Heuristics and Biases in Bankruptcy Judges
In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 163, Heft 1, S. 199
ISSN: 1614-0559
In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 163, Heft 1, S. 199
ISSN: 1614-0559
International audience The concept of power provides a unique analytical tool to study, understand and explain organized action set ups. The paper lists a series of examples derived from the research practice of its author. Such a perspective does not imply that this tool by definition makes sense only for theoretical agendas dealing with power and domination issues. The paper also explores some scientific enigmas that are still open for further inquiry
BASE
In: Policy sciences: integrating knowledge and practice to advance human dignity ; the journal of the Society of Policy Scientists, Band 32, Heft 1, S. 59-94
ISSN: 0032-2687
In: [Evolution and cognition]
In: In: Essays in Financial Analytics. Springer. Forthcoming
SSRN
In: Policy sciences: integrating knowledge and practice to advance human dignity ; the journal of the Society of Policy Scientists, Band 32, Heft 1, S. 59
ISSN: 0032-2687
SSRN
Working paper
In: Strategic analysis: a monthly journal of the IDSA, Band 33, Heft 4, S. 590-606
ISSN: 1754-0054
In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 163, Heft 1, S. 167
ISSN: 1614-0559
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 33, Heft 4, S. 652-675
ISSN: 1552-8766
Flawed arguments often recur in debates on U.S. security policy long after their weaknesses have been exposed. In this article I argue that certain political misconceptions and fallacies resist counterargument because they are reinforced by particular reasoning shortcuts known as "cognitive heuristics." Although heuristics save time and mental work, they can lead to error because they are based on violable assumptions. I discuss seven different cognitive heuristics and the particular security fallacies they perpetuate — from the domino theory to the idea that deterrence requires force matching. Finally, the scope and limitations of such psychological explanations will be discussed.
In: Mirovaja ėkonomika i meždunarodnye otnošenija: MĖMO, Band 62, Heft 10, S. 114-123
In: European Political Science
Theories of policy responsiveness assume that political decision-makers can rationally interpret information about voters' likely reactions, but can we be sure of this? Political decision-makers face considerable time and information constraints, which are the optimal conditions for displaying decision-making biases—deviations from comprehensive rationality. Recent research has shown that when evaluating policies, political decision-makers display biases related to heuristics—cognitive rules of thumb that facilitate judgments and decision-making—when evaluating policies. It is thus likely that they also rely on heuristics in other situations, such as when forming judgments of voters' likely reactions. But what types of heuristics do political decision-makers use in such judgments, and do these heuristics contribute to misjudgements of voters' reactions? Existing research does not answer these crucial questions. To address this lacuna, we first present illustrative evidence of how biases related to heuristics contributed to misjudgements about voters' reactions in two policy decisions by UK governments. Then, we use this evidence to develop a research agenda that aims to further our understanding of when political decision-makers rely on heuristics and the effects thereof. Such an agenda will contribute to the literature on policy responsiveness.
In: Research & politics: R&P, Band 5, Heft 1, S. 205316801875666
ISSN: 2053-1680
Common visual heuristics used to interpret marginal effects plots are susceptible to Type-1 error. This susceptibility varies as a function of (a) sample size, (b) stochastic error in the true data generating process, and (c) the relative size of the main effects of the causal variable versus the moderator. I discuss simple alternatives to these standard visual heuristics that may improve inference and do not depend on regression parameters.
In: Reality of politics: estimates - comments - forecasts, Band 3, Heft 1, S. 237-251
The aim of this article is to describe the concept of political heuristics. It is most often understood as : party identification, political ideology, personal qualities of the candidate, candidate's relative viability, electability and momentum. In author's opinion, it is obvious that the so-called political heuristics do not lead to the best solution / choice. Moreover, this concept suggests that politics / political activity = elections. Political heuristics, as described in this article, are political pseudoheuristics, as they do not help solving political problems: they only help 'getting rid' of certain electoral problems. Sets of such political heuristics could be regarded as variants of political / electoral marketing mix.
The thirty-five chapters in this book describe various judgmental heuristics and the biases they produce, not only in laboratory experiments but in important social, medical, and political situations as well. Individual chapters discuss the representativeness and availability heuristics, problems in judging covariation and control, overconfidence, multistage inference, social perception, medical diagnosis, risk perception, and methods for correcting and improving judgments under uncertainty. About half of the chapters are edited versions of classic articles; the remaining chapters are newly written for this book. Most review multiple studies or entire subareas of research and application rather than describing single experimental studies. This book will be useful to a wide range of students and researchers, as well as to decision makers seeking to gain insight into their judgments and to improve them