Shui de zheng zhi: zur politischen Theorie, Praxis und Kritik globaler Governance
In: Zheng zhi yu gong gong guan li yi cong
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In: Zheng zhi yu gong gong guan li yi cong
In: Ren da chong yang zhi ku zuo pin xi lie
In: 人大重阳智库作品系列
World Affairs Online
World Affairs Online
In: Bo , P 2014 , ' A Study of the BRICS Bank from the Perspective of Global Financial Governance ' , Journal of China and International Relations , bind 2 , nr. 2 , s. 50-57 . https://doi.org/10.5278/ojs.jcir.v2i2.939
The transition of the global financial governance system is a history of the rise and fall of the Western advanced countries in the post-war international political and economic system. Since the end of the Second World War, the International Monetary Foundation and the World Bank have always taken the dominant role in the field of global financial governance. However, after the beginning of the global financial crisis in 2008, many drawbacks have become apparent concerning these two significant institutions, such as the lack of representatives, the slow and ineffective response to the crisis, etc. Following a strong appeal from the developing countries (with the emerging powers as their representatives), the global financial governance system has experienced several rounds of reforms which have yet to yield acceptable results. Therefore, it is highly necessary to create a new institution which can play a complementary role in the existing financial governance system rather than overthrow it. Complying with the tide of history, the official establishment of the BRICS Bank can be of great significance to the reform of current global financial governance systems such as diversifying the global financial governance bodies, representing the interests of developing countries in a better way, enhancing the status and improving the importance of emerging economies in the international political and economic order. Admittedly, the BRICS Bank also faces great challenges and limits such as the lack of a core leadership and the absence of a unified currency, etc.
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Abstract: The year 2019 marks the 5th anniversary of Chinese President Xi Jinping's vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security. This article firstly makes a general summary of the progress made in national decision-making, policy oath and international recognition in the past five years since China put forward the vision of sustainable security.The article will then analyze the current challenges in global security governance. Based on the above information, the way forward for global security governance in the 21st century is discussed. Lastly, the vision of sustainable security is applied to practical issues of international security governance such as climate change and the future prospects of the Korean Peninsula. Additionally, a new security paradigm and specific resolutions for those problems are put forward. Keywords: Sustainable security; Global governance; International security; Climate change; Korean peninsula ; 2019是中国国家主席习近平提出共同、综合、合作、可持续安全观5周年。拙文首先就中国提出可持续安全观5年来,在国家决策、政策宣誓、国际认同方面取得的进展做一概要的总结;然后分析当前全球安全治理方面面临的挑战;在此基础上探讨21世纪全球安全治理的出路,将可持续安全观与气候变化问题、朝鲜半岛前景等国际安全治理的实际问题相结合,创造性地提出新的安全范式及解决问题的具体措施。 【关键词】可持续安全;全球治理;国际安全;气候变化;朝鲜半岛
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The third Beijing Forum on Human Rights was successfully held in Beijing by China Society for Human Rights Studies on 19 October 2010. The theme of the forum "Human Rights and Development: Rethink Concepts, Models and Approaches" is supported by three sub-themes, "Scientific Development and Human Rights," "Cultural Diversity and Human Rights" and "Global Governance and Human Rights." This book, divided into five parts according to theme, is a compilation of 69 theses received by the forum.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has emerged as a new model of regional governance at a moment of an increasing deficit of global governance and a governance dilemma in the European Union. In the past several years, during the consultations with the respective countries, the BRI has shocked the traditional western governance paradigm from the perspective of governance concept, structure and regulation. The BRI has also marked a change from Western governance emphasizing good-governance to Oriental and Chinese governance, emphasizing good-administration. From actor-oriented governance to topic-oriented governance and from pluralistic integration governance to multivariate, multibody governance. Those changes indicate the characteristics of the BRI based on resolving problems under shared circumstances, building consensus with shared ideals, searching for new ideas with shared needs, and would help to provide a regional governance transition with a feasible and referable model providing promising prospects. Key words: The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Governance Paradigm, Concept, Structure, Regulation ; 全球治理赤字突显、欧盟治理遭遇困难之际,"一带一路"这一新型区域治理形式出现。几年来,在与沿线周边国家共商共建实践中,"一带一路"倡议合作在治理理念、结构、规范几个方面动摇了西方传统治理范式,预示着区域治理的改变和转向:从强调良治的西方治理模式向强调良政的东方方式、中国方式转变,从主体导向治理向主题导向治理转变,从多元一体治理向多元多体治理转变。这些转变体现了"一带一路"基于共同处境解决问题、出于相同理念凝聚共识、立于共同需求寻找方案的新特点,有望为区域治理转型提供可行的经验、可鉴的模式与可期的前景。 【关键词】:"一带一路";治理范式;理念;结构;规范
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It is generally acknowledged that Europe will not be a super power in the sense of a political-military ensemble on an equal footing with the United States or China. Europeans reject this possibility across the board. Moreover, even if they wanted to go that route, wouldn't it expose them to reproducing on a European scale what they have struggled to combat amongst themselves: the idea of becoming a great power with all the attributes of force and supremacy that such a project implies?So if Europe will not be a super power, how can it be a power at all? Probably by reinforcing what remains its major political resource: its capacity to produce and set up at the global level a system of norms as broad-sweeping as possible that can organize the world, discipline the interplay of its actors, introduce predictability in their behavior, develop among them a sense of collective responsibility, and offer those who engage on this path, particularly the weakest, at least the partial possibility to use these norms as an argument/force* against all, including the world's most powerful.The task may seem colossal, even outrageous. It probably is, but does Europe have any other choice but to assume its responsibility as a normative power? Probably not.[publisher's website]
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It is generally acknowledged that Europe will not be a super power in the sense of a political-military ensemble on an equal footing with the United States or China. Europeans reject this possibility across the board. Moreover, even if they wanted to go that route, wouldn't it expose them to reproducing on a European scale what they have struggled to combat amongst themselves: the idea of becoming a great power with all the attributes of force and supremacy that such a project implies?So if Europe will not be a super power, how can it be a power at all? Probably by reinforcing what remains its major political resource: its capacity to produce and set up at the global level a system of norms as broad-sweeping as possible that can organize the world, discipline the interplay of its actors, introduce predictability in their behavior, develop among them a sense of collective responsibility, and offer those who engage on this path, particularly the weakest, at least the partial possibility to use these norms as an argument/force* against all, including the world's most powerful.The task may seem colossal, even outrageous. It probably is, but does Europe have any other choice but to assume its responsibility as a normative power? Probably not.[publisher's website]
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In its nature, world history is an evolutionary cycle of non-rules, non-order to rules and order. The Peace of Westphalia began the international order aiming to resolve disputes through multinational meetings. However, the fragile world order and the code of international relations failed to prevent World War Ⅰ. Although a new system of multinational mechanisms, formed after World War I, reformed the international community, it did not stop World War Ⅱ from breaking out. After World War Ⅱ, a new system of international organizations represented by the United Nations and new norms of international relations centered on the Charter of the United Nations were established. Despite its undeniable role in the world order and the norms of international relations, the so-called Yalta System, still has its flaws. After the end of the Cold War, the necessity of a new world political, economic and security order is rising. The theory and practice of global governance is in need of upgrading. However, due to complicated historical and realistic reasons, the process of building up a new order based on new rules would be long and tortuous. Key Words: International Order, Power Relations, Charter of the United Nations, Global Governance ; 世界历史归根到底,就是从无规则无秩序到有规则有秩序,再到建立新规则新秩序无限发展历程。威斯特伐利亚条约的诞生,标志着以多边会议为争端解决机制的国际秩序开始形成,但粗陋而孱弱的世界秩序和国际关系准则并没能阻止第一次世界大战的爆发。一战后形成的一系列新型多边合作机制曾使国际社会欢欣鼓舞,但这套体制和规则仍未能阻止二战的爆发。国际社会于二战结束之际,建立起以联合国为代表的新的国际组织体系和联合国宪章为核心的新型国际关系准则。这套名为雅尔塔体系的世界秩序和国际关系规则虽然发挥了不可否认的历史作用,但许多方面仍不尽如人意。冷战结束后,世界呼唤新的政治经济秩序、安全格局,全球治理从理论到实践都亟待更新。但由于极其复杂的历史和现实原因,建立基于新规则的新秩序,将是一个漫长而曲折的历史过程。 【关键词】国际秩序,大国关系,联合国宪章,全球治理
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自20世纪90年代起,金融及法律界学者逐渐提出到境外发达资本市场上市可以发挥其 "捆绑"作用:企业可以通过跨越本国薄弱的法律机制,受制于发达国家的法律以及监管,实现公司治理的提高。"捆绑理论起源于美国, 但随后也被运用于全球市场的其他角落。 问题关键在于本国市场与境外市场之间是否存在一个"质量差距", 因为只有在"质量差距"存在的情况下,"捆绑"的作用才有可能产生。 ; 源于"香港"英文拼写中的第一个字母H,到香港上市的中国企业被统称为H-股公司。自"青岛啤酒"于1993成功于香港上市,至今香港联交所已有169 间H-股公司。其中,2002至2006 是到港上市的高峰期. 此期间,中国资本市场混乱,难以发挥为企业融资的作用。鉴于此,中国政府鼓励国内企业到香港上市,寄予通过香港更好的治理机制,实现对本土企业治理实践的提高。 ; 当前,人们普遍认为香港上市可以顺利提高中国企业的治理实践。如若事实如此,我们有理由相信中国本土市场与香港市场之间存在明显的"质量差距"。也就是说香港市场的治理体系优于国内市场。此文以中小股东保护为出发点,于以下几个方面探讨两地之间是否存在"质量差距":信息披露,独立董事,金融中介机构的"看门人"作用,证券法的公力救济,以及公司法,证券法的私力救济。 ; In the 1990s, finance and legal scholars gradually proffered the view that cross-listing in a developed market functions as a "bonding" mechanism: a firm may improve governance practices in spite of the home country's weak legal institutions by subjecting itself to the legal and regulatory regime of the developed market. Initially developed in the context of overseas companies listed in the US, this bonding effect has been applied to other places of the global market as well. Critical to this scenario is the existence of a "quality gap" between the home and the foreign markets, which must exist for generating the bonding effect. ; Chinese companies listed in Hong Kong are known as H-share companies for the first letter of the listing locality. Since the birth of the first H-share company, Tsingtao Beer, in 1993, a total of 168 H-share companies have floated on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. A majority of these companies were listed between 2002 and 2006. Around this period, the two domestic exchanges were highly volatile and failed to provide an efficient fund-raising device for Chinese companies. Against this backdrop, the Chinese government adopted the strategy of encouraging domestic companies list in Hong Kong, which is perceived to be a better governance regime, thereby bonding the governance practices of Chinese companies to a superior standard. ; It is current conventional wisdom that the governance practices of Chinese companies can be enhanced indeed through ...
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The COVID-19 pandemic brought on the so-called "coronacrisis," a global crisis event enormous in size and force. The crisis questioned the ability of states and instruments of international governance to respond quickly and effectively to the global threats. It is noteworthy that there was no strong correlation between crisis management efficacy and the type of political system of a country. However, the countries with elaborated and well-financed health systems, were able to struggle with the devastating consequences of the coronacrisis better than those with systemic, structural and financial problems of their healthcare sectors. It is obvious that the ability to manage the coronacrisis is not related to the type of political governance or ideology, but to the state administrative resources and competence of the cabinet / leaders. That potentially gave an opportunity for countries with different ideological foundations to neglect their tensions and unite the efforts in the containment of the SARS-CoV-2 virus (e.g. create mutual programmes of vaccination and medicine distribution). The main forces are the Transatlantic alliance, Russia and China. Unfortunately, no visible COVID-19-related agreement between them ever happened so far. Instead, the coronacrisis situation was used by the political rivals to intensify their aggressive rhetoric against each other (e.g., USA and Russia, USA and China) or profit from it in deepening international collaboration not connected with the pandemic itself (e.g., Russia and China). We do not observe any real mutual efforts of liquidating the pandemic consequences even within an ideological block, to say nothing about different blocks. The US–EU relationships worsened during the pandemic, especially at the background of Trump's cool attitude towards international organisations and his decision to leave the World Health Organization in the midst of the pandemic and his threatening words that US may also abandon the NATO. Likewise, John Bolton spoke of the EU as an entity hostile ...
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In: National Defense University blue paper
"In 2016, economic globalization suffered a severe crisis after over half a century of smooth development, and deglobalization was running mountains high. Not only did it trigger domestic political discord in major countries like the United States, Britain, France and Germany, but also led to international economic and political disputes among Western countries, intensifying strategic competition between major powers. With the arrival of 2017, through the perilous waves of deglobalization and the consequent international political upheavals, we find that the post Cold War era that we were familiarized with, is coming to a rapid end, ushering in a new international political era, full of uncertainties. This annual book presents Chinese scholars' views, opinions and predictions on global political and security issues, as well as China's strategic choice. It covers a wide range of important issues concerning international security, ranging from the assessment of Sino-US relations, Russian-American relations, the counter terrorism situation in the Middle East, the political situation in Taiwan and cross-Strait relations, Brexit and the refugee problem, and the strategic situation in the South China Sea, to the judgment of the strategic posture in countries and regions like Japan, the Korean Peninsula, Southeast Asia, Latin America and Africa. Also covered are the analysis of the strategic posture in cyber space, outer space (as well as their governance), and discussion on China's international strategic choice in the wave of deglobalization."--
本研究聚焦2009年到2013年,中國廣州的一場圍繞垃圾處理展開的社會運動。運動最初是當地居民動員起來反對市政府垃圾焚燒項目的鄰避抗爭。勝利後,運動領袖成立了一個環保組織,和政府從對抗走向合作,力圖推动焚燒技術以外的替代性垃圾治理方案。不過,儘管政府和環保者致力於解決垃圾,垃圾問題在消費社會中始終無法消除。本研究試圖理解後社會主義中國的綠色治理和環保行動之間的對抗與合作。 ; 首先,我分析當代中國高速城市化和消費社會急速發展所帶來的垃圾危機。然后,我檢視圍繞垃圾焚燒技術的主要爭議,並描繪廣州居民是如何針對政府計劃中的垃圾焚燒項目做出抗爭的。我指出,他們結合地方性知識和科學話語,將自己建構為"常民專家",對全球性的焚燒科技的"地方適用性"作出成功挑战。接下來,我提供一個民族誌,追溯抗議成功后運動的歷史軌跡。我注意到,通過成立一個環保組織"EC",反焚運動走向合法化、組織化和制度化,抗爭被體制吸納,轉變為參與協助國家環境治理的運動。最後,我描繪EC與广州政府聯手推動的垃圾分類運動。指出,國家在此運動中的尷尬身份、以利潤為導向的回收市場影響、理想化的垃圾分類知識與普通民眾的知識存在斷裂,都使得推動垃圾分類異常艱難。 ; 通過展示運動變遷與國家治理轉型相互交織的辯證关系,本研究挑戰了國家與社會的二元對立,指出在國家在治理轉型過程中不斷收編反抗的行動和話語,而於此同時反焚者又在不斷生產新的另類知識做出挑戰。此外,本研究還貢獻於對廢棄物的理解,將廢棄物視為是一個動態的範疇,國家、市場、科學技術、普通消費者、環保行動者等多個行動者共同生產、競爭、建構其意義。還有,本研究對於科技知識的普遍性的探討,對科學技術研究領域做出了貢獻。 ; This is a study on social movements that focused on waste treatment in Guangzhou, China from 2009-2013. The campaign began as a NIMBY (Not-In-My-Backyard) movement that mobilized community residents to protest against municipal government's proposed incineration projects. After its success, the movement leaders changed their dissident role to form an environmental protection NGO, collaborating with the state to explore alternative waste treatment solutions other than incineration. However, despite of the politicians and activists' attempt to eliminate waste, waste continues to exist in tandem of our consumption spree. I endeavor to understand the contradiction as well as collusion between green governance and environmental activisms in post-socialist China. ; Firstly, I analyze the garbage crisis caused by the rapid urbanization and the dramatic growth of consumer society in contemporary China. Then I examine a few major technological controversies of waste incineration and depict how the activists protest against the pro-incineration government. I argue that through deploying local knowledge, the activists, as "lay experts", successfully challenged the "local appropriateness" of the global technology of incineration. Next, I provide an in-depth ethnography of the transformation of this campaign after its ...
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