Suchergebnisse

Based on newly available memoirs and previously unexplored policy speeches by insiders, this article conducts a political analysis of the Chinese Communist Party's decision to radically expand college enrollment in June 1999. I argue that the decision exemplifies a "guerrilla-style approach" to policy-making. From late March to early June of 1999 when the radical expansion policy was formulated and legitimated, the top leadership ignored opposition from the Ministry of Education (MOE), overturned established policies and assumed de facto control over MOE bureaucratic power. This abrupt, forceful, disruptive and non-professional policy intervention, which aimed to ensure regime survival in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, was antithetical to regularized educational policy-making in post-Mao China. (China J/GIGA)

The Great Recession after 2008 did not turn out to be as deep and severe as the Great Depression of the 1930s. According to the European Commission, this positive result is due to the fact that economic policymakers around the world learnt their lessons from the Great Depression in stabilizing their financial systems and, moreover, that particularly the European Union and its economic governance system has become a shelter against negative external shocks in coordinating stabilization policies to maintain aggregate demand. This paper argues that the claim of the European Commission needs some qualifications: on the one hand, the lessons have not been applied appropriately in all EU and, particularly, Eurozone Member States. This is, on the other hand, not merely the result of mismanagement of individual governments but the systematic outcome of an ineffective and even counterproductive European economic governance system. Although, in the wake of the Euro Crisis some crisis control and emergency measures have been established, crisis resolution has failed as the core of the inefficient governance system - the European Stability and Growth Pact (ESGP) - has not been reformed adequately.

The economic crisis in Asia is not an "Asian" crisis. The conditions that precipitated it are by no means unique to the region. They have their own roots in badly managed government liberalization of the financial sector, excessive borrowing and lending by private industry, and the inability and unwillingness of key players - including governments - to accurately assess risk. The resulting collapse of domestic asset value (real estate, stock market prices) and currencies was a phenomenon already seen in the early 1990s in Europe and Latin America, and now Asia. With the cost of bailout packages ballooning, everyone has a stake in improving crisis prevention and response. Governments, international organizations, and domestic banks must coordinate efforts that should include: easier access to information in the financial industry, increased government oversight of private institutions, more flexibility in exchange rates, and greater control by public authorities over short-term flow of capital among countries. Finally, private companies that take excessive risk in financial markets should be forced to bear the cost of their own actions.

Economic analysis, risk regulation, and the dynamics of policy regret / Lori S. Bennear -- Revised risk assessments and the insurance industry / Carolyn Kousky -- Understanding public risk perception and responses to changes in perceived risk / Elke U. Weber -- Focusing events, risk, and regulation / Thomas A. Birkland and Megan K. Warnement -- The story of risk : how narratives shape risk communication, perception and policy / Frederick W. Mayer -- From Santa Barbara to the Exxon-Valdez : policy learning and the emergence of a new regime for managing oil spill risk / Marc Allen Eisner -- The Nordic model of offshore oil regulation : managing crises through a proactive regulator / Ole Andreas Engen and Preben H. Lindoe -- Reform in real time : evaluating reorganization as a response to the gulf oil spill / Christopher Carrigan -- Recalibrating risks of nuclear power : reactions to Tthree-Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima / Elisabeth Pate-Cornell -- Nuclear accidents and policy responses in Europe : comparing the cases of France and Germany / Kristian Krieger, Ortwin Renn, M Brooke Rogers, & Ragnar Lofstedt -- Public attitudes and institutional changes in Japan following nuclear accidents / Atsuo Kishimoto -- Regulatory responses to the financial crises of the Great Depression : Britain, France and the United States / Youssef Cassis -- Financial decommodification : risk and the politics of valuation in U.S. banks / Bruce G. Carruthers -- Euro are risk (mis)management / Barry Eichengreen -- The regulatory responses to the global financial crisis : some uncomfortable questions / Stijn Claessens and Laura Kodres -- Institutional mechanisms for investigating the regulatory implications of a major crisis : the commission of inquiry and the safety board / Edward J. Balleisen, Lori Bennear, David Cheang, Jonathon Free, Megan Hayes, Emily Pechar, and A. Catherine Preston -- Recalibrating risk : crises, learning, and regulatory change / Edward Balleisen, Lori Bennear, Kimberly Krawiec & Jonathan Wiener

The novelty of this paper is the comparative analysis of the Romanian and Icelandic banking systems. The study results reveal that despite the fact that Romania and Iceland are two different worlds, there are several similarities between the banking systems of these countries. They include a late development of banking systems, foreigners contributing a great deal to the development of the banking systems in the early stage of evolution. After the Second World War until the 1990s specialized banks operated in both countries. The banking systems of both countries prior to the 1990s were dominated by politics. Liberalization of banking and capital occurred both in Romania and Iceland after 1990; the bank privatization process took place during a similar period (1999-2006, Romania; 1998-2002, Iceland). Before privatization, banks in both countries lacked experience in a new banking "arena". The global financial crisis greatly affected the two banking systems. Despite similarities, the evolution of the two banking systems was also marked by differences, notably the ownership origin of banks after privatization (foreign dominance in Romania; domestic owners in Iceland) and different business models developed by banks in the pre-crisis period.

"Now is the time to redirect your focus from short-term gain to long-term growthAlfred Rappaport, who first introduced the principles and practical application of "shareholder value" in his groundbreaking 1986 classic Creating Shareholder Value, reiterated the basic message in his 2006 Harvard Business Review article: Focusing on Wall Street quarterly earnings expectations rather than on creating long-term value is an invitation to disaster. Rappaport shows how deeply flawed short-term performance incentives for corporate and investment managers were an essential cause of the recent global financial crisis. In Saving Capitalism from Short-Termism, Rappaport examines the causes and consequences of "short-termism" and offers specific recommendations for how publicly traded companies and the investment management community can overcome it. Whether you're a corporate manager, money manager, public policymaker, business-school student, or simply concerned about your financial future, Saving Capitalism from Short-Termism provides valuable insights and practical ideas to change the course of your organization --and contribute to a healthier economy that benefits all"--Provided by publisher

This paper analyses the impact of financial crises on the Sustainable Development Goal of eradicating poverty. To do so, we develop an adjusted Multidimensional Poverty Framework (MPF) that includes 15 indicators that span across key poverty aspects related to income, basic needs, health, education and the environment. We then use an econometric model that allows us to examine the impact of financial crises on these indicators in 150 countries over the period 1980–2015. Our analysis produces new estimates on the impact of financial crises on poverty's multiple social, economic and environmental aspects and equally important captures dynamic linkages between these aspects. Thus, we offer a better understanding of the potential impact of current debt dynamics on Multidimensional Poverty and demonstrate the need to move beyond the boundaries of SDG1, if we are to meet the target of eradicating poverty. Our results indicate that the current financial distress experienced by many low-income countries may reverse the progress that has been made hitherto in reducing poverty. We find that financial crises are associated with an approximately 10% increase of extreme poor in low-income countries. The impact is even stronger in some other poverty aspects. For instance, crises are associated with an average decrease of government spending in education by 17.72% in low-income countries. The dynamic linkages between most of the Multidimensional Poverty indicators, warn of a negative domino effect on a number of SDGs related to poverty, if there is a financial crisis shock. To pre-empt such a domino effect, the specific SDG target 17.4 on attaining long-term debt sustainability through coordinated policies plays a key role and requires urgent attention by the international community.

This study improves on the methodology for calculating the financial stress index (FSI) for Ukraine by introducing time-varying correlation into the aggregation of 5 sub-indices (representing the banking sector, households, the corporate sector, government securities, and the foreign exchange (FX) market). The index consists of 20 indicators selected from an initial list of 47 potential candidates. To check the performance of the indicators, sub-indices, and index, we use area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC) and logit tests. Each sub-index is assigned a weight that reflects the impact of each market on the financial system. This new FSI peaks during periods of crisis that are in line with the consensus of financial experts and performs better than the previous FSI, which makes it more attractive for policy decisions. In particular, the new FSI can be used as a monitoring tool for the macroprudential policy of the National Bank of Ukraine.