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Recent advances in game theory and experimental social science provide insights for the study of corruption and abuse of power in local politics. We survey the evidence from theoretical and experimental research and illustrate findings and problems with two examples from a survey among local politicians and officials in Sweden. The most simplified theoretical models, such as the prisoner's dilemma, fail to capture the distinction between group loyal behavior at different levels. There are several grey zones between pro-social behavior and corruption. These grey zones can be considered corruption danger zones. While Sweden is typically seen as a non-corrupt society, there are several situations where local politicians and officials must make choices in these corruption danger zones. Both formal institutions and informal norms influence these choices, and the views among politicians can vary substantially regarding what behavior is considered acceptable. Communication, openness and public debate can help the fight against corruption. Adapted from the source document.

The theory of social choice has recently benefited much from advances within the power index approach in game theory. One may start from the classical Wicksell framework of a unanimity regime & proceed to state the advantages of deviations from his model. A case can be stated for quantitative voting using some majority voting scheme, as it empowers the choice participants, also providing for blocking power. The power distinctions generated from the power index framework may be applied to the institutional evolution of the Council of Ministers with the EC or EU. It allows one to state in a concise manner the comparative advantages & disadvantages of alternative regimes for the European Community or Union. Tables, Figures, Appendixes, References. Adapted from the source document.

Telemedicine is an innovative approach that helps alleviate the health disparity in developing countries and improve health service accessibility, affordability, and quality. Few studies have focused on the social and organizational issues involved in telemedicine, despite in-depth studies of and significant improvements in these technologies. This paper used evolutionary game theory to analyze behavioral strategies and their dynamic evolution in the implementation and operation of telemedicine. Further, numerical simulation was carried out to develop management strategies for promoting telemedicine as a new way of delivering health services. The results showed that: (1) When the benefits are greater than the costs, the higher medical institutions (HMIs), primary medical institutions (PMIs), and patients positively promote telemedicine with benign interactions; (2) when the costs are greater than the benefits, the stability strategy of HMIs, PMIs, and patients is, respectively, 'no efforts', 'no efforts', and 'non-acceptance'; and (3) promotion of telemedicine is influenced by the initial probability of the 'HMI efforts', 'PMI efforts', and 'patients' acceptance' strategy chosen by the three stakeholders, telemedicine costs, and the reimbursement ratio of such costs. Based on theoretical analysis, in order to verify the theoretical model, this paper introduces the case study of a telemedicine system integrated with health resources at provincial, municipal, county, and township level in Guizhou. The findings of the case study were consistent with the theoretical analysis. Therefore, the central Chinese government and local governments should pay attention to the running cost of MIs and provide financial support when the costs are greater than the benefits. At the same time, the government should raise awareness of telemedicine and increase participation by all three stakeholders. Lastly, in order to promote telemedicine effectively, it is recommended that telemedicine services are incorporated within the scope of medical insurance and the optimal reimbursement ratio is used.

Up until 2020 Aleksandr Lukashenka's authoritarian regime had ruled Belarus for 26 years without major challenges. Thus, the popular mobilization that took shape in connection with the August 2020 presidential election came as a surprise. It was not the first time that elections in Belarus were not fair – but it was the first time that large sectors of the population reacted openly. Six months later, Belarusians all over the country were still contesting the falsified results. What contributed to this mobilization and politicization of a previously largely apolitical society? Why does that development represent such a serious threat to the authoritarian system? This study sees the Belarusian presidential election and its aftermath as illustrating the 'politics of uncertainty' of electoral authoritarian regimes. Because of the intrinsic insecurity of authoritarian systems, all regular elections in that context entail risks, which in theory might lead to change. In Belarus, the emergence of latent threats to the regime's legitimacy in the form of social cleavages and an economic crisis, combined with the fundamental dynamics of the 'election game', amplified this instability. The election served as the starting point for a process of transformation that became the most serious threat ever faced by the Lukashenka regime.