Suchergebnisse

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Federal interagency contract service programs are being used in a wide variety of situations, from those in which a single agency provides limited contracting assistance to an approach in which the provider agency's contracting officer handles all aspects of the procurement. This increased use of interagency contracts is a result of reforms and legislation passed in the 1990s, allowing agencies to streamline the acquisition process, operate more like businesses, and offer increasing numbers of services to other agencies. Most of the contract service programs GAO reviewed reported an excess of revenues over costs in at least one year between fiscal years 1999 and 2001. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance directs agencies with governmentwide acquisition contracts (GWAC) or franchise fund programs to account for and recover fully allocated actual costs and to report on their financial results. Agencies are to identify all direct and indirect costs and charge fees to ordering agencies based on these costs. However, some GWAC programs have not identified or accurately reported the full cost of providing interagency contract services. OMB's guidance further directs that agencies return GWAC earnings to the miscellaneous receipts account of the U.S. Treasury's General Fund. However, this guidance conflicts with the operations of agencies' revolving funds, which were established by statutes that allow retention of excess revenues. The Federal Supply Schedules program has generated hefty earnings, largely because of the rapid growth of information technology sales. Rather than adjust the fee, however, the General Services Administration has used the earnings primarily to support its stock and fleet programs. However, the significant amount of earnings means that Federal Supply Schedules program customers are being consistently overcharged for the contract services they are buying."

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "DOE is the largest civilian-contracting agency in the federal government, and relies primarily on contractors to operate its sites and carry out its diverse missions. For fiscal year 2003, DOE will spend about 90 percent of its total annual budget, or $19.8 billion, on contracts, including $9.4 billion to operate 16 of its research laboratories (called federally funded research and development centers). Since 1990, GAO has identified DOE's contract management as high-risk for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. In 1994, DOE began reforming its contracting practices to, among other things, improve contractor performance and accountability. As part of that effort, DOE has at times used competition in awarding contracts to manage and operate its research laboratories. In September 2002, GAO reported on the status of contract reform efforts in DOE. (Contract Reform: DOE Has Made Progress, but Actions Needed to Ensure Initiatives Have Improved Results) (Sep. 2002, GAO-02-798) This testimony discusses some of the findings in that report. GAO was asked to testify on DOE's rationale for deciding whether to compete a laboratory research contract, the extent to which DOE has competed these contracts, and the role of competition and other mechanisms in improving contractor performance."

How does emigration affect tax preferences in migrant-sending countries? Experiencing public services in a high tax-capacity destination may reduce support for tax increases by throwing fiscal failure at home into stark relief (the socialization hypothesis). Alternatively, migrants' exclusion from certain public services may increase desire to fund these services in migrant origin countries (the exclusion hypothesis). We test these competing hypotheses with an online survey experiment in Mexico and explore variation in US healthcare access on fiscal policy preferences of migrant households. Migrant households, especially those with returned migrant members, are more supportive of taxation when tax revenue is earmarked for healthcare, a service to which many Mexican immigrants in the US lack access. It is migrants' exclusion from, rather than their socialization into, the fiscal contract in destination countries that influences fiscal policy preferences in their countries of origin.

This paper uses a new data set on budgetary institutions in Europe to examine the impact of fiscal rules and budget procedures in EU countries on public finances. It briefly describes the main pattern of budgetary institutions and their determinants across the EU 15 member states. Empirical evidence for the time period 1985-2004 suggests that the centralisation of budgeting procedures restrains public debt. In countries with one-party governments or coalition governments where parties are closely aligned and where political competition among them is low, this is achieved by the delegation of decision-making power to the minister of finance. Fiscal contracts that require countries to set multi-year targets and that reinforce those targets increase fiscal discipline in countries with ideologically dispersed coalitions and where parties regularly compete against each other.

Cover -- CONTENTS -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. STYLIZED FACTS -- A. Global Trends in PPPs -- B. Country-level Determinants of Contractual Disputes -- C. Contract Design and Fiscal Institutions -- III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK -- A. Procurement -- B. Investment Decision -- C. Conditions for Outbreak of Disputes -- IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY -- A. Data and Sample -- B. Hazard Estimation -- C. Bias Adjustment using the Propensity Score Matching -- V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS -- A. Determinants of Contract Selection -- B. Hazard Regression -- C. Robustness Checks in Alternative Specifications -- D. Role of Public Financial Management -- VI. CONCLUSIONS -- FIGURES -- 1. Overall Trend of PPP Investments -- 2. Evolution of Dispute Risk -- 3. Change in Government Financial Commitment -- 4. Sectoral Distribution of Each Instruments -- 5. Change in Hazard Ratio by Contract Types -- 6. Distribution of the Quality Scores on Fiscal Institutions -- TABLES -- 1. Determinants of Government's Financial Commitment -- 2. Parametric Hazard Regressions -- 3. Effect of the Quality of Fiscal Institutions -- References -- TECHNICAL ANNEX -- A. Country Groupings -- B. Map -- C. Summary Statistics -- D. Balancing Test of PSM -- E. Derivation of the Shadow Price -- F. Role of PPP Investment Management in case of Concessions.

The purpose with this work is to evaluate if there is an argument in favor of "central banking" that cannot be put aside on either economic or moral ground. In order to do such an inquiry, it will be discussed philosophically whether the institutions of private property and freedom of contract in general and good money in particular are of a higher value than national defense, since that is the last standing justification for the monetary prerogatives of government analyzed; also, we will analyze if there are other ways to provide funds for national defense less prone to create problems of collective action than interventionism in money and banking. ; El propósito de este trabajo es evaluar si hay un argumento a favor de la "banca central" que no se pueda aislar de los terrenos económicos y morales. Para realizar esta investigación, se discutirá de manera filosófica si las instituciones privadas con libertad para contratar y buenas entradas tienen un mayor valor al de la defensa nacional puesto que es la última justificación vigente para las prerrogativas económicas analizadas por el gobierno. De igual forma, analizaremos si hay otras formas de proveer fondos para la defensa nacional menos propensas a crear problemas de acción colectiva que el intervencionismo en el dinero y la banca. ; Le but de ce travail est d'évaluer s'il existe un argument en faveur de la banque centrale qui ne peut pas être mis de côté ou comme un autre motif économique ou moral. Pour faire une telle enquête, il sera discuté philosophiquement si les institutions de la propriété privée et la liberté contractuelle en argent général et bonne en particulier, sont d'une valeur supérieure à la défense nationale, étant donné que c'est la dernière justification de longue date pour les prérogatives monétaires du gouvernement analysé; aussi, nous analysons si il ya d'autres façons de fournir des fonds pour la défense nationale moins enclins à créer des problèmes d'action collective que l'interventionnisme de l'argent et des banques. ; O propósito deste trabalho é avaliar se há um argumento a favor do "banco central" que não possa isolar-se dos terrenos econômicos e morais. Para realizar esta pesquisa, discutirar-se-á de maneira filosófica se as instituições privadas com liberdade para contratar e boas entradas têm um maior valor ao da defesa nacional posto que é a última justificação vigente para as prerrogativas econômicas analisadas pelo governo. De igual forma, analisaremos se existem outras formas de prover fundos para a defesa nacional menos propensas a criar problemas de ação coletiva que o intervencionismo no dinheiro e no banco.

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "According to information in the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), in fiscal year 2001, small businesses received approximately 23 percent of federal contract dollars awarded. However, concerns have been raised that large companies are receiving federal contracts intended for small businesses."

AbstractThis paper considers the effects of fiscal governance in Central and East European countries 1998–2008. The first part makes predictions about which form of fiscal governance fits which form of government. Under multi-party coalition governments, fiscal contracts where governments make political commitments to multi-annual fiscal plans work well. In countries where two political blocks face off against one another, delegation based around a strong finance ministry should be most effective. The second part examines electoral and party systems, which affect the form of government in place. The third part documents norms, rules, and institutions in place. The final section considers the joint effects of fiscal governance on fiscal outcomes. On balance, the underlying political climate is crucial for determining what types of fiscal norms, institutions, and rules function best. The more countries diverge from their expected form of fiscal governance, the greater the increase in a country's debt burden.

In 1992, both the national and provincial governments signed the Federal Fiscal Pact I (the first in a series of pacts that redefined the fiscal contract and redesigned the distribution system of the fix competency between both governmental levels). The outcomes of this agreement (of as successive agreements signed), have not satisfied the generated expectations, especially to the subnational levels, whose fiscal situation has worsened since then. In the present work we will attempt to explain what variables were involved into the negotiation processes leading to the sign of the Pact and what resources were put into play by the actors involved, focusing the analysis into the institutional setting within which intergovernmental relations develop between both national and subnational levels and by considering the actors involved. ; En 1992 el gobierno nacional y los gobiernos provinciales firmaron el Pacto Fiscal Federal I (el primero de una serie de pactos que redefinieron el contrato fiscal y remodelaron el sistema de distribución de competencias tributarias entre ambos niveles de gobierno). El resultado de este acuerdo (como el de los sucesivos acuerdos firmados) no satisfizo las expectativas generadas, especialmente para los niveles subnacionales, quienes vieron su situación financiera agravaba partir de entonces. En el presente trabajo intentaremos explicar qué variables intervinieron en los procesos de negociación previos a la firma del Pacto y qué recursos fueron puestos en juego por los actores intervinientes, focalizando nuestro análisis en el marco institucional dentro del cual se desenvuelven las relaciones intergubernamentales (RIG) y en la constelación de actores intervinientes.

The purpose of this paper is to show that the linear penalization to inflation found in Walsh (1995) is not the government's optimal choice when the fixed part of the transfer scheme is any given constant & the payment to the central bank represents a cost for the government. 1 Figure, 1 Appendix, 15 References. Adapted from the source document.

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "GAO has reported that the Department of Defense's (DOD) inability to accurately account for and report on disbursements is a long-term, major problem. GAO was requested to determine (1) the magnitude of the adjustments and related costs in fiscal year 2002, (2) why contracts, including payment terms, are so complex, (3) the key factors that caused Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Columbus to make payment adjustments, and (4) what steps DOD is taking to address the payment allocation problems."

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