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Tax systems worldwide face far-reaching transformations through the implementation of digital technologies. A growing body of academic literature addresses these transformations and explores how digitalisation is affecting the operations and efficiency of revenue agencies, and taxpayer compliance. However, the literature largely ignores the diversified body of research regarding the characteristics, dynamics and determinants of the "fiscal contract". This term describes an implicit agreement between state and both citizen and business taxpayers that associates individual tax compliance and the distribution of the tax burden within a society with public service delivery and access to political decision-making. Fiscal contract theory helps us to understand that taxation is primarily a political - not a technical - issue. But what happens if some technologies cause profound power shifts in the relationship between revenue authorities and taxpayers? Will they trigger the emergence of broad-based, stable fiscal contracts, or might tax system digitalisation increase exclusion and decrease stability? What drives these changes? How do digital technologies in the tax systems of developing countries affect their fiscal contracts? This paper seeks to lay the conceptual groundwork at the intersection of two dynamic academic debates. Based on a thorough review of the literature, it proposes a research framework that combines economic, public management and political science perspectives in order to generate knowledge about institutional, attitudinal and behavioural responses to tax system digitalisation.

The petroleum fiscal system for a country is essentially the taxation structure, including royalty payments, that has been established by legislation. More broadly, the fiscal system includes all aspects of the contractual and taxation framework that governs the relationship between the host government and an international oil company. Worldwide, there are many different fiscal systems with different taxation and contractual terms. These vary from country to country and some countries use more than one system. Countries, for example, may offer concessionary system arrangements or service and production sharing agreements. Whichever system prevails, the issue for an oil company is how it can recover costs expended and how will the profit be divided. This depends upon tax regulations and the principles of the economics of the life of a field. The focus of this book is on the mechanics of the various kinds of fiscal systems and the factors that drive exploration and development economics. The emphasis is on practical aspects of petroleum taxation and industry/government relationships. There is also fertile ground for considering the philosophy of petroleum taxation which has changed the industry. Legal and operational aspects of contract/fiscal terms are also examined to provide a foundation in the dynamics of international negotiations. Both industry and government viewpoints are addressed in this book since a complete grasp of the subject requires an understanding of the aims and concerns of both sides. There are few things more discouraging for a government?s national oil company than an unsuccessful licensing round. Yet prolonged, inconclusive negotiations can be equally frustrating for oil companies. This book has been written for those interested in petroleum taxation and international negotiations, and the way to carry out successful exploration and development projects. Much of the subject has evolved years ago whilst some aspects of taxation are timeless. Examples are included to give the reader a wide perspective about the implementation of fiscal systems.

This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast with a fiefdom form of governance, in which the decision-making process is decentralized. An important insight is that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. Delegation functions well when there are few, or no, ideological differences among government parties, whereas contracts are effective when there are many such differences. Empirically, delegation and contract states perform better than fiefdom states if they match the underlying political system. Additional chapters consider why countries have the fiscal institutions that they do, fiscal governance in Central and Eastern Europe, and the role of such institutions in the European Union

Cover -- CONTENTS -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. STYLIZED FACTS -- A. Global Trends in PPPs -- B. Country-level Determinants of Contractual Disputes -- C. Contract Design and Fiscal Institutions -- III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK -- A. Procurement -- B. Investment Decision -- C. Conditions for Outbreak of Disputes -- IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY -- A. Data and Sample -- B. Hazard Estimation -- C. Bias Adjustment using the Propensity Score Matching -- V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS -- A. Determinants of Contract Selection -- B. Hazard Regression -- C. Robustness Checks in Alternative Specifications -- D. Role of Public Financial Management -- VI. CONCLUSIONS -- FIGURES -- 1. Overall Trend of PPP Investments -- 2. Evolution of Dispute Risk -- 3. Change in Government Financial Commitment -- 4. Sectoral Distribution of Each Instruments -- 5. Change in Hazard Ratio by Contract Types -- 6. Distribution of the Quality Scores on Fiscal Institutions -- TABLES -- 1. Determinants of Government's Financial Commitment -- 2. Parametric Hazard Regressions -- 3. Effect of the Quality of Fiscal Institutions -- References -- TECHNICAL ANNEX -- A. Country Groupings -- B. Map -- C. Summary Statistics -- D. Balancing Test of PSM -- E. Derivation of the Shadow Price -- F. Role of PPP Investment Management in case of Concessions.

"Tax and taxation are conventionally understood as the embodiment of social contract. This ground-breaking collection of essays challenges this truism, examining what tax might tell us about the limits of social-contract thinking. The contributors shed light on contemporary fiscal structures and public debates about the moralities, practices, and imaginaries of tax systems, using tax to explore the nature of citizenship, personal freedom, and moral and economic value. Their ethnographically grounded accounts show how taxation may be influenced by spaces of fiscal sovereignty that exist outside or alongside the state, taking various forms, from alternative religious communities to economic collectives."

The combination of discretionary montetary policy, labor-market distortions and nominal wage rigidity yields an inflation bias as monetary policy tries to exploit nominal wage contracts to address labor-market distortions. Although an inflation target eliminates this inflation bias, it creates a conflict between monetary policy and discretionary fiscal policy if fiscal policy is set at a higher frequency than nominal wages are. To avoid the associated excessive accumulation of public debt, ceilings on public debt are called for. If countries differ substantially in terms of structural distortions or economic shocks, uniform debt ceilings must be complemented by country-specific debt targets in order to prevent decentralised fiscal authorities from employing debt policy strategically.

Intro -- GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS AND SMALL MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESSES: CHALLENGES AND ASSISTANCE -- GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS AND SMALL MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESSES: CHALLENGES AND ASSISTANCE -- Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1: GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING: FEDERAL EFFORTS TO ASSIST SMALL MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESSES -- ABBREVIATIONS -- WHY GAO DID THIS STUDY -- WHAT GAO FOUND -- BACKGROUND -- Federal Goals for Contracting with Small Businesses -- Federal Agency Contracting Assistance for Small Businesses -- AGENCIES AND ADVOCACY GROUPS IDENTIFIED VARIOUS CONTRACTING CHALLENGES THAT MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESSES MAY FACE -- Agency and Advocacy Group Officials Differed in Their Opinions on Contracting Challenges That Minority-Owned Businesses May Face -- Performance History -- Knowledge of the Federal Contracting Process -- Contract Bundling -- Lack of Access to Contracting Officials -- Lack of Monitoring of Subcontracting Plans -- Lack of Access to Capital and Other Resources -- Linguistic and Cultural Barriers -- Agency Outreach Efforts Help Address Some Challenges Facing Small and Minority-Owned Businesses -- FEDERAL AGENCIES COLLECT SOME INFORMATION ON CONTRACTING ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO MINORITYOWNED BUSINESSES -- AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION -- APPENDIX I: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY -- APPENDIX II: PERCENTAGE OF OBLIGATED FUNDS FOR CONTRACTS TO SOCIOECONOMIC CATEGORIES BY MINORITY GROUP, FISCAL YEAR 2011 -- APPENDIX III: SELECTED FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING PROGRAMS, RESOURCES, AND OUTREACH ACTIVITIES -- APPENDIX IV: POTENTIAL APPLICABILITY OF THE LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENCY EXECUTIVE ORDER TO FEDERAL CONTRACTING -- End Notes -- End Notes for Appendix I

The New Fiscal Sociology: Taxation in Comparative and Historical Perspective demonstrates that the study of taxation can illuminate fundamental dynamics of modern societies. The sixteen essays in this collection offer a state-of-the-art survey of the new fiscal sociology that is emerging at the intersection of sociology, history, political science, and law. The contributors include some of the foremost comparative historical scholars in these disciplines and others. They approach the institution of taxation as a window onto the changing social contract. Their chapters address the social and historical sources of tax policy, the problem of how taxes persist, and the social and cultural consequences of taxation. They trace fundamental connections between tax institutions and macrohistorical phenomena - wars, shifting racial boundaries, religious traditions, gender regimes, labor systems, and more

This book examines the politics of revenue bargaining in Africa in a time when attention to domestic revenue mobilisation has expanded immensely. Measures to increase taxes and other revenues can -but do not always- lead to a process of bargaining, where revenue providers negotiate for some kind of a return. This book offers in-depth analyses of micro-instances of revenue bargaining across five African countries: Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, and Uganda. All case studies draw on a common theoretical framework combining the fiscal contract theory with the political settlement approach, which enables a systematic exploration into what triggers revenue bargaining; how these processes unfold; and finally, if and when they reach an agreement (whether a fiscal contract or not). From the empirically rich case narratives emerges a story of how power and initial bargaining position influence not only whether bargaining emerges in the first place, but also the processes and their outcomes. Less resourceful taxpayers are in a more difficult position to raise their voice, but in some cases even these groups manage to ally with other civil society groups to protest against tax reforms they perceive as unfair. Indirect taxes such as VAT often trigger protests, and so do sudden changes in tax practices. Revenue providers rarely call for improved services in return for paying tax, which would be expected to nurture the foundation for a fiscal social contract. Instead, revenue providers are more likely to negotiate for tax reductions, implying that governments' effort to increase revenue is impeded. We do find many instances of state-society reciprocity when ruling elites try to be responsive to revenue providers' demands. Hence, this book gives insight into the nature and dynamics not only of revenue bargaining but of policy-making in general as well as the implications hereof for state-society reciprocity in Africa.

This volume offers in-depth analyses of micro-instances of revenue bargaining across five African countries. The case studies all draw on a common theoretical framework combining the fiscal contract theory with the political settlement approach, which enables a systematic exploration into what triggers revenue bargaining.

Countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are entering the second decade of political transformation and economic reform. The first decade involved macroeconomic stabilization, privatization, and development of the basic institutional infrastructure of a market economy. The new policy challenges center on the nature of the social contract between citizens and their governments. These challenges include identifying the appropriate boundaries between the obligations of the public sector and the responsibilities of individual citizens, the range of public goods the government should supply, and who should pay for and benefit from their provision. The essays in this volume, first published in 2001, focus on two interrelated issues: the making of fiscal policy and the provision of citizens' welfare, particularly regarding pensions and health care. The essays emphasize that there is no single model of a market economy; rather, governments and publics face a range of options for restructuring the socialist welfare state