Suchergebnisse

Ten years ago, now, the Eurozone began to shake on its foundations. This article traces the genesis of the crisis and the present state of affairs. As to the causes of the global financial crisis in 2008, I argue that contrary to common understanding, the financial crisis had its deeper causes in a decades old tendency towards crisis in the real economy, produced by the continuous overaccumulation of capital which can only return profits by undertaking speculative short-term investments (a phenomenon known as 'financialisation'). I then trace how the global financial crisis morphed into a crisis of public deficits and debt in 2010-2011, particularly in the Eurozone. Three factors are shown to be responsible: financialization, design faults in the European monetary union, and the neo-mercantilist strategy of especially Germany and the Netherlands. The paper next looks at the five main traits of the policy responses in the Eurozone: bailing out governments and banks through creating emergency funds; imposition of austerity and budget discipline for member state governments; attempting to create and complete a Eurozone banking union; subsequently the European Central Bank engaged on an unprecedented scale in 'quantitative easing'; and finally, institutional reform in an attempt to repair the most pressing design faults of the EMU. The paper concludes that the underlying structural factors leading up to the crisis have only been addressed incompletely: the overaccumulation of capital continues, the completion of the banking union is in an impasse, quantitative easing has mostly just intensified financialization by pushing up asset prizes, and institutional reform has taken the form of a fundamentally undemocratic attempt at monetary and political union by stealth. The broader legitimacy of the European project has been substantially undermined, and Europe is not in a better position than eight years ago in case of a new global crisis.

The question whether the Belgian foreign policy is marked by a continuity or break between the first & second turns of Guy Verhofstadt as a prime minister of this country's governments is addressed, surveying developments in the 1999-2004 period & scrutinizing the rhetorical declarations & concrete initiatives "on the ground" by the foreign minister Louis Michel. The diplomatic style of the first & second administrations are compared, & the principles & directions of Belgian foreign policy in 2004 are assessed in the context of the state of political affairs on the global arena, with special attention to the split between the EU & US on the war in Iraq, the division inside the former vis-a-vis supporting or opposing US intervention in this Middle Eastern country, & the recent troubles the EU experiences with greater degree of political integration, projecting also into a lack of coherent, uniform foreign policy on the supranational level. Some of the major issues the Belgian foreign policy must deal in 2004 & beyond are identified: securing democratic & peaceful governance in Central Africa, responding to the anti-Belgian campaign conducted by the US, & supporting the process of strengthening the EU position as a relevant actor on the geopolitical stage. Z. Dubiel