Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis article examines the problem of divergent judicial interpretation of harmonized documents. Drawing on the experience of harmonization of the law of arbitration, it points out that divergent interpretation runs much deeper than is commonly assumed, and shows strong similarities to the 'transplant effect' discussed in the literature on legal transplants. The article examines why the transplant effect shows up in harmonization, and considers its importance for the eventual success or failure of harmonization projects.

Although harmonization of EC banking laws has only just started, it does already have some practical significance, because in adjustments of national laws account is taken to some extent of the ideas developed on the level of the Community. Nevertheless, a number of problems make it doubtful that a meaningful harmonization in that field can be realized in the near future.

Globalization brings the perceived need for offsetting the effects of deregulation & world competition through harmonization & regulations. The author searches for an acceptable explanation for this approach & for counterarguments to explain its errors. The optimal degree of diversification & homogenization is determined by competition as producers are given free entry into markets. The current transformation of productive structures from big production units to a network style of producing suggests that a transformation of nations could evolve in parallel; functional federalism & competition are preferable to political integration. Harmonization is essentially the suppression of differences; whereas in a free market people seek for optimal differentiation. It is the diversity of standards, not set rules & standards, which bring innovations & profits to consumers. International public goods result in no one bearing direct responsibility for damages caused to specific individuals. It is the network of individuals, interdependent, but exercising individual rights, who use the price system & the judicial system to find solutions to their problems. 4 References. L. A. Hoffman

It is a widely acknowledged result of the literature on capital tax competition that underprovision of public goods can only be avoided if tax coordination between governments is intensive and residence-based capital taxation can be enforced. In this paper we use a model where commodity and factor taxes are available and we show that governments competing for tax bases will choose a globally efficient tax structure. In contrast to previous conclusions, we also show that the availability of a destination-based commodity tax or a labor tax is necessary to mitigate the problem of inefficient Nash equilibria and thus reduces the necessity of supranational tax harmonization or coordination.

The central bargain of CESL is to provide firms that do business throughout the European Union the protection of a set of uniform rules that will override the many local laws that now govern consumer and small business transactions. The price for that protection is that firms that opt into CESL must accept an onerous set of mandatory terms intended to protect consumers and SMEs. In practice that price is too steep. The key objective of all contractual arrangements is to secure mutual gains from trade for both sides. That objective is hampered by insisting on intrusive mandatory terms that make contracting more costly and less efficient that it ought to be. A far better approach, fully consistent the principle of subsidiarity, allows any firm to pick its preferred standardized terms for any given class of transactions. That approach has been adopted in the American decision in Carnival Cruise v. Shute. It should work equally well in the European context.