Although it is positive that it is still able to connect different fragments, in terms of content it is negative that during the pre-election period it had comparatively little amount of information on election campaign, parties and candidates. However, a very popular media outlet competing with television was the biggest internet news portal, which had a huge amount of information on elections. The article also includes analysis of agenda fragmentation in the audience which revealed the tendency of internet users to have a more fragmented agenda than the part of the audience that doesn't use the internet. However, in comparison to similar Norwegian data on agenda fragmentation, the agenda of the Lithuanian audience could not be regarded as fragmented. In the future, the analysis of audience fragmentation will be dependent on the collection of comparable data, since it would provide data for comparison and assessing the trends of fragmentation in time. These data would also help to solve some methodological issues that are also discussed in the article, like choice of criteria for assessment and having a point of comparison.
Although it is positive that it is still able to connect different fragments, in terms of content it is negative that during the pre-election period it had comparatively little amount of information on election campaign, parties and candidates. However, a very popular media outlet competing with television was the biggest internet news portal, which had a huge amount of information on elections. The article also includes analysis of agenda fragmentation in the audience which revealed the tendency of internet users to have a more fragmented agenda than the part of the audience that doesn't use the internet. However, in comparison to similar Norwegian data on agenda fragmentation, the agenda of the Lithuanian audience could not be regarded as fragmented. In the future, the analysis of audience fragmentation will be dependent on the collection of comparable data, since it would provide data for comparison and assessing the trends of fragmentation in time. These data would also help to solve some methodological issues that are also discussed in the article, like choice of criteria for assessment and having a point of comparison.
Although it is positive that it is still able to connect different fragments, in terms of content it is negative that during the pre-election period it had comparatively little amount of information on election campaign, parties and candidates. However, a very popular media outlet competing with television was the biggest internet news portal, which had a huge amount of information on elections. The article also includes analysis of agenda fragmentation in the audience which revealed the tendency of internet users to have a more fragmented agenda than the part of the audience that doesn't use the internet. However, in comparison to similar Norwegian data on agenda fragmentation, the agenda of the Lithuanian audience could not be regarded as fragmented. In the future, the analysis of audience fragmentation will be dependent on the collection of comparable data, since it would provide data for comparison and assessing the trends of fragmentation in time. These data would also help to solve some methodological issues that are also discussed in the article, like choice of criteria for assessment and having a point of comparison.
Although it is positive that it is still able to connect different fragments, in terms of content it is negative that during the pre-election period it had comparatively little amount of information on election campaign, parties and candidates. However, a very popular media outlet competing with television was the biggest internet news portal, which had a huge amount of information on elections. The article also includes analysis of agenda fragmentation in the audience which revealed the tendency of internet users to have a more fragmented agenda than the part of the audience that doesn't use the internet. However, in comparison to similar Norwegian data on agenda fragmentation, the agenda of the Lithuanian audience could not be regarded as fragmented. In the future, the analysis of audience fragmentation will be dependent on the collection of comparable data, since it would provide data for comparison and assessing the trends of fragmentation in time. These data would also help to solve some methodological issues that are also discussed in the article, like choice of criteria for assessment and having a point of comparison.
Straipsnio tikslas yra isnagrineti Lietuvos ziniasklaidos auditorijos fragmentacija rinkimu kampanijos metu ir nustatyti, kurie kanalai labiausiai gali susieti auditorija tarpusavyje. Straipsnyje apzvelgiama fragmentacijos reiksme demokratijai ir jos tyrimuose vartojamos savokos, pristatomi empirinio tyrimo poziuriai, besiremiantys auditorijos sutapimo analize. Remiantis reprezentatyvios apklausos duomenimis ir pristatytais poziuriais, analizuo-jama Lietuvos ziniasklaidos auditorijos fragmentacija. Kadangi nustatytas gana didelis skirtingu kanalu susiklojimas, straipsnyje daroma isvada, kad Lietuvos ziniasklaidos auditorija kol kas nera labai fragmentiska. Taciau palyginimas su ankstesniu metu duomenimis rodo tam tikrus fragmentacijos didejimo polinkius. Labiausiai Lietuvos ziniasklaidos auditorija susiejantis kanalas yra televizija, taciau vis didesne svarba igyja ir populiarus interneto portalai The aim of the article is to analyse the extent of media audience fragmentation in Lithuania during the 2012 Parliament election campaign and to define which media channels are best able to unify the audience. The article reviews the significance of fragmentation in terms of democracy and concepts used in its analysis, and presents approaches for its empirical study, based on audience duplication. On the basis of this approach and data from a representative survey, the fragmentation of Lithuanian media audience is analysed. Since the analysis shows a considerable overlap of audience of different media outlets, the main conclusion is made that the Lithuanian media audience is not (yet) fragmented. The media that unites the biggest share of the audience is television, although popular internet portals are also becoming very important. Adapted from the source document.
Minority government in Lithuania is established for the fist time in the independent Lithuanian history. The research was cared out on the basis of the minority government formation, stability and efficiency variables. In this work were analysed factors, which influence formation, stability and efficiency of minority government in Lithuania. First chapter ("government formation, stability and efficiency concept") dealt with the theoretical notions about government forms, minority government formation factors, ideas about stability and efficiency. In the second chapter ("minority government formation process in Lithuania: factors influence") were analysed positive parliamentarism, parliamentary fragmentation, presidential powers and polarisation of party system. Third chapter ("minority government termination and stability") explored variables that are crucial for this government stability. First of all, in this chapter the termination of the 14 th Lithuanian government was analysed and then was made research of stability. This research was made with three main variables – party system fragmentation, polarisation (out - parties included), prime ministers forces to influence government stability and voters volatility with the variable of out - party strategy. Fourth chapter ("analysis of minority government efficiency") address factors that have influence to efficiency. Such factors are – productivity of minority government, party coherence and discipline, coalition coherence and discipline, budgetary and taxation policy.
Minority government in Lithuania is established for the fist time in the independent Lithuanian history. The research was cared out on the basis of the minority government formation, stability and efficiency variables. In this work were analysed factors, which influence formation, stability and efficiency of minority government in Lithuania. First chapter ("government formation, stability and efficiency concept") dealt with the theoretical notions about government forms, minority government formation factors, ideas about stability and efficiency. In the second chapter ("minority government formation process in Lithuania: factors influence") were analysed positive parliamentarism, parliamentary fragmentation, presidential powers and polarisation of party system. Third chapter ("minority government termination and stability") explored variables that are crucial for this government stability. First of all, in this chapter the termination of the 14 th Lithuanian government was analysed and then was made research of stability. This research was made with three main variables – party system fragmentation, polarisation (out - parties included), prime ministers forces to influence government stability and voters volatility with the variable of out - party strategy. Fourth chapter ("analysis of minority government efficiency") address factors that have influence to efficiency. Such factors are – productivity of minority government, party coherence and discipline, coalition coherence and discipline, budgetary and taxation policy.
(i) commercial entities which control copyright in a commercially attractive repertoire will gain extremely big power; (ii) new collective management conditions under which CMOs will no longer perform social and cultural functions will be dominant; (iii) new CMOs will be established either as CMOs created specifically to administer the repertoire of a certain commercial entity (big publisher, etc.) or as licensing bodies not having the legal status of CMOs; (iv) competition will lead to several dominant management bodies administering copyright and related rights in the EU, what will reduce fragmentation from the territorial perspective but will increase the fragmentation of the repertoire; (v) CMOs will compete with each other for the right to administer the popular repertoire, thus, CMO's will be forced to adapt to the interests of the entities controlling this repertoire which do not have the motivation to fund the costs of the administration of 'niche repertoire' and, as a result, small owners of copyright and related rights will barely have an opportunity to benefit from effective collective management of their rights; (vi) the traditional system of collective management will become weaker, its effectiveness will be reduced, bargaining power vis-à-vis big commercial users will be weakened; (vii) the administration of repertoire for small CMOs will be more expensive and due to this reason their repertoire will be less competitive. Small authors, performers and other small copyright or related rights owners will, therefore, receive lower remuneration and their creative works will be less used.
(i) commercial entities which control copyright in a commercially attractive repertoire will gain extremely big power; (ii) new collective management conditions under which CMOs will no longer perform social and cultural functions will be dominant; (iii) new CMOs will be established either as CMOs created specifically to administer the repertoire of a certain commercial entity (big publisher, etc.) or as licensing bodies not having the legal status of CMOs; (iv) competition will lead to several dominant management bodies administering copyright and related rights in the EU, what will reduce fragmentation from the territorial perspective but will increase the fragmentation of the repertoire; (v) CMOs will compete with each other for the right to administer the popular repertoire, thus, CMO's will be forced to adapt to the interests of the entities controlling this repertoire which do not have the motivation to fund the costs of the administration of 'niche repertoire' and, as a result, small owners of copyright and related rights will barely have an opportunity to benefit from effective collective management of their rights; (vi) the traditional system of collective management will become weaker, its effectiveness will be reduced, bargaining power vis-à-vis big commercial users will be weakened; (vii) the administration of repertoire for small CMOs will be more expensive and due to this reason their repertoire will be less competitive. Small authors, performers and other small copyright or related rights owners will, therefore, receive lower remuneration and their creative works will be less used.
This article is an attempt to overview the state of the theory of European integration and it's development perspectives. Distinct and divergent "broad" and "narrow" definitions of integration theory, as well as various understandings of it's meaning and purpose should be regarded as symptoms of it's disintegration and fragmentation. In the absence of the broader theoretical paradigm "mosaic" picture of integration unfolds and gains dominance, thus preventing the understanding of deep and long-term tendencies of the integration process. The reconstruction and renewal of the theoretical paradigm of European integration research through the reflective restoration of the equilibrium between theoretical "explanation" and "understanding" is the necessary prerequisite for the development and progress in this research. Adapted from the source document.
This article argues that the local government capacities and local government performance in Europe clearly rank this continent to the most developed world areas from the point of local democracy. The background factors explaining this situation have a multidimensional character and one can identify as core positive factors the relative economic wealth, high human development, the long historical tradition of the subsidiarity principle in most parts of Europe, and the regulatory function of the Council of Europe. The strong development of local and regional democracy in Europe is protected and based on the principles of European Charter of Local Self Government. However, this does not mean that everything is perfect in Europe and that there would be no challenges to be addressed. It is difficult to define clear common weaknesses of the local democracy in Europe. We need to mention the core structural challenges here, for instance the continuous discussion about amalgamation versus fragmentation. Most countries also indicate one overarching threat to the local democracy in Europe today, that is, the financial crisis, which significantly decreased the level of available financial resources for self-governments, while the structure of responsibilities remains the same or even increases. Another core threat visible in many European countries is the trend toward re-centralization or limited real will do continue with decentralization in, both in established and emerging democracies. Regional issues differ, and we mention especially the situation of post-communist countries, where local democracy does not have a long tradition and still needs to be revitalized. ; Straipsnyje įrodoma, jog vietos valdžios gebėjimai ir veiklumas Europoje leidžia aiškiai laikyti šį žemyną kaip labiausiai pažengusį vietos savialdos srityje. Kontekstiniai veiksniai, paaiškinantys šią situaciją, yra daugiadimensiniai – kaip esminius teigiamus veiksnius galima išskirti santykinę ekonominę gerovę, aukštą žmogaus raidos indeksą, ilgą istorinę subsidiarumo principo daugelyje Europos šalių tradiciją ir reguliacinę Europos Tarybos funkciją. Nuoseklus vietos ir regioninės demokratijos Europoje vystymasis yra ginamas ir grindžiamas Europos Tarybos priimtoje Europos vietos savivaldos chartijos principais. Europos Taryba, be daugelio kitų veiklų, reguliariai vykdo stebėsenos vizitus į visa šalis nares, kurių metu tikrina vietos ir regioninės demokratijos situaciją. Šie vizitai yra svarbi ir efektyvi visų Europos šalių vyriausybių motyvavimo stiprinti Chartijos principais pagrįstą vietos demokratiją priemonė. Tačiau tai nereiškia, jog Europoje viskas tobula ir kad nėra jokių iššūkių, į kuriuos reikėtų reaguoti. Yra sunku aiškiai apibrėžti bendrus vietos demokratijos trūkumus Europoje. Tačiau reikia paminėti, jog kaip vieną esminių struktūrinių iššūkių galima išskirti nepertraukiamą diskusiją apie suvienijimą versus fragmentaciją. Dauguma šalių kaip vieną svarbiausių grėsmių vietos demokratijai šiandienos Europoje nurodo finansinę krizę, kuri žymiai sumažino vietos valdžiai prieinamų finansinių išteklių lygį, nors atsakomybė išlieka tokia pati ar net didesnė, tuo pačiu neabejotinai didėja ir poreikiai. Kita daugumoje Europos šalių pastebima esminė grėsmė yra recentralizacijos arba ribotos valios tęsti decentralizaciją tiek išsivysčiusiose, tiek besivystančiose demokratijose, tendencija. Regioninės problemos yra skirtingos, ypač situacija pokomunistinėse šalyse, neturinčiose ilgos vietos demokratijos tradicijos, kuri turi būti gaivinama iš naujo. Dar daugiau, centrinė valdžia kai kuriose NVS šalyse visiškai nėra linkusi propaguoti decentralizacijos idėją kaip oficialią nacionalinę politiką (ypač Baltarusija ir Azerbaidžanas).
This article is focused on the relation between the political institutional conditions (regime properties) and collective violence. Relying on works of Charles Tilly, two most important properties of regimes (political institutional conditions) that could affect the occurrence and intensity of collective violence are discerned: regime (governmental) capacity and democracy level. Empirical-graphical analysis finds no relation between the democracy level and degree/occurrence of collective violence. However, statistically significant relationship between the governmental capacity (measured as polity fragmentation index) and degree of collective violence is found. Moreover, higher levels of collective violence are observed in the low capacity- undemocratic regimes, but the most successful in terms of containment of collective violence are high-capacity undemocratic regimes (not high capacity-democratic, as formulated in the hypothesis). Adapted from the source document.
First hypothesis is falsified – in accordance with other similar works (f.e., Gupta, 2008), no relation between democracy level and degree/occurrence of collective violence is found. However, empirical analysis strongly supports the second hypothesis: there is a statistically significant relationship between the regime capacity (measured as polity fragmentation index) and degree of collective violence. The probability that regime will experience higher levels of collective violence (if it occurs) is raised greatly when the regime capacity is lower. As it is expected from these findings, third hypothesis is only partially supported: higher levels of collective violence are indeed observed in the low capacity-undemocratic regimes, but the most successful in terms of containment of collective violence are high-capacity undemocratic regimes (not high capacity-democratic, as formulated in the hypothesis).
First hypothesis is falsified – in accordance with other similar works (f.e., Gupta, 2008), no relation between democracy level and degree/occurrence of collective violence is found. However, empirical analysis strongly supports the second hypothesis: there is a statistically significant relationship between the regime capacity (measured as polity fragmentation index) and degree of collective violence. The probability that regime will experience higher levels of collective violence (if it occurs) is raised greatly when the regime capacity is lower. As it is expected from these findings, third hypothesis is only partially supported: higher levels of collective violence are indeed observed in the low capacity-undemocratic regimes, but the most successful in terms of containment of collective violence are high-capacity undemocratic regimes (not high capacity-democratic, as formulated in the hypothesis).
First hypothesis is falsified – in accordance with other similar works (f.e., Gupta, 2008), no relation between democracy level and degree/occurrence of collective violence is found. However, empirical analysis strongly supports the second hypothesis: there is a statistically significant relationship between the regime capacity (measured as polity fragmentation index) and degree of collective violence. The probability that regime will experience higher levels of collective violence (if it occurs) is raised greatly when the regime capacity is lower. As it is expected from these findings, third hypothesis is only partially supported: higher levels of collective violence are indeed observed in the low capacity-undemocratic regimes, but the most successful in terms of containment of collective violence are high-capacity undemocratic regimes (not high capacity-democratic, as formulated in the hypothesis).