Suchergebnisse

GOOD POLITICAL JUDGMENT IS DISCUSSED IN LIGHT OF RELEVANT PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS. THE DUALISM BETWEEN RATIONAL /NORMATIVE AND SUBRATIONAL/HEURISTIC MODES OF JUDGMENT IS REEXAMINED. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT BOTH REPRESENT DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF THE SAME PROCESS WHEREBY ALL JUDGMENTS ARE RENDERED. THE ARTICLE ALSO CONCLUDES THAT A GOOD METHOD OF JUDGMENT REPRESENTS AT BEST A NECESSARY, NOT A SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR JUDGMENTAL ACCURACY. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS ANALYSIS FOR POLITICAL JUDGMENT AND DECISION-MAKING ARE CONSIDERED.

THIS ARTICLE EXPLORES THE DRAMATIC DIMENSIONS OF GORBACHEV'S ACTIONS AS A SOURCE OF LESSONS ON SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE FUTURE. IT IS ARGUED THAT TRANSFORMATIVE MOMENTS IN SOCIETY RESULT FROM THE IDENTIFICATION OF PEOPLE WITH AN EVOLVING DRAMA. THESE MAY THEN LEAD TO REAL CHANGE OF LASTING SIGNIFICANCE. QUESTIONS ARE RAISED ABOUT THE EXTENT TO WHICH SUCH DRAMATIZATION IS ALREADY USED AND THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR USING IT TO A FAR GREATER EXTENT IN THE FUTURE. THE LINK BETWEEN SUCH DRAMA AND THE USE OF METAPHOR IS EXPLORED IN RELATION TO WORLD GOVERNANCE.

RECENT RESEARCH ON LEADERSHIP IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HAS EMPHASIZED THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW "STRATEGY OF INCLUSION," BY WHICH PARTY RANK-AND-FILE MEMBERS ARE INCLUDED TO A MUCH LARGER EXTENT IN THE PARTY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS, AND HENCE BECOME MORE RESPONSIVE TO LEADERSHIP PRESSURES. THIS ARTICLE EXPLORES THE USE OF ONE SUCH MECHANISM OF INCLUSION, THE SPEAKER'S TASK FORCE, UTILIZED IN THE HOUSE DURING THE LATE 1970S. A MODEL IS DEVELOPED TO TEST THE PROCESS BY WHICH HOUSE MEMBERS ARE SELECTED TO SERVE ON TASK FORCES. TWO MAJOR SETS OF MOTIVATIONS ARE SEEN AS UNDELYING THE SELECTION PROCESS: (1) THE SHORT-TERM GOAL BY HOUSE LEADERS TO MAXIMIZE THE PROBABILITY THAT IMPORTANT LEGISLATION FOR WHICH TASK FORCES ARE CREATED WILL PASS THE HOUSE; AND (2) THE LONG-TERM GOAL OF INCLUSION AND THE ASSOCIATED SOCIALIZATION OF RANK-AND-FILE PARTY MEMBERS INTO PARTISANSHIP AND/OR FOLLOWERSHIP ROLES. BASED ON THE ANALYSIS OF TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP LISTS, SUBSTANTIAL EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IS FOUND FOR BOTH MOTIVATIONS DURING THE PERIOD UNDER STUDY, ALTHOUGH VARIABLES REPRESENTING THE SHORT-TERM GOALS OF HOUSE LEADERS TEND TO DOMINATE THE TASK FORCE SELECTION PROCESS.

POWERS AND INFORMAL INFLUENCE ALTHOUGH FORMAL GUBERNATORIAL POWERS HAVE OFTEN BEEN EMPLOYED AS A SURROGATE MEASURE OF ACTUAL GUBERNATORIAL INFLUENCE, THE LINKAGE IS MORE COMPLEX THAN THAT. THIS ARTICLE BUILDS AND TESTS THE ARGUMENT THAT FORMAL GUBERNATORIAL POWERS ARE TRANSLATED INTO INFLUENCE LARGELY THROUGH THE MECHANISM OF THE GOVERNOR'S INFORMAL POLITICAL RESOURCES. THAT IS, FORMAL POWERS DO RELATIVELY LITTLE TO BOLSTER A GOVERNOR'S INFLUENCE WHERE INFORMAL RESOURCES ARE LACKING, BUT A COMBINATION OF FORMAL POWERS AND INFORMAL RESOURCES CONTRIBUTES GREATLY TO GUBERNATORIAL INFLUENCE. TESTS OF AN INTERACTIVE MODEL OF THE GOVERNOR'S INFLUENCE OVER STATE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES STRONGLY SUPPORT THIS INTERPRETATION.

THIS ARTICLE PRESENTS A MODEL WHEREIN LOCAL AUTHORITY DECISION-MAKING IS VIEWED AS JOINTLY IN THE HANDS OF POLITICIANS AND BUREAUCRATS (CHIEF OFFICERS). THE POLITICIANS ARE HELD TO VALUE, INTER ALIA, THEIR POLITICAL SECURITY WHILST THE BUREAUCRATS ARE ASSUMED TO DERIVE SATISFACTION FROM STAFF NUMBERS OVER AND ABOVE THE NECESSARY MINIMA. AS SUCH THE WORK STANDS AT SOME DISTANCE FROM APPROACHES WHICH ADOPT THE MEDIAN VOTER CALCULUS INSPIRED BY DOWNS (1957). THE ARGUMENTS DEVELOPED LEAD TO THE HYPOTHESIS THAT LOCAL AUTHORITY DECISION-MAKERS POSSESS A JOINT UTILITY FUNCTION WHOSE ARGUMENTS ARE LABOUR AND VOTES, WHICH THEY MAXIMISE SUBJECT TO THEIR BUDGET CONSTRAINT. IN THE GENERAL CASE THIS LEADS TO A SYSTEM OF LABOUR AND VOTE DEMAND FUNCTIONS WHICH ARE, IN PRINCIPLE, AMENABLE TO EMPIRICAL TEST. DATA CONSIDERATIONS DICTATE, HOWEVER, THAT THIS IS ONLY POSSIBLE IN PROXIMATE FORM; THE RESULTS OF WHICH ARE PRESENTED.

ALTHOUGH BEHAVIORAL SCHOLARS HAVE DEVOTED MUCH TIME AND ENERGY TO ATTEMPTING TO EXPLAIN DECISION MAKING ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, THEY HAVE VIRTUALLY IGNORED THE UNANIMOUS DECISION. THE AUTHORS INVESTIGATED THE VINSON, WARREN, AND BURGER COURTS AND DISCOVERED THAT THE LIBERAL OUTCOME WAS MORE SUCCESSFUL IN THE UNANIMOUS CASES WHETHER THOSE CASES INVOLVE CIVIL LIBERTIES OR ECONOMIC LIBERALISM AND WHETHER THEY WERE DECISIONS TO REVERSE OR DECISION TO AFFIRM. THE AUTHORS ALSO ASCERTAINED THAT THE IDEOLOGICAL POSITION THAT TENDED TO WIN IN THE UNANIMOUS REVERSE CASES WAS RELATED TO THE IDEOLOGICAL POSITION THAT TENDED TO WIN IN THE NONUNANIMOUS REVERSE CASES, BUT THAT NO SUCH RELATIONSHIP WAS PRESENT IN THE TWO KINDS OF AFFIRM CASES. THESE TWO FINDINGS ARE IN CONFORMITY WITH A PSYCHOMETRIC MODEL, WHICH POSITS THAT THE RELATIVE POSITION OF JUDICIAL ATTITUDES AND CASE STIMULI DETERMINES THE VOTE ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT.