol I, and asserts that these rules do not require human judgment in targeting decisions. Rather, these rules prescribe a particular analysis that must be completed by those who plan or decide upon an attack prior to exercising force, including decisions made by autonomous systems without meaningful human control. To the extent that autonomous weapons and weapons systems using autonomous functions can be designed and employed in such a way to comply with all required precautions, they would not violate the LOAC. A key feature of determining the ability of autonomous weapons and weapons systems using autonomous functions to meet these requirements must be a rigorous weapons review process.

Targeted killing is not the battlefield killing of combatants by opposing combatants or the assassination of an individual for political purposes. But in a new age of nonstate actors engaged in transnational terrorist violence, it has become a new reality, and the law of armed conflict should recognize it.

During armed conflict, people with disabilities are victims of a vicious cycle of violence, social polarization, deteriorating services and deepening poverty. They are among the most marginalized and excluded part of the population affected by the armed conflict. They are at greater risk in situations of conflict, most likely to be left behind when populations flee and also at greater risk of violence and discrimination. The international normative framework related to people with disabilities in armed conflicts is mainly based on human rights law and international humanitarian law. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities moves the meaning of disability from regarding persons with disabilities as objects of medical care and charity to recognizing them as subjects with rights. There is still a long way to go in effectively protecting disabled people during armed conflicts. It seems that legal norms in this respect are sufficiently precise. But as often happens, the executive fails. The international community has a highly developed sense of solidarity and empathy for those in need. However, we are constantly observing many imperfections and shortcomings in the procedures and mechanisms of humanitarian aid operations. ; mbuczko@pwsip.edu.pl ; PhD, Lecturer, at the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Lomza State University of Applied Sciences (Poland). ; Lomza State University of Applied Sciences, Poland ; Advisory opinion of ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Reports par 70. (1996 July 8). ; Aust, A. (1986). The Theory and Practice of International Instruments. The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 35(4), 787-812. ; Baxter, R. (1980). International law in "Her Infinite Variety". International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 29, 549-566. ; Bierzanek, R. (1987). Miękkie prawo międzynarodowe [International Soft Law]. Sprawy międzynarodowe, 1, 91-106. ; Bothe, M. (1980). Legal and NonLegal norms: A Meaningful Distinction in International Relations?, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 11, 65-95. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0167676800002725. ; Bouvier A., & Dutli, M.T. (1996). Children In Armed Conflict. The International Journal of Children's Rights, 4(2), 115-212. ; Chinkin, Ch. (1988-1989). General Perspective to the International Use of Force. Australian Yearbook of International Law, 12, 279-293. ; Cohn J., & Goodwin-Gill, G. (1994). Child Soldiers. The Role of Children In Armed Conflicts, A Study on Behalf of the Henry Dunant. Institute. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ; CRDP. Statement on disability inclusion for the World Humanitarian Summit - Adopted at the CRPD 14th Session (17 August-4 September 2015). Retrieved from https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/CRPDStatements.aspx [accessed on 12.09.2019]. ; Delissen, A.J.M. (1991). Legal Protection of Child-Combatant after the Protocols: Reaffirmation, Development or a Step Backwords In: A.J.M. Delissen & G.J. Tan (Eds.), Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: Challenges Ahead; Essays in Honour of F. Kalshoven (pp. 153-164). Dordrecht, Netherlands; Boston, Mass., M. Nijhoff: Kluwer Academic Publishers. ; Devandas, C., Barriga, S., & Quinn, G. (2017). Ochrona osób cywilnych z niesprawnościami w warunkach konfliktu [Protection of civilians with disabilities during armed conflict]. Przegląd NATO [NATO Review]. Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2017/Also-in-2017/Protecting-civilians-with-disabilities-in-conflicts/PL/index.htm [accessed on 12.09.2019]. ; Gardam, J. (1998). Women, human rights and international humanitarian law. International Review of the Red Cross, 324, 421-432. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020860400091221. ; Gold, J. (1983). Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Agreements. American Journal of International Law, 77, 443-489. https://doi.org/10.2307/2201074. ; Hoof, G.J.H. (1983). Rethinking the sources of international law. Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers. ; HRC. Thematic study on the rights of persons with disabilities under article 11 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, on situations of risk and humanitarian emergencies. Report of the United nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2015, November 30) A/HRC/31/30. ; IV Konwencja genewska dotycząca ochrony ludności cywilnej [IV Geneva Convention of the protection of civilian population], 1949, August 12 (Journal of Laws of 1956, no. 38, item 179). ; Klabbers, J. (1996). The Concept of Treaty of International Law. The Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer Law International. ; Konwencja o prawach osób niepełnosprawnych [Convention on the rights of disabled people, 2006, December 13 (Journal of Laws of 2012, item 1169). ; Lachs, M. (1963). Współczesne organizacje międzynarodowe i rozwój prawa międzynarodowego [Contemporary International organizations and the development of international law]. Państwo i Prawo, 12, 823-830. ; Morris, M. (1996). By Force of Arms: Rape, War and Military Culture. Duke Law Journal, 45(4), 651-781. https://doi.org/10.2307/1372997. ; Protokół dodatkowy I do konwencji genewskich z 12 sierpnia 1949 r. dotyczący ochrony ofiar międzynarodowych konfliktów zbrojnych, podpisany w Genewie 12 grudnia 1977 [Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Protocol I, 1977, June 8 (Journal of Laws of 1992, no. 4, item 175). ; Protokół dodatkowy II do konwencji genewskich z 12 sierpnia 1949 r. Dotyczący ochrony ofiar niemiedzynarodowych konfliktówn zbrojnych, podpisany w Genewie 12 grudnia 1977 [Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non International Armed Conflicts, Protocol I], 1977, June 8 (Journal of Laws of 1992, no. 4, item 175). ; Resolution of the UN Security Council (2019, June 20 ) S/RES/2475. ; Sassoli, M. (1987). The National Information Bureau in aid of the victims of armed conflicts. International Review of the Red Cross, 256, 6-24. ; Thomas, E. (2018). Children with disabilities in situations of armed conflict. Discussion paper. New York: UNICEF ; UN. Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2475 (2019), Ground-Breaking Text on Protection of Persons with Disabilities in Conflict. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13851.doc.htm [accessed on 12.09.2019]. ; UNGA. Humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation for El Salvador and Guatemala (2005, December 22), A/RES/60/220. ; UNGA. Humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation In Ethiopia (2005, February 8), A/RES/59/217. ; UNGA. Humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation in Ethiopia (2006, March 31), A/RES/60/218. ; UNGA. Strengthening emergency relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and prevention in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster (2005, November 14), A/RES60/15; UNGA. Strengthening emergency relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and prevention in Pakistan in the aftermath of the South Asian earthquake disaster (2005, November 14), A/RES/60/13. ; UNHCR. Thematic study on the rights of persons with disabilities under article 11 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, on situations of risk and humanitarian emergencies. Report of the Office of the UNHCHR, 30.11.2015, A/HCR/31/30. ; 3 ; 2 ; 43 ; 55

Despite the declaration of St. Petersburg in 1868, Brussels Declaration of 1874, Hague Convention of 1899. Chemical weapons were used even in warfare which resulted in the deaths of more than one hundred thousand people and around one million people injured. The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of biological weapons and chemical weapons, but does not prohibit the development, production, stockpiling or distribution, and does not regulate the handling mechanisms and procedures in the event of a violation. Then the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC) was formed which regulates the use of chemical weapons in general, which means during times of peace or armed conflict. There are several forms of sanctions that can be imposed on parties to disputes in the internal Syrian conflict, namely non-military sanctions and military sanctions. In the context of international law, non-military sanctions are regulated in Article 41 of the UN Charter while military sanctions are regulated in Article 42 of the UN Charter which determines the authority of the UN Security Council to impose sanctions. The involvement of OPCW as an international organization in disarming chemical weapons by terrorist IS and opposition groups that are not recognized by the Syrian government has limited operations. Therefore, OPCW as an international organization based on CWC in world chemical disarmament requires greater authority and fluency in upholding its rules. According to article 13 letter b of the Rome Statute it has been stipulated that the UN Security Council based on its authority under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter has the right to submit to the Court through the Prosecutor for crimes that have not or have not ratified the Statute. Article 13 letter b of the ICC is a strong and legal juridical basis to legitimize the UN Security Council in making policies to hand over cases of gross human rights violations in the Syrian conflict to the ICC.

In reflecting on the arc of US and coalition detention operations in Afghanistan, three key issues related to the law of armed conflict stand out: one substantive, one procedural and one policy. The substantive matter – what are the minimum baseline treatment standards required as a matter of international law? – has clarified significantly during the course of operations there, largely as a result of the US Supreme Court's holding in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. The procedural matter – what adjudicative processes does international law require for determining who may be detained? – eludes consensus and has become more controversial the longer the Afghan conflict has continued. And the policy matter – in waging counterinsurgency warfare, how do foreign military forces transition military detention operations to effective civilian institutions? – has emerged as a critical strategic priority for which the law of armed conflict provides little instructive guidance. President Barack Obama's determination to close Guantanamo while expanding US military commitments in Afghanistan will draw new public attention to these questions. After briefly explaining the basis of US and coalition detention operations, this article addresses each of these issues in turn. Viewing them together, it concludes with some general observations about the convergence of law and strategy.

In recent years, legal commentators have begun to write on women in war: usually as the civilian victims of belligerent forces, sometimes as military victims of discrimination within their own armed forces. Very little has been written about women as belligerents. What has been written does not focus on the legal problems conventional forces face when women are "unprivileged belligerents"' who fail to comply with law of war requirements for combatant status. These problems can become acute when conventional forces are engaged in "Small Wars" where unarmed women often serve as auxiliaries to their unconventional opponents. Although legal sources have been remarkably silent about these problems, a number of examples are available. I have selected two involving unarmed women: one from Northern Ireland involving the British Army, and one from Somalia involving the American Army.

As increasingly automated – and in some cases fully autonomous – weapon systems enter the battlefield or become possible, it is important that international norms to regulate them head down a path that is coherent and practical. Contrary to the claims of some advocates, autonomous weapon systems are not inherently illegal or unethical. The technologies involved potentially hold promise for making armed conflict more discriminating and causing less harm on the battlefield. They do pose important challenges, however, with regard to law of armed conflict rules regulating the use of weapons. Those challenges demand international attention and special processes for adapting existing law to meet those challenges. Rather than seeking to impose, up front, a new set of prohibitory rules or seeking to suspend development of autonomous weapon systems pending a comprehensive agreement on rules to govern them, international regulation of autonomous weapons systems should begin with the premise that the law of armed conflict provides an appropriate general framework. States should work to build on that framework through continually-improving interpretive standards and agreed-upon best practices. We propose a three-tiered approach to emerging automation and autonomous weapon technologies: (i) an international agreement that makes clear the applicability of baseline law of armed conflict rules and that codifies standards, practices, and interpretations that states have converged upon over a long period of actual development of systems, in tandem with discussion among states informally, and informed by sufficiently transparent and open sharing of relevant information; (ii) state-level development and inter-state discussion of weapon review practices, tailored to these specific weapons and their battlefield environments; and (iii) close coordination among weapons designers, developers, manufacturers, and military end-users of these systems, with lawyers responsible for legal weapons review, at each granular stage of design, development, and testing. The integration of these three levels can assist to appropriately and realistically shape advancing military technologies while improving adherence to core law of armed conflict principles.

This article analyses the changes in the law and practice of exclusion zones in the law of armed conflict at sea. It identifies three principal phases. First, it explores the exclusion zones of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, which were modest in size and defensive in character. Second, it turns to the exclusion zones of the First World War and several subsequent conflicts. The exclusion zones of this period were fundamentally different to those of the Russo-Japanese war: if a vessel was within an exclusion zone, it was deemed susceptible to attack. The article then turns to the third phase of exclusion zone, which can be traced back to the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (1994). The San Remo Manual separated out the establishment of the zone from its enforcement and specified that the same law applies within the zone as outside it. It also set out regulations for the zones should they be created. The practice of States is considered throughout.

So far, outer space has merely become involved in terrestrial armed conflicts as part of the supportive infrastructure for military activities. Unfortunately, the risk that this changes is considerably growing, and it can no longer be excluded that (armed) force will become used in outer space, either directed towards Earth or within outer space itself. This raises serious issues in the legal context, where space law so far has been premised on the hope that armed conflicts in outer space could be avoided whereas the law of armed conflict was not required so far to deal with the use of force in outer space. For the same reason, there is hardly any relevant State practice that could provide guidance here. While both legal regimes can loosely claim to constitute leges speciales as compared to the lex generalis of general public international law, and hence are doctrinally superior to the latter, this does not solve the issue of hierarchy in application as between those two leges speciales. The current article presents a comprehensive effort to provide legal tools to determine where the law of outer space would overrule any incompatible law of armed conflict rules and vice versa, principally by constructing a matrix of prioritization. While too many different activities, events, scenarios, and developments could be envisaged for such a matrix to come up with easy and comprehensive answers, it nevertheless purports to provide initial guidance on how to address each particular possible activity, event, scenario, or development.

Weapon systems are becoming increasingly automated and arguably some autonomous military systems have been deployed for years. Recent advances in automated systems and the possibilities they portend have generated interest and anxiety within some militaries and defense ministries, and a movement of non-governmental activists seeking to ban fully autonomous weapons. In May 2014, the High Contracting Parties of the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) convened an extensive discussion of the legal and ethical issues that autonomous weapons raise, while recognizing that many of these problems lie at an uncertain point in the future. It is important that normative development regarding autonomous weapon systems head down a path that is coherent and practical. By "autonomous weapon systems," we mean systems "that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator." We draw this definition from a 2012 U.S. Department of Defense policy directive, which remains the most extensive public pronouncement by any State on how it intends to proceed with regard to research, development and deployment of autonomous weapon systems. This paper addresses several questions that are critical to charting such a path. First, are autonomous weapon systems different from other new weapon systems, and, if so, how? Second, to the extent they are different, can and should autonomous weapon systems be regulated within the framework of the existing law of armed conflict? If yes, how should States go about doing so? If not, what alternative regulatory approach is appropriate? We conclude that autonomous weapon systems have special features that pose risks and that create challenges in applying the existing law of armed conflict. Nevertheless, we conclude it is possible to adapt the existing framework to account for the features of autonomous weapons, and that the suggested alternative of prohibiting these systems outright is misguided. Instead, we propose a three-tiered process for regulating the development, deployment and use of autonomous systems.