Liberal states and fiscal contracts
In: Routledge advances in international political economy
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In: Routledge advances in international political economy
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 57, Heft 4, S. 530-567
ISSN: 0043-8871
Using data from approximately ninety countries, the author shows that the more a state taxes the rich as a percentage of GDP, the more it protects property rights; and the more it taxes the poor, the more it provides basic public services. There is no evidence that states gouge the rich to benefit the poor or vice versa, contrary to state-capture theories. Nor is there any evidence that taxes and spending are unrelated, contrary to state-autonomy models. Instead, states operate much like fiscal contracts, with groups getting what they pay for. (World Politics / SWP)
World Affairs Online
In: Peace research abstracts journal, Band 43, Heft 6, S. 530
ISSN: 0031-3599
In: Asian perspective, Band 28, Heft 2, S. 171-204
ISSN: 0258-9184
World Affairs Online
In: Discussion Paper des Deutschen Instituts für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 2020, 20
World Affairs Online
In: African affairs: the journal of the Royal African Society, Band 119, Heft 475, S. 177-202
ISSN: 0001-9909
World Affairs Online
In: Congressional quarterly weekly report, Band 29, S. 1923 : table
ISSN: 0010-5910, 1521-5997
In: Almanac of sea power, Band 56, Heft 3
ISSN: 0736-3559, 0199-1337
In: Public choice, Band 120, Heft 1-2, S. 29-39
ISSN: 0048-5829
The purpose of this paper is to show that the linear penalization to inflation found in Walsh (1995) is not the government's optimal choice when the fixed part of the transfer scheme is any given constant & the payment to the central bank represents a cost for the government. 1 Figure, 1 Appendix, 15 References. Adapted from the source document.
In: Journal of contemporary studies: JCS, Band 5, Heft 2, S. 3-19
ISSN: 0272-7595