Réfléchir aux transformations qui affectent les démocraties contemporaines amène à réévaluer le rôle que les partis politiques jouent dans leur fonctionnement. Même si le principe représentatif est né sans les partis (Manin, 1995), historiquement, ceux-ci ont été des agents de démocratisation (Ostrogorski, 1993 (1903) ; Bryce, 1912 ; Duverger, 1992 (1956) ; Pombeni, 1992 ; Offerlé, 1987) dans la mesure où ils ont principalement permis l'encadrement, la mobilisation et, en partie, la socialisation politique des masses électorales. Mais leur contribution au fonctionnement démocratique passe aussi par leur travail de prise en charge des clivages sociaux et idéologiques autour desquels s'organisent le débat démocratique et la logique de représentation politique. Ce rôle, traditionnellement désigné comme celui de « structuration de l'opinion » (Apter 1, 1965 ; Epstein, 1967), a également été au cœur des réflexions sur les évolutions des systèmes partisans. [Premières lignes du chapitre]
In this article from subaltern perspective, the author studies the impact of Pauline perception and praxis on ministries. He asserts that the conflicts and opportunities presently encountered by the people, especially of the subaltern sectors in our country, are multifaceted. The diagnostic framework for grappling with these complex issues could be evolved through the following three snapshots: (1) Universalist Outlook Vs. Par- ticularist Outlook (2) Institutional Authority Vs. Charismatic Authority (3) Accumulation of Power Vs Democratisation of Power. The people of God, as the very living extension of the murdered but Risen body of the Eucharistic Lord with the self-emptying spirit unto death, are none but the community-building community thrown amidst conflict-rid den situations with historical uncertainties. Their role is to function as the members of the enlivening God of history in bringing out the fullness of life as envisaged by the same very Lord of history. Whatever be one's identity, status, birth or opportunity, each of the members of the battered and fragmented body of Christ has to be incorporated as the harmoniously integrated body of Christ as a unified and living cosmotheandric organism of Christ. This leads from Fragmentation to genuine Communion.
In: Orient: deutsche Zeitschrift für Politik, Wirtschaft und Kultur des Orients = German journal for politics, economics and culture of the Middle East, Band 53, Heft 3, S. 64-69
Describes fragmentation of the party system and the end of the dominance of the Congress party, the shifting of power to the states, and the consensus on economic liberalization.
In: Policy sciences: integrating knowledge and practice to advance human dignity ; the journal of the Society of Policy Scientists, Band 2, Heft 4, S. 439-446
The rapid emergence of the policy sci conception is a consequence of profound changes in the modern world, & in turn is affecting public & private decision. In broad outline European civilization has passed from a high level of homogeneity to increasing fragmentation, & more recently toward a new & comprehensive configurative outlook. (1) The diff'iation of the modern world fostered the fragmentation of intellectual life. It reduced the relative number of men of knowledge who gave attention to the map of knowledge as a whole, or to the soc consequences & policy implications of sci & scholarship. (2) At a later state of diff'iation specialists attain a high level of involvement in the policy processes of society. Increasingly they utilize a configurative approach to the advancement & application of knowledge. (3) At first, special & exclusive interests are multiplied by diff'iation & fragmentation. As the aggregate impact of men of knowledge expands, particular demands are made more universal. This is a by-product of coalition formation. (4) Configurative ways of thinking do not necessarily result in effective control by champions of democratic & peaceful policy aims unless genuine freedom of access to knowledge--to data banks--is maintained, realistic common interests are unlikely to be defined either by policy sci'ts or decisionmakers. Modified HA.
This introduction to volume 7 of Inter Faculty traces the reasoning and objectives for taking the theme of Fragmentation and Divergence as the focus of discussion. It takes a close look at the discussions proper and their outcome. In considering the issues taken up here, the introduction underscores the complexity of the systems that make up the present globalised world (economical, political, social, cultural) and questions the role of research in human and social sciences, highlighting the importance of articulating the phenomena of mankind and his existence and those of nature.
"The peaceful protests that erupted in the southern Syrian City of Dar'a in March 2011 sparked a protracted protest movement that has now entered its second year. These uprisings have been met with fierce repression by the regime, which has until recently rejected all regional and national demands for a halt to the violence, instead offering cosmetic political reforms, for example, in the form of a political parties law and a new constitution. Thus far, the regime has been able to shield itself from a more substantive political transition process in large part because of the absence of a unified Syrian opposition. Although the Syrian uprising has created the political opportunity for the formation of multiple Syrian opposition groups, they have, to date, been unsuccessful in uniting under one common organizational framework. Rather, as the uprising continues, more and more groups claiming to represent the opposition have emerged, creating disunity, conflict, and mistrust between the different opposition groups. In this paper, the author asks the following question: What are the factors behind fragmentation in the Syrian opposition? Here, the author makes three claims. First, the presence of external and internal (inside/ outside) opposition groups has impeded coordination among different political actors and the formation of a cohesive, organized framework for the mobilization of the opposition. The dynamics behind inside/ outside divisions are complex, and include the lack of trust between different political actors and the inability of external based groups, such as the Syrian National Council (SNC), to affect political change on-the-ground. Following this latter point, the second claim made here is that the lack of popular representation among the protestors has contributed to fragmentation. This has created a legitimacy deficit that has multiple implications both domestically and internationally. On the one hand, their lack of popular representation has allowed the regime to avoid including these groups in a political transition process. On the other hand, this deficit has also prevented the international community from providing its full political and material support to the opposition. The legitimacy deficit is important to understanding fragmentation since it has discouraged Opposition groups from centralizing their coordination. To some degree, the legitimacy deficit is a product of failed political strategies. The final claim advanced here concerns the competing political strategies of opposition groups. Opposition groups have been confronted with key strategic questions since the uprising began, including questions of violence or non-violence, negotiation with the regime or not, as well as whether to support military Intervention. The political strategies adopted vis-a-vis these strategic questions have placed various Opposition groups in tension with one another and have contributed to their fragmentation. The most obvious example here is of groups that emerged, such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), to exercise violence against the regime. These groups have caused major splits with those, such as the Local Coordination Committee (LCC), who advocate non-violence. Despite the political opportunity provided by the Syrian uprising, there remains no cohesive opposition. Rather, the opposition remains weak and fragmented. This fragmentation is reflected in the multiple splits between groups and the lack of coordination on key strategic issues. These divisions have negatively affected the possibilities for affecting political change in Syria and have worked to shield the regime from demands for a political transition process." (author's abstract)
This paper measures and compares fragmentation in aid sectors. Past studies focused on aggregate country data but a sector analysis provides a better picture of fragmentation. We start by counting the number of aid projects in the developing world and find that, in 2007, more than 90 000 projects were running simultaneously. Project proliferation is on a steep upward trend and will certainly be reinforced by the emergence of new donors. Developing countries with the largest numbers of aid projects have more than 2 000 in a single year. In parallel to this boom of aid projects, there has been a major shift towards social sectors and, as a consequence, these are the most fragmented. We quantify fragmentation in each aid sector for donors and recipients and identify which exhibit the highest fragmentation. While fragmentation is usually seen as an issue when it is excessive, we also show that some countries suffer from too little fragmentation. An original contribution of this paper is to develop a monopoly index that identifies countries where a donor enjoys monopoly power. Finally, we characterise countries with high fragmentation levels. Countries that are poor, democratic and have a large population get more fragmented aid. However, this is only because poor and democratic countries attract more donors. Once we control for the number of donors in a country-sector, democratic countries do not appear different from non-democratic ones in any sector and poor countries actually have a slightly less fragmented aid allocation.
Cross-border production chains tend to include geographically proximate countries. This suggests that increases in fragmentation should be largest among nearby trading partners, and thus may serve to localize gross trade. Using data on gross and value added trade from 1970-2009, we present three results supporting this conjecture. First, value added to export ratios are lower and falling more rapidly within geographic regions than between them. Second, gross trade travels shorter distances from source to destination than value added trade, and this gap is growing over time. Third, bilateral value added to export ratios have fallen most among nearby trading partners.