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"Covering both noncooperative and cooperative games, this comprehensive introduction to game theory also includes some advanced chapters on auctions, games with incomplete information, games with vector payoffs, stable matchings, and the bargaining set. Mathematically oriented, the book presents every theorem alongside a proof. The material is presented clearly and every concept is illustrated with concrete examples from a broad range of disciplines. With numerous exercises the book is a thorough and extensive guide to game theory from undergraduate through graduate courses in economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering, and life sciences to being an authoritative reference for researchers"--

"What is a game? Classically, a game is perceived as something played by human beings. Its mathematical analysis is human-centered, explores the structures of particular games, economic or social environments and tries to model supposedly "rational" human behavior in search of appropriate "winning strategies". This point of view places game theory into a very special scientific corner where mathematics, economics and psychology overlap and mingle. This book takes a novel approach to the subject. Its focus is on mathematical models that apply to game theory in particular but exhibit a universal character and thus extend the scope of game theory considerably. This textbook addresses anyone interested in a general game-theoretic view of the world. The reader should have mathematical knowledge at the level of a first course in real analysis and linear algebra. However, possibly more specialized aspects are further elaborated and pointers to relevant supplementary literature are given. Moreover, many examples invite the reader to participate "actively" when going through the material. The scope of the book can be covered in one course on Mathematical Game Theory at advanced undergraduate or graduate level"--

Based on papers prepared for the Peace Research Seminar and the Symposium on Game Theory Models Applied to Case Studies of International Conflict, held in Ontario, June 11-13, 1984. Some consideration of the "prisoner's dilemma" game and tactics used in the negotiations concerning the release of US hostages from Iran in 1979-80.

Equilibrium points in n-person games ; The bargaining problem / John F. Nash, Jr. -- Non-cooperative games / John Nash -- An iterative method of solving a game / Julia Robinson -- Equivalence of games in extensive form / F.B. Thompson -- Extensive games and the problem of information / H.W. Kuhn -- A value for n-person games ; Stochastic games / L.S. Shapley -- Recursive games / H. Everett -- Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments / R.J. Aumann and B. Peleg -- A limit theorem on the core of an economy / Gerard Debreu and Herbert Scarf -- The bargaining set for cooperative games / Robert J. Aumann and Michael Maschler -- Existence of competitive equilibria in markets with a continuum of traders / Robert J. Aumann -- The core of an n-person game / Herbert E. Scarf -- Games with incomplete information played by "Bayesian" players. Pt. 1. The basic model ; Pt. 2. Bayesian equilibrium points ; Pt. 3. The basic probability distribution of the game / John C. Harsanyi -- The big match / David Blackwell and T.S. Ferguson -- On market games / Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik -- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games / R. Selten