"Covering both noncooperative and cooperative games, this comprehensive introduction to game theory also includes some advanced chapters on auctions, games with incomplete information, games with vector payoffs, stable matchings, and the bargaining set. Mathematically oriented, the book presents every theorem alongside a proof. The material is presented clearly and every concept is illustrated with concrete examples from a broad range of disciplines. With numerous exercises the book is a thorough and extensive guide to game theory from undergraduate through graduate courses in economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering, and life sciences to being an authoritative reference for researchers"--
Traditional game theory requires at least two individuals. This book extends game theory to the inner workings of a single person.Using game theory to analyse single individuals makes sense if one thinks of individuals as consisting of two or more relatively autonomous partitions that might have conflicting motives. This is not to say that individuals are literally made up from multiple selves; it only suffices that we adopt a portrayal of the individual as a multilayered entity or of a dual nature, in a manner similar to Adam Smith's depiction of an ""impartial spectator"" ex.
Game theory is a branch of mathematics that studies strategic interactions, i.e., interactions which involve more than one agent and in which each agent makes her/his decision while striving to predict the decisions of other agents. Game theory has been successfully applied in many areas of both the natural and social sciences, and it is the belief of this book's author that it can also be gainfully invoked in the area of legal philosophy. In this book, Wojciech Zaluski analyzes legal-philosophical concepts - such as legal interpretation, justice, legal rights, contract law, tort law, and prop
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Game theory and contemporary decision theory provide the mathematical foundation of economics. Neuroeconomics, which principally concerns itself with the integrative study of brain, mind and behavior, builds on this mathematical foundation while also drawing heavily from the repository of experimental paradigms that have grown out of economic game theory and behavioral economics. Game theory is central to neuroeconomics primarily because it constitutes a formal mathematical framework with which to bridge insights occurring at different levels of neuroeconomic analysis. In particular, game theoretic principles can be used to express neuroscientific ideas about the brain, psychological concepts regarding the human mind, and economic predictions of human behavior, thereby making these different ideas more rigorously relatable to each other. In this chapter we provide a nontechnical introduction to game theory and its relation to neuroeconomics. It has been written as an overview of the basic concepts most likely to be encountered in neuroeconomic research. The first part of the chapter introduces the reader to the basic concepts and philosophical underpinnings of game theory in relation to neuroeconomics. The second part is an introduction and discussion of common games, including the games featured in the other chapters of this book.
This book primarily addresses various game theory phenomena in the context of management practice. As such, it helps readers identify the profound game theory principles behind these phenomena. At the same time, the game theory principles in the book can also provide a degree of guidance for solving practical problems. As one of the main areas in management research, there is already an extensive body of literature on game theory. However, it remains mainly theoretical, focusing on abstract arguments and purely numerical examples purely. This book addresses that gap, helping readers apply game theory in their actual management or research work.
Equilibrium points in n-person games ; The bargaining problem / John F. Nash, Jr. -- Non-cooperative games / John Nash -- An iterative method of solving a game / Julia Robinson -- Equivalence of games in extensive form / F.B. Thompson -- Extensive games and the problem of information / H.W. Kuhn -- A value for n-person games ; Stochastic games / L.S. Shapley -- Recursive games / H. Everett -- Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments / R.J. Aumann and B. Peleg -- A limit theorem on the core of an economy / Gerard Debreu and Herbert Scarf -- The bargaining set for cooperative games / Robert J. Aumann and Michael Maschler -- Existence of competitive equilibria in markets with a continuum of traders / Robert J. Aumann -- The core of an n-person game / Herbert E. Scarf -- Games with incomplete information played by "Bayesian" players. pt. 1. The basic model ; pt. 2. Bayesian equilibrium points ; pt. 3. The basic probability distribution of the game / John C. Harsanyi -- The big match / David Blackwell and T.S. Ferguson -- On market games / Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik -- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games / R. Selten.
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