Suchergebnisse

The article looks into the changes in the party and the social structure of the first House of the Croatian parliament (Sabor) in the transitional period. A total of twenty-six political parties have had seats in the Parliament; sixteen of them secured their place in it through a prior support of the electoral body, while ten of them secured their parliamentary status solely through individual lists. The author shows that the party fragmentation has occurred due to the process of parliamentary parties' factioning and the transfer of delegates from the parliamentary into the non-parliamentary parties. The degree of the party fragmentation in the Sabor is considered moderate and not disruptive for the functioning of the Parliament. This is due to the continued and stupendous mandate dominance of the majority party and to the fact that the party fragmentation has primarily involved the opposition parties. An analysis of the social/demographic characteristics of the representatives has shown that the Sabor is dominated by male, college-educated, forty-eight years old Croats with a bit more than four years of parliamentary experience. The educational structure of the Sabor does not differ much from other European parliaments, but the number of senior representatives is somewhat higher than in other European countries, while the share of women is the standards. It has been suggested that the most effective strategy the Croatian parliamentary political parties could employ regarding the gender and age representation are internally determined quotas for women and young people on their candidates' lists for elections. This would indirectly influence the social structure sof the Croatian parliament. (SOI : PM: S. 174)

As a democratic and economically developed country, whose interests are not any different from those of Western democratic states, the Republic of Croatia may be a decisive factor in the future processes of stabilization in the region. It occupies a very important place in the regional geopolitical structures and might influence the future development of the neighbouring countries and regions, especially through the continuation of democratic transition and the improvement of the relations with its neighbours. Hence the importance of its policies. Its future geopolitical initiatives regarding the stabilization and security of the region can be viewed in relation to their importance within global and regional geopolitical structures, to its participation in the processes of the fragmentation of South-East Europe, and to its geographical, cultural/religious, and historical/geopolitical environment. (SOI : PM: S. 172)

In Serbia, in the aftermath of 5 October 2000, the process of desecularization, including the revitalization of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), overlapped with the democratization of its political institutions, as well as with the political and social pluralism. The desecularization of the Serbian society had already started in the socialist Yugoslavia, but the process itself intensified in the early period of political pluralism and establishment of the democratic political institutions. Is Orthodoxy compatible with democracy, viewed not only as the will of the majority or an election procedure, but also as a political culture of pluralism and rule of law? Is Orthodoxy possible as a "civic" church, in line with the European political tradition of democracy and pluralism? The author contends that the contemporary Orthodoxy, including the SOC, accepts globalization in its technical, technological and economic sense, with a parallel tendency towards cultural fragmentation. Thus one needs a consensus between the SOC, state and society in Serbia concerning the basic values, such as: democracy, civil society, pluralistic discourse, secular tolerance and individual human rights. ; In Serbia, in the aftermath of 5 October 2000, the process of desecularization, including the revitalization of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), overlapped with the democratization of its political institutions, as well as with the political and social pluralism. The desecularization of the Serbian society had already started in the socialist Yugoslavia, but the process itself intensified in the early period of political pluralism and establishment of the democratic political institutions. Is Orthodoxy compatible with democracy, viewed not only as the will of the majority or an election procedure, but also as a political culture of pluralism and rule of law? Is Orthodoxy possible as a "civic" church, in line with the European political tradition of democracy and pluralism? The author contends that the contemporary Orthodoxy, including the SOC, accepts globalization in its technical, technological and economic sense, with a parallel tendency towards cultural fragmentation. Thus one needs a consensus between the SOC, state and society in Serbia concerning the basic values, such as: democracy, civil society, pluralistic discourse, secular tolerance and individual human rights.

The ownership structure is one of the determining factors in the development of all agricultures; Croatia's is not an exception to this rule. I the long run, the ownership structure is undoubtedly going to determine the direction of the development of the market-oriented Croatian agriculture. The process of building the ownership structure appropriate to the market economy is neither simple not fast, let alone cheap. An overnight change in the ownership structure is neither possible nor prudent. The existing ownership structure of Croatian agriculture is the result of a century and a half long historical development. Socio-economic and political factors exerted a strong influence onthe process of the ownership structure's formation. Today Croatia has an "atomized" estate of only 2.9 hectares. A century ago the average size of estates was 8 hectares. This fragmentation is a direct result of the agrarian reform and colonization in the second Yugoslavia when the land maximum was reduced to 10 hectares. The existing - very unfavorable structure - should be in the transitional period gradually adapted to the family economy as the basis of future development, which will be market-oriented, cost-effective, and profitable. (SOI : PM: S. 238)

The "May Declaration" of the Yugoslav Club (Vienna, 1917), regardless of its original intent, enabled various political parties and groups in the South Slav areas of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to promote the "Yugoslav idea" and work toward the creation of a unified Yugoslav state. In Croatia, as well as in Bosnia and Hercegovina, the most vociferous advocates of the "May Declaration" were members of the Croatian Catholic Seniorate, the leading organization within the Croatian Catholic movement. In Bosnia and Hercegovina, the Franciscans were the leading proponents of the "May Declaration" alongside the Seniorate. The greatest opposition to the "May Declaration" was voiced by the "Frankist-Rightist" circle centered around Archbishop Josip Stadler. Especially prominent among this group was Ivo Pilar, author of the "Memorandum" (July 1917), wherein he called for the creation of a "united administrative territory," or, the political unification of Croatian lands elevated to the status of a "condominium" relative to both component halves of the Monarchy. In his "Declaration" (November, 1917), Archbishop Stadler and his supporters came out in favour of the unification of "Croatian historical lands" within the boundaries of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, but on the basis of a subdualistic formula. Considering the existence of the dualistic system in the Monarchy a historic reality, they believed that this was the best possible resolution of the problem of political/constitutional fragmentation of the Croatian lands. The dissolution of Austria-Hungary and the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs , Croats and Slovenes rendered irrelevant the demands voiced in Stadler's "Declaration". Symbolically, the death of the Archbishop occurred at precisely the same time as these ominous events befell the Croat people. (SOI : CSP: S. 71f.)