Suchergebnisse

Inhalt: - 1. Einleitung - 2. Ein friedensstrategisches Vakuum? - 3. Wandel in den Internationalen Beziehungen - 4. Der Sicherheitsbegriff im Global-Governance-Ansatz - 5. Bestehende Global Governance-Strukturen im Bereich "Frieden und Sicherheit" - 6. Fazit: Gemeinsame Sicherheit als friedensstrategisches Leitbild - Literatur

Internationale Konferenzen sind ein wichtiger Bestandteil des globalen Regierens: Hier werden internationale Normen und Regeln ausgehandelt. Die Blütezeit dieser Konferenzen ist jedoch vorbei: Andere Governance-Formen gewinnen immer weiter an Bedeutung.

The globalization world has brought the changes toward the world condition of politic, social and economy. Although the globalization politic has been more dominating, but its development has become multi dimensional and multi perspective. The raise of global governance is seen as the legitimating need toward the existing world norms. The terminology for the legitimating is the product from the politic that gives the justification. Global Governance is the matter of arrangement in running and executing global politic rules. Global Governance in the view of liberalist is not merely only the norms of independency without any intervention, but also includes the politic activity and sub national, national and supra national level. It also covers the public policy and administration.

Published online: 06 November 2021 ; Recent decades have seen a proliferation in the number, depth and span of international institutions regulating different domains of global politics. Issues like global health, intellectual property rights, climate change and many others that were once governed by relatively distinct rulesets are today regulated by multiple institutions with intersecting mandates and memberships. As a result, the creation, evolution and effectiveness of international institutions are fundamentally shaped by how they relate to other institutions operating within their policy domains. Yet, global governance complexes—that is, clusters of overlapping institutions and actors that govern specific policy issues—differ widely. The number and types of rulesets and actors involved, the degree of overlap between them and the extent to which overlapping rules conflict vary markedly across governance complexes and over time. The same is true for institutional responses to regulatory conflict. The broad trend towards growing institutional complexity in global governance is thus subject to important variation.

This article focuses, first, on the moral legitimacy, leadership, and capacity of public service, and theirpotential role in considerations of ethics in international relations, in general, and corruption, in particular.Second, arguing that realpolitik has attenuated our analysis of corruption and our ability to oppose iton moral grounds, a case is made for linking the scholarly work on corruption and the scholarly work onmorality in international relations, in order to enrich our understanding of corruption as a key moral concernof global governance, and to enable us, as well, to design and deliver effective anti-corruption initiativesacross the globe. Finally, the article concludes with a call for morally independent and resilient publicadministrators as key players in competent states, as well as collaboration between practitioners andscholars in the development of new skills and strategies to advance democratic discourse and decisionmaking at all levels of governance.

Global Governance - ein tragfähiges Friedensprojekt? 1. Einleitung 2. Ein friedensstrategisches Vakuum? 3. Wandel in den Internationalen Beziehungen 4. Der Sicherheitsbegriff im Global Governance-Ansatz 5. Bestehende Global Governance-Strukturen im Bereich "Frieden und Sicherheit" 6. Fazit: Gemeinsame Sicherheit als friedensstrategisches Leitbild Literatur Diskussion im Anschluß an die ersten beiden Referate Diskussion im Anschluß an das dritte Referat Diskussion im Anschluß an das vierte und fünfte Referat

Cyberweapons are a relatively new addition to the toolbox of contemporary conflict but have the potential to destabilize international relations. Since Stuxnet (a malicious computer worm) in 2010 demonstrated how computer code could be weaponised to generate political effect, cyberweapons have increasingly been discussed in terms of potential regulation and prohibition. Most analyses focus on how global institutions and regimes might be developed to regulate the development and use of cyberweapons and identify the political and technical obstacles to fulfilling this ambition. This focus on centralized authority obscures identification of existing governance efforts in this field, which together constitute an emerging global governance architecture for offensive cyber capabilities. This article explores three sources of cyberweapons governance—cyberwarfare, cybercrime and export controls on dual-use technologies—and briefly describes their political dynamics and prospects. It is argued that although fragmented, the global governance of cyberweapons should not be dismissed on this basis. Fragmentation is a condition of global governance, not its antithesis, and policy should respect this fragmentation instead of regarding it as an impediment to further development of cyberweapons governance. This article is published as part of a collection on global governance.

Die Sozialwissenschaften reden ganz selbstverständlich von Global Governance, obwohl es (noch) keinen Weltstaat und auch keine Weltregierung gibt. Dennoch hat sich eine Weltgesellschaft in nuce herausgebildet, die eigene, globale Formen der Regierung und der Selbststeuerung anstelle staatszentrierter politischer Steuerung hervorbringt. Dies geschieht wesentlich mittels Organisationen, Institutionen und Regelsystemen neuen Typs (etwa WTO, BIZ, UN), in die verschiedene Mechanismen der gesellschaftlichen Steuerung (Markt, Recht, Solidarität, Wissen) eingebettet sind.Der Band führt in die verschiedenen Debatten um Global Governance ein, diskutiert Grenzen und Möglichkeiten einzelner Formen gesellschaftlicher Steuerung in der Weltgesellschaft und zeichnet exemplarisch die Entstehung neuer Regimes globaler Steuerung nach. Dabei wird gezeigt, dass die entscheidende Herausforderung in der Steuerung der globalen Wissensgesellschaft liegt.

Die Indische Union repräsentiert mit 1,2 Milliarden Menschen circa ein Sechstel der Weltbevölkerung. Allein schon wegen dieser Größe und der zahllosen sozio-ökonomischen Herausforderungen, die damit verbunden sind, ist Indien in vielen Bereichen von Global Governance ein zentraler Akteur. Ohne die aktive Zusammenarbeit mit Indien sind keine nachhaltigen Erfolge bei internationalen Klima-, Umwelt- und Energievereinbarungen oder im weltweiten Kampf gegen Armut zu erzielen. Allerdings war, ist und bleibt Indien für die westlichen Staaten ein schwieriger Partner. Indien ist in vielen Global-Governance-Verhandlungen eher als "Neinsager" gegenüber westlichen Positionen aufgetreten und tut sich besonders mit der Zustimmung zu international verbindlichen Vereinbarungen schwer. Über diese Haltung herrscht zwischen den großen Parteien in Indien ein weitgehender Konsens. Indien hat seine außenpolitischen Instrumente den veränderten nationalen Interessen seit der Liberalisierung 1991 und den gewandelten internationalen Konstellationen nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts angepasst. Traditionelle Organisationen wie die Blockfreien-Bewegung spielen in den Global-Governance-Verhandlungen kaum noch eine Rolle. Indien war maßgeblich an der Entstehung von neuen Formaten wie BRICS und BASIC beteiligt, und versucht jetzt in diesen Foren seine nationalen Interessen durchzusetzen. Im Unterschied zu Staaten wie China und Russland versteht Indien diese Gremien aber nicht als Alternative zu westlichen Institutionen, sondern eher als ergänzende Mechanismen für Regelungen in den einzelnen Politikfeldern. (SWP-Studien)

The concept of the globalisation has experienced an astonishing career in the 1990s. By the resolution of the Soviet block and the breakdown of the Berlin Wall the planet seemed to become all together from uniform principles of western-modern life creation interlace. If one wants to bring the spirit of the times of the last turn of the century on the concept, one can say that we have entered into the epoch of the globalisation. There remains to us no other alternative. The concept of the globalisation controls furthermore the headlines, without always becomes clear what is meant with it. Therefore, this present thesis offers an introduction to the topic. Globalisation is a many-faceted process which stamps the societies today radically. A network of growing density has broken open the Partikularismus in all life forms and speeds up in rapid tempo worldwide exchange, adaptation processes and mutual influencing in the area of economy, policy and society. The globalisation has hardened to a Kohärenz which presents itself not only to the focused field of vision of social-scientific analysis, but to the everyday object of experience of the individuals in all parts of the world asserts itself. If these are the technically ingenious possibilities of the globalized transfer of information and flow of communication, the worldwide exchange of persons, goods, services and money, the cultural-covering adjustment and Transfers of consumption customs or the global standardization of perception patterns and values – in all life connections becomes the globalisation immediately perceptible. However, with precise investigation of the globalisation process another picture will appear. Of a globalisation can be spoken only in several times limited sense. While more than 70 percent of the good exports move between the triad (the EU, Japan and the USA), less than 20 percent of the commercial volume are cancelled to nearly three quarters of the world population. The number of the trans-nationwide operating enterprises has risen ...

Greater interdependence is often taken to require more global governance, but the logic requires scrutiny. Cross-border spillovers do not always call for international rules. The canonical cases for global governance are based on two sets of circumstances: global commons and "beggar-thy-neighbor" (BTN) policies. The world economy is not a global commons (outside of climate change), and much of our current discussions deal with policies that are not true BTNs. Some of these are beggar-thyself policies; others may produce domestic benefits, addressing real market distortions or legitimate social objectives. The case for global governance in such policies, I will argue, is very weak, and possibly outweighed by the risk that global oversight or regulation would backfire. While these policy domains are certainly rife with failures, such failures arise not from weaknesses of global governance, but from failures of national governance and cannot be fixed through international agreements or multilateral cooperation. I advocate a mode of global governance that I call "democracy-enhancing global governance," to be distinguished from "globalization-enhancing global governance."

Global governance is in flux. Scholarship on the practice of global governance has reimagined it as a realm of disputes and confrontation, rather than one of interest-alignment within multilateral interstate forums. A profound sense of governance deficit is provoking critical reflection both within the corridors of power and among practitioners and scholars. A call within academic circles for renewed reflection on global governance as a practice-oriented scholarship has elicited varied responses from the international relation (IR) fraternity. In taking stock of the state of the art of 'global governance theory', a number of scholars have advocated for its revival to be grounded in the kind of critical reflection often absent from mainstream IR discussion. Others contest any meaningful demarcation between IR and global governance scholarship. This forum responds to a number of converging developments. Situating contributions broadly within the notion of an interregnum, it is a first cut towards a more innovative global governance research and practice-oriented agenda. We focus, in particular, on reframing the problematique of global governance from one dominated by multilateral interstate geopolitics, towards a critical reappraisal of both structure and political economy in light of the evident complexity of global governance systems.

Despite paying attention to a growing number of actors and agents, the literature on global governance remain remarkably traditional and Western-centric. Much of it still revolves around the existing multilateral system created under U.S. hegemony after World War II. In this paper, I propose a new understanding of studying global governance that reflects recent and ongoing global economic and political shifts. To this end, in the place of the traditional conception of a liberal world order within which the mainstream literature on global governance has been anchored, this paper employs the idea of a 'Multiplex World'. Unlike the former, the idea of a Multiplex World envisions a more pluralistic and diversified architecture of global governance shaped by a proliferation of transnational challenges, diffusion of new ideas, and expansion of actors and processes that lie at the center of global governance. A Multiplex World better captures the ongoing fragmentation of global governance, which in turn reflects a growing demand for new principles and approaches that cannot be accommodated by a simple extension of the existing but fading international order dominated by the US or the multilateral institutions it created. The concept of global governance, argues this paper, must come to terms with an emerging realities of the Multiplex World.

Der Emissionshandel als klimapolitisches Instrument erscheint deshalb besonders attraktiv, da er gleichzeitig zwei wesentliche Anforderungen an die Klimapolitik zu erfüllen verspricht - ökonomische Effizienz und ökologische Treffsicherheit. Die aktuellen politischen Verhandlungen zum Emissionshandel bewegen sich im Spannungsfeld regionaler, nationaler, europäischer und globaler Politik. Die vorgelegte Arbeit richtet den Analysefokus auf den politischen Prozess zum Emissionshandel in Deutschland seit Ende der 1990er Jahre. Die politische Debatte in Deutschland zur Umsetzung der flexiblen Mechanismen gemäß Kyoto-Protokoll von 1997 bzw. der europäischen Emissionshandelsrichtlinie von 2003 ist von erheblichen Widerständen gegen das Instrument gekennzeichnet. Die zentrale Forschungsfrage lautet: Kann die deutsche Klimapolitik den neuartigen Anforderungen des Handelns in der Global Governance-Architektur gerecht werden? Wenn nein: wo liegen die Ursachen hierfür und welche Vorschläge zur Verbesserung der Global Governance-Tauglichkeit lassen sich entwickeln?

Angesichts weltweiter Krisen und Konflikte ist eine stärkere Einbindung der Transnationalen Zivilgesellschaft notwendiger denn je. Ihr Engagement für mehr Demokratie, Transparenz und Gerechtigkeit brachte ihr den Status eines Hoffnungsträgers in der Global Governance ein – vor allem in den 1990er Jahren, als der Fokus zunehmend auf nichtstaatliche Akteure gerichtet wurde. Mit den globalen Herausforderungen der Jahrtausendwende rückten jedoch Nationalstaaten wieder in den Mittelpunkt, und es stellt sich die Frage, inwiefern die Akteure der Transnationalen Zivilgesellschaft angesichts dieser veränderten Konstellationen noch als Hoffnungsträger bei der Bewältigung weltweiter Krisen gelten können. Dieser Beitrag argumentiert, dass trotz wesentlicher Schwachstellen wie des Legitimitätsdefizits, der vielschichtigen Abhängigkeiten und der Ungleichheit im Nord-Süd-Gefälle die Transnationale Zivilgesellschaft eine essentielle Rolle in der Global Governance wahrnimmt. Sie führt zu mehr Effizienz in Governance-Strukturen, fördert demokratische Prozesse, schafft mehr Transparenz in internationalen Verhandlungen und leistet somit einen Beitrag zu einer gerechteren Welt – ein Hoffnungsträger also im globalen Mächtekonzert. ; In the light of worldwide crises and conflicts, stronger involvement of transnational civil society is more necessary than ever before. Its engagement for more democracy, transparency and equity has awarded the transnational civil society to the status of a bearer of hope within global governance – especially in the 1990s when non-governmental actors got into the focus of research. Facing the global challenges at the turn of the millennium, the nation state came back to center stage and the question has to be raised whether the actors of transnational civil society still are a bearer of hope to cope with the global crises. This article argues that in spite of significant deficiencies like the lack of legitimacy, complex dependencies and the disparity within the north-south divide, transnational civil society still is playing an essential role within global governance. It leads to more efficiency in governance structures, promotes democratic processes, creates more transparency in international negotiations and contributes to a fairer world – transnational civil society thus still is a bearer of hope in the global concert of power.