Foreign exchange restrictions: a comparative survey
In: Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law, Band 21, S. 54-61
471622 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law, Band 21, S. 54-61
In: ICSID review: foreign investment law journal, Band 9, Heft 2, S. 165-182
ISSN: 2049-1999
SSRN
Working paper
In: Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law, Band 21, S. 75-82
World Affairs Online
In the study of the current legislation, including Federal law "On currency regulation andcurrency control", it is established that the category of "monetary operation" was not disclosedby the legislator but only contains a closed list of operations, which are recognised as currencyones. At the first glance, the monetary operation is an ordinary civil transaction. Indeed, in thecourse of the transaction there is a transfer of title to currency values, and in the case of non –residents on domestic securities. In addition, in certain civil law relations in the exchange values,and in the case of non-residents and currency of the Russian Federation internal securitiescan serve as a means and form of payment. The author rightly refutes the premise and draws aconclusion about the peculiarities of foreign exchange transactions. ; В результате проведенного исследования действующего законодательства, в том числе Федерального закона «О валютном регулировании и валютном контроле», установлено, что категория «валютная операция» законодателем не раскрыта, а лишь содержит закрытый перечень операций, которые признаются валютными. На первый взгляд, валютная операция – это обычная гражданско-правовая сделка. Действительно, в ходе ее совершения происходит переход права собственности на валютные ценности, а в случае с нерезидентами – на внутренние ценные бумаги. Кроме того, в тех или иных гражданско-правовых отношениях валютные ценности, а в случае с нерезидентами и валюта РФ, и внутренние ценные бумаги, могут служить средством и формой расчетов. Автор вполне обоснованно опровергает данный посыл и делает вывод об особенностях валютных операций.
BASE
In: BOFIT Discussion Paper No. 28/2012
SSRN
Working paper
In: International Affairs, Band 12, S. 504-517
In: IMF Working Paper, S. 1-36
SSRN
In: Economica, Band 20, Heft 77, S. 94
This dissertation consists of three essays on currency competition, institutional restrictions and exchange rates. When faced with currency competition, a country's government has two tools at its disposal: reduce the level of inflation or place institutional barriers to the use of foreign currency. In the first chapter, I propose a two-country, two-currency New Monetarist model to study currency competition. I model institutional barriers as a `tax' on the real value of foreign currency holdings which tends to lower a currency's value abroad than at home. This tax-induced asymmetric valuation of currencies leads to a set of rich and unique equilibrium currency regimes thus overcoming the multiplicity of equilibrium often noticed in models of currency competition. In the second chapter, I examine whether capital controls as well as restrictions on financial current account in certain emerging market economies had any effect in providing buoyancy to its domestic currency. Using a country-by-country SVAR approach for five emerging market economies -- Chile, Colombia, India, Malaysia and Indonesia for the time period of 1970-2013 and then using a panel VAR approach, I find that there is a role for such restrictions in affecting the nominal exchange rate. However, such effects are limited to the short-run and their effectiveness vary by country. In the third chapter, I propose a tractable model of the black market for currencies where the black market premium on foreign currency arises endogenously and depends on the relative inflation rates of domestic and foreign currencies. Using a New Monetarist framework, I offer a plausible explanation as to why this association could be sometimes positive and sometimes negative. The black market is modeled as a market that can be used by buyers to readjust their portfolio when access to the official market is infrequent and after the realization of a shock that forces them to either consume local or foreign goods. After allowing for currency substitution by agents, in the stationary monetary equilibrium the rate of black market premium could be decreasing in the domestic inflation rate if agents are not very risk averse. Else, the black market premium is increasing in domestic inflation.
BASE
Blog: Cato at Liberty
In short, we have a textbook situation where a prohibition on labor supply causes shortages, black markets, and losses for both business and labor.
World Affairs Online