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Veyor® is a trademark of Idea Works, Inc. It is a text analysis program that performs, either by itself or in combination with programs such as Qualrus® and Globalpoint®, not only word category counts, but also sentiment analysis. According to a newspaper article about a recent application to a campaign for the US Senate elections (Reed, 2010), the sentiment towards the candidates in blogs and newspapers as extracted by Globalpoint® predicted the outcome of the elections more accurately than a telephone survey. Candidates received positive or negative points based on what was being said about key issues in the race and were categorized under headings such as 'government,' 'economy,' 'personal' and subsets such as 'free market' and 'tax issues'.

Internal dispute, the crisis surrounding the war in Iraq, arguments concerning the financial perspectives for 2007-2013 and a double negative result of the referenda (in France and the Netherlands) concerning the European Constitution, mean a crisis for the EU. In the year and a half which have expired between 2005 and 2007, many plans have progressed slightly, but little have been concretized. In defense of Prime Minister Verhofstadt's "The United States of Europe", on socioeconomic policies, technological cooperation, unified justice, security policies, diplomacy, and a European army -- a plan that has not found its way to either the public or high political discussions. It is suggested to take it up with a limited number of member states, so that other countries will follow later. In general, the author reproaches European politicians lack of emotion: more open conflicts of Left against Right, large against small, swiftly and non-too-soft -- therein lies the nature of democracy, and therefore also the future of European politics. Figures, References. O. van Zijl

Ten years ago, now, the Eurozone began to shake on its foundations. This article traces the genesis of the crisis and the present state of affairs. As to the causes of the global financial crisis in 2008, I argue that contrary to common understanding, the financial crisis had its deeper causes in a decades old tendency towards crisis in the real economy, produced by the continuous overaccumulation of capital which can only return profits by undertaking speculative short-term investments (a phenomenon known as 'financialisation'). I then trace how the global financial crisis morphed into a crisis of public deficits and debt in 2010-2011, particularly in the Eurozone. Three factors are shown to be responsible: financialization, design faults in the European monetary union, and the neo-mercantilist strategy of especially Germany and the Netherlands. The paper next looks at the five main traits of the policy responses in the Eurozone: bailing out governments and banks through creating emergency funds; imposition of austerity and budget discipline for member state governments; attempting to create and complete a Eurozone banking union; subsequently the European Central Bank engaged on an unprecedented scale in 'quantitative easing'; and finally, institutional reform in an attempt to repair the most pressing design faults of the EMU. The paper concludes that the underlying structural factors leading up to the crisis have only been addressed incompletely: the overaccumulation of capital continues, the completion of the banking union is in an impasse, quantitative easing has mostly just intensified financialization by pushing up asset prizes, and institutional reform has taken the form of a fundamentally undemocratic attempt at monetary and political union by stealth. The broader legitimacy of the European project has been substantially undermined, and Europe is not in a better position than eight years ago in case of a new global crisis.

In Europe and especially in the euro existed between mid 2007 to late 2009 preserve vote on how the institutions of a sometimes fragile EU and the single currency managed to the global financial crisis defy. The crisis hit over from the United States, where the dangers of applied liberal and deregulated model of financial markets and inadequate governance were insufficiently recognized. European banks, but a few, behaved more than their American peers. Also banking supervision was generally effective, especially in countries like Italy, Spain and the small Cyprus. Through an innovative and fast answer to the European Central Bank had a leading role in tackling the crisis: the European legal framework for emergency loans was modified and cross-border coordination was performed. Crucial factor was that, in countries such as Belgium, Greece and Italy after, most EU and eurozone countries thanks to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the Treaty of Maastricht had their debt under control. The result was that most European countries have not been hit as hard by the recession and the United States. The Anglo-American capitalism performed moderately, while the European system had shown its resilience (for the first time). Adapted from the source document.

Dutch socioeconomic concertation has experienced some transformative changes in its modus operandi in recent years, which has given the 'Polder Model' a new lease on life for the time being. Building on an older tradition of sharing political space with civil society organizations, the recent liberal-social democratic government coalition, with Mark Rutte at the helm (2012-2017), has been able to enact a surprisingly successful structural reform agenda in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Governing in times of significant economic, social and political uncertainty, it is no mean feat that the Rutte II administration – de facto a minority government – is the first Dutch coalition to complete its term since the administration under Wim Kok (1994-1998). After the foundational Social Accord (the so-called Mondriaan Akkoord) in April 2013, a series of reform agreements were reached in the policy areas of education, housing, healthcare, industrial and energy policy. For each of these more meso-level accords, a variety of civil society organizations participated that were beyond the traditional social partners of business and labor. Over time these seemingly ad hoc, open and non-hierarchical agreements materialized in a trajectory of cumulatively transformative policy change. The political tactic of the Rutte II government stands out in comparison with the halcyon Dutch miracle era of the Polder Model in the 1980s and 1990. We explain the new modes of Dutch socioeconomic policy concertation and its political tactic as a kind of rallying around existing institutional arrangements to bring the contested political and social center together behind a major adjustment strategy, including retrenchment, compensatory social meas­ures and investments, when reform output and outcomes are fundamentally uncertain. Whether the new Polder Model will prove robust remains an open question. Recently, new multiple party covenants were negotiated in the textile and banking industry. Meanwhile a number of issues concerning regional labor market regulation and work-life balance reconciliation have yet to be resolved.

Beleggingsondernemingen en gereglementeerde markten worden sinds 1 november 2007op indringende wijze gereguleerd door de Europese Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), de MiFID-uitvoeringsrichtlijn en de MiFID-uitvoeringsverordening (MiFID-regime). Per 3 januari 2017 - een kleine tien jaar later - wordt het MiFID-regime vervangen door MiFID II, bestaande uit onder meer een richtlijn (MiFID II), de Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR) en een indrukwekkende hoeveelheid uitvoeringsmaatregelen. MiFID mag dan de reputatie hebben streng te zijn, MiFID II/MiFIR trekt de teugels nog verder aan. De aanleiding hiervoor laat zich raden: de financiële crisis heeft lacunes blootgelegd in de beleggersbescherming en tekortkomingen in de werking en transparantie van financiële markten. Het MiFID II/MiFIR regime zal een belangrijke impact hebben op de financiële sector. Dit preadvies 2015 uitgebracht voor de Vereniging voor Financieel Recht beoogt de belangrijkste wijzigingen en vernieuwingen die MiFID II meebrengt, te bespreken

Poverty in Antwerp, Belgium, is discussed from a historical perspective, noting that the worst misery began to disappear in the latter 19th century, & indigence virtually disappeared after the establishment of social care agencies after WWI. After WWII, the ongoing need for relief agencies was quickly recognized; the Openbaar Centrum voor Maatschappelijk Welzijn ([OCMW] Public Center for Social Welfare), established in 1976, is currently one of the main social relief agencies in Flanders. Here, quantitative data concerning its clients are provided, noting that, since 1994/95, relative & absolute records for the number of people in need of financial & medical aid have been broken. This crisis is related to the increasing number of single-parent families, political refugees, drug addicts, & elderly in the inner city. The need for preventive policies is addressed, asserting that only integrated development projects can improve matters for all risk groups. 6 Tables. Adapted from the source document.

In spite of an approval of the financial perspectives 2007-2013 and the economic boom of the euro zone, "crisis" has not left the EU. It is installed in the institutions, but also and especially it has infected the spirits of European citizens. An article that treats the pros, cons and influences of the EU enlargement from 15 to 25 states, discussing the attitudes of single member states regarding for example immigration, the treatment of files and common questions, pluralistic votes that render difficult processes now that the Rhine-model (a BENELUX and Franco-German alliance) no longer has the upper hand. Furthermore is discussed European Parliament and Justice Court, both influenced in their functioning by the enlargement of the EU. Belgium's future role lies in seeking alliances with same-spirited member states, and to fill in the EU's delivery-gap regarding citizen demands for more justice, freedom and security, and a more uniform Europe as regards energy and foreign policy. References. O. van Zijl