Game Theory and Generalization in Ethics
In: The review of politics, Band 27, Heft 4, S. 491
ISSN: 0034-6705
In: The review of politics, Band 27, Heft 4, S. 491
ISSN: 0034-6705
In: The review of politics, Band 27, Heft 4, S. 491-500
ISSN: 1748-6858
SINCE World War II and particularly in the last decade game theory has acquired broad interest, attention, and application by behavioral scientists. Basically, game theory is an attempt to simulate mathematically a situation of decision-making so as to discover the most rational decision. Situations involving two or more "persons" (that is, sets of individuals, groups or environments with isomorphic interests and/or capabilities) can be simulated. Currently game theory is employed in both university and corporate research for studying problems in the areas of economics, sociology, political science, international relations, and militarydefense strategy.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 3, Heft 2, S. 101-101
ISSN: 1552-8766
In: Journal of peace research, Band 1, S. 39-44
ISSN: 0022-3433
Strategic reasoning must take place, explicitly or implicitly, within some framework, whether formal or otherwise. It is often assumed that game theory is the only formal framework for strategic analysis. However, strategic reasoning is here distinguished from its particular bases. It is suggested that formal bases other than the game theoretic one are possible. A number of weaknesses & inadequacies of game theory, both as a direct & as an indirect basis for strategic reasoning, are pointed out. (With a game theoretic model of bargaining processes which in turn serves as a framework for strategic reasoning, game theory forms an indirect basis.) An alternative approach is suggested, involving the idea of a closed loop system; & it is argued that this may serve as a more fruitful basis for strategic reasoning. IPSA.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 12, Heft 1, S. 34-44
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
Ethical systems can be thought of as sets of constraints that, together with legal, biological, physical, & other constraints, affect decisions where the welfare of others, or the behavior of others, must be taken into account. Like any soc constraints, they can be examined for their effects on expectations & decisions. Game theory has already contributed to the study of collective choice & of certain kinds of 'fairness'; it may be helpful in clarifying those ethical constraints that affect people's expectations about each other & in working out the soc-behavioral implications of diff ethical systems. Examples are lying, breaking promises, coercive threats, & the possible soc inefficiency of selfishness or altruism. HA.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 6, Heft 1, S. 1-4
ISSN: 1552-8766
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 6, S. 1-76
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
Papers presented at a conference devoted to the applications of game theory to negotiations, held under the auspices of the Institute for defense analyses, at Princeton university, Princeton, N.J., Oct. 7, 1961.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 2, Heft 3, S. 203-264
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
While game theory has been useful in the strategy of pure conflict, it has not performed well re 'games' in which mutual dependence is part of the logical structure & demands some kind of collaboration or mutual accommodation. Thus the scope of game theory must be enlarged, with the zero-sum game taken to be a limiting case rather than a point of departure. Such an extension is proposed along 2 lines: (1) identification of the perceptual & suggestive element in the formation of mutually consistent expectations, & (2) identification of some of the basic 'moves' that may occur in actual games of strategy & the structural elements that the moves depend on. The following problems are analyzed: mutual perception & suggestive behavior, enforcement, communication, & strategic moves; & coordination of expectations in the 'pure'-bargaining game. It is concluded that in the methodology appropriate to a study of bargaining games: (a) the mathematical structure of the payoff function should not be permitted to dominate the analysis, (b) there is a danger in too much abstractness; the character of the game is changed when there is a drastic alteration in the amount of contextual detail that it contains or when such complicating factors as the players' uncertainties about each other's value systems are eliminated, & (c) some essential part of the study of mixed-motive games is necessarily empirical. I. Taviss.
In: Doubleday short studies in political science 9
In: Cooperation and conflict: journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, Band 3, Heft 1, S. 108-130
ISSN: 1460-3691
In: Cooperation and conflict: journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, Band 3, Heft 3, S. 247-253
ISSN: 1460-3691
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 6, Heft 1, S. 39-41
ISSN: 1552-8766
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 12, Heft 1, S. 34-44
ISSN: 1552-8766
In: Public choice, Band 2, Heft 1, S. 11-26
ISSN: 1573-7101