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Abstract
This article questions the role of historical analogies in reaching – or not – effective and durable agreements. It compares two emblematic cases, the Israeli-Palestinian case and the Franco-Algerian case, and focuses on the tension that exists between the weight of the past and the need to move forward. The purpose of the article is not to reduce the hardest cases to their historical dimension. It is rather to show that the ways in which the memories of past events are interpreted, misinterpreted, or even manipulated create the context that shapes peace processes. The analysis is structured on the three main functions attributed to historical analogies: representing the unfamiliar, assigning social roles, and framing action. The examination of these functions helps us to better understand how negotiators and mediators can try to live with the memories rather than without them or against them.

Using a recent book by Jeffrey Record as a point of departure, this essay considers the role of historical analogies in decisions by U.S. leaders to use force during the Cold War. The analogies considered by Record those of Munich and Vietnam may have had a bearing on some decisions, but it is often difficult to assess their relative weight compared to other critical variables. Moreover, several analogies not considered by Record Pearl Harbor, for example may have been far more salient during certain crises than the analogies he examines. In any case, we need a more systematic analysis of historical analogies than Record provides if we are to gauge the real influence and impact of historical analogies on the Cold War.

This article offers a conceptual framework that broadens and enhances our understanding of the role of 'history' in contemporary governance and the attempts by policy‐makers to 'manage' critical issues. Building upon the literature on historical analogies in policy‐making, we distinguish three dimensions that clarify how the past may emerge in and affect the current deliberations, choices and rhetoric of policy‐makers. We apply this in a comparative examination of two cases of crisis management where historical analogies played an important part: the Swedish response to (alleged) submarine intrusions in 1982, and the European Union sanctions against Austria in 1999. We induce from the case comparison new concepts and hypotheses for unders

Established models of the domestic policymaking process accord some role to the individual decision‐maker, but they usually fail to show how policy decisions are ultimately influenced by the character of the information available to the policymakers concerned. Drawing on one prominent model of decision‐making developed by analysts of foreign policy—the analogical reasoning approach—this article proposes that individual‐level approaches are most useful in domestic policy analysis where decision‐makers must confront a discrete policy "episode" in which perceived levels of cognitive uncertainty and ambiguity are high. An analysis of decision‐making by political leaders during the 1967 Detroit riots reveals that these leaders made widespread use of historical analogies at various stages of the policymaking process. Policymakers can probably be expected to rely on analogizing under circumstances and contexts that make cognitive demands similar to those observed in the Detroit case.

This paper assesses the role that analogical reasoning played in Israel's decision making during the 2006 Second Lebanon War with Hezbollah. Two analogies seemed to dominate internal deliberations: the 'air power superiority' analogy which drew on more than a decade of developments in military theory and the air-based campaigns of the two Gulf wars and the Balkan wars of the mid-1990s and late 1990s; and the 'Lebanese quagmire' analogy which drew on Israel's own traumatic experience of Israel following the its first war in Lebanon in 1982. The misuse of these analogies by the Israeli political-military leadership during the war produced a myopic approach which advocated an almost total reliance on air power rather than ground maneuver to win the war and refrained from using ground forces for fear of entering another bloody and unpopular war in Lebanon. The constraining power of these analogies prevented the consideration of alternative courses of action or the effective calculation of cost-benefit analysis during the war. Whereas previous studies of the war provided various explanations to singular decisions or episodes, this paper shows that the air power and quagmire analogies contained the conceptual boundaries of Israeli decision making during the war and thus best explain its attraction and limitations. Adapted from the source document.

Analyzing mass protest movements in different countries this paper argues that protests against electoral fraud in Moscow in December 2011 do not represent "Russian Spring", "Orange Revolution", or a new version of Perestroika. Rather they have more in common with the Progressive movement that fought political corruption in the U.S. during the early part of the 20th century. The author notes that protest movement can provide new chances for institutional reforms and social development but only if main elite groups are ready to cooperate in elaboration of new more open and more transparent "rules of the game".

Which uses of historical analogies help us compose an intelligible picture of international relations and which ones mislead us? This paper deals with this question on three levels. First, my epistemological argument makes a case for a rhetorical-pragmatist stance on historical analogies. I contend that critical discussion and adjudication make it possible to extract leads for a better understanding of the world from historical analogies. Second, my methodological argument proposes a frame of guiding questions for such discussions. These address the repertoire from which we select historical interpretations for analogies, the manner in which we interpret them, the similarities and differences between the past and present phenomena that the analogy compares, and the new insights that this comparison generates. Third, I employ these questions to put under scrutiny the historical analogies that the protagonists of the American Empire use to make their case for the supposedly benign American imperialism.

"The economics profession both sanctioned and rationalized a business model of society which supported a minimally supervised rule of markets. As a consequence, the failure of markets has marginalized economics itself. It is left on the sidelines as politicians try to salvage something from the breakdown of the market order." Robert Skidelsky, 2009"When I was in college, I majored in political science. But if I were going through college today, I'd major in economics. It possesses a rigor that other fields in the social sciences don't—and often greater relevance as well. That's why economists are shaping national debates about everything from health care to poverty, while political scientists often seem increasingly theoretical and irrelevant." Nicholas D. Kristof, 2011Foreign policy decision makers tend to rely on historical analogies. The "surge" in Afghanistan, for example, was inspired in part by the "surge" in Iraq. Processes for dealing with foreign policy issues involving the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were substantially different from those processes in the Bush and Obama administrations aimed at dealing with economic crises in 2008 and 2009. The latter processes were influenced extensively by economists, especially in the Obama administration. The decisions to send additional troops to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan involved relatively few political scientists. More substantial input from political scientists in the decision making process about the surge in Afghanistan might have produced more knowledgeable and informative analyses of relevant historical and political data in the form of structured focused comparisons of the wars and counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as analyses and interpretations of data on larger numbers of cases pertaining to broader phenomena of which the US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan are examples. Perhaps political scientists deserve a role within foreign policy making processes more similar to that reserved for economists in processes focusing on economic issues.

This article asks the question, how foreign policy is explained by analyzing historical analogies that are voiced by policymakers? There had been attempts to answer this question already. In general four approaches based on the role of historical analogies they see can be outlined: instrumental, cognitive, cognitive-instrumental and constitutive. However a review of conventional approaches revealed their limits and questions that they ignore. None of the conventional approaches has a theoretical explanation of how policymakers use historical analogies in order to show differences between past and present events that they compare. None of the conventional approaches can explain the role of historical analogies in constituting rule-based context that governs actions of actors. Instrumental and cognitive approaches are not interested in consequences of historical analogy use. Instrumental, cognitive and cognitive-instrumental approaches do not explain constitutive role of the use of historical analogy.This article presents an alternative explanation of how and why policymakers use historical analogies and develops new model for analysis of historical analogies. It enables answering all of the above mentioned questions that conventional approaches can not. The model is based on the assumptions of rule-oriented constructivism, speech act theory and includes dialogical analysis method. Based on speech act theory use of language and in this case – use of historical analogy is a form of action. Historical analogy is not a simple comparison of past and present events but it is a comparison of what is perceived as social rules of the past and the present. Based on rule-oriented constructivism theoretical question how historical analogies construct social rules is answered. With dialogical analysis method empirical question how historical analogies construct social rules is answered.It is argued that historical analogies play two roles in foreign policy decision-making stage. First role is cognitive – policymakers use historical analogies in order to understand foreign policy issues with the help of intersubjective rules that are linked with particular past or present events. Second role is constitutive – foreign policy context, identities and interests of actors are constituted by giving them meanings that are related with particular rules of the past or present events.The role of historical analogies in foreign policy implementation stage is to construct rule-based context in which foreign policy takes place. This is not an individual action as the constitutive role of historical analogies may imply. Construction of rule-based context is a collective process that involves interaction between actors who use historical analogies and actors that are described by those historical analogies. Thus in order to explain foreign policy one needs to identify rules that actors follow and constitute. Thus the question, how foreign policy is explained by analyzing historical analogies, can be answered by identifying what type of rules and context are emerging out of interaction between policymakers who use historical analogies. ; Straipsnyje keliamas klausimas, kaip galima paaiškinti valstybės užsienio politiką analizuojant užsienio politikos veikėjų pasisakymuose naudojamas istorines analogijas ir su jomis susijusį užsienio politikos procesą. Teigiama, kad konvencinių požiūrių į istorinių analogijų vaidmenį užsienio politikos procese atstovai pernelyg siaurai apsibrėžia istorinės analogijos sampratą. Taip pat, kad besivadovaujantieji konvenciniais požiūriais, pirmenybę teikdami pozityvistų prielaidoms, jog istorija yra faktų rinkinys ir kalba nesvarbi arba aprašo tikrovę, apriboja galimybes tirti istorines analogijas. Straipsnyje formuluojamas naujas istorinių analogijų analizės modelis, apimantis taisyklių konstruktyvizmo ir kalbėjimo akto teorijos prielaidas bei dialoginės analizės metodą.

This article maps the historical analogies of the war on terrorism used by the Bush administration. It identifies four historical analogies of the war on terrorism present in the US political and academic discourse since the attacks on 11 September 2001. These are the war on terrorism as: (a) the Second World War; (b) the Crusades; (c) the Vietnam War; and (d) the Cold War. These analogies have been a constant presence in the US discourse, although the analogy with the Crusades has been more prominent in the academic discourse than in the political. There is, moreover, no conclusive pattern of when and how these analogies have been used, suggesting that we cannot use them to evaluate how well the war on terrorism is progressing. This also indicates that the Bush administration, with one exception, was not successful in framing the policy agenda in a certain direction regarding the war on terrorism. Understanding the war on terrorism as a new Cold War, for example, still implies different policy measures such as roll-back and containment.