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Established models of the domestic policymaking process accord some role to the individual decision‐maker, but they usually fail to show how policy decisions are ultimately influenced by the character of the information available to the policymakers concerned. Drawing on one prominent model of decision‐making developed by analysts of foreign policy—the analogical reasoning approach—this article proposes that individual‐level approaches are most useful in domestic policy analysis where decision‐makers must confront a discrete policy "episode" in which perceived levels of cognitive uncertainty and ambiguity are high. An analysis of decision‐making by political leaders during the 1967 Detroit riots reveals that these leaders made widespread use of historical analogies at various stages of the policymaking process. Policymakers can probably be expected to rely on analogizing under circumstances and contexts that make cognitive demands similar to those observed in the Detroit case.

Students of political psychology have long shown an interest in exploring how analogical reasoning affects decision‐making. However, the existing literature on analogical reasoning has remained within the rationalist explanatory framework by assuming that an actor's interests can be deduced from that actor's position in a certain material structure, thus treating those interests as unaffected by the process of analogical reasoning. This assumption unduly restricts the role that analogies may play. Analogies can do more than simply allow decision‐makers to figure out what specific policies will advance their preexisting interests—they can also determine the interests themselves. To demonstrate the benefits of moving the analogical literature beyond rationalism, this article explores the Reagan administration's policy toward American hostages in Lebanon, which culminated in the Iran‐Contra scandal.

Introduction /Yuichi Shionoya --1.Rational reconstruction of the German Historical School: an overview /Yuichi Shionoya --2.Adam Muller's 'Agronomische Briefe' /Tetsushi Harada --3.A lecture notebook of Wilhelm Roscher with special reference to his published works /Yukihiro Ikeda --4.Karl Knies's conception of political economy: the logical status of Analogie and Sitte /Jun Kobayashi --5.Lujo Brentano on the compulsory insurance system for workers in Germany /Sachio Kaku --6.Anonymous history in Austrian economic thought: from Carl Menger and Anton Menger to Friedrich von Wieser /Kiichiro Yagi --7.Gustav von Schmoller and Werner Sombart: a contrast in the historico-ethical method and social policy /Shin'ichi Tamura.

Examines the "social dimension" since the Treaty of Rome. Argues for choosing the correct social policies based upon the nature of the problem rather than ideological preconceptions or historical analogies; redistributing wealth, social integration, proper government intervention policies, and models for social policy without forming a European welfare state.

Michael Confino, Present events and the representation of the past. Some current problems in Russian historical writing. Historical writing is probably not just a re-enactment of the present by other means. Nevertheless, there is something of it in all historical writing. For that reason the real questions are : to what extent do current events influence the historian's work, and is he or she sufficiently aware of this influence and its by-products ?
The recent developments in Russia have had a profound effect on Soviet/Russian historical writing, and a devastating one on Western Sovietology. But they have also put on the agenda of Western historiography new questions, or given an acute topicality to old ones. Is this new turn justified by the organic development of the discipline ? Is it a "paradigmatic revolution" of sorts ? Or does it reflect rather some inadequacies in traditional historiography during the last thirty years or so ? Inadequacies such as deterministic and teleological approaches inspired by the "1917 paradigm" ? In turn, these approaches have generated an hypertrophy of phenomena such as the crisis of the Old Regime, revolutionary processes, and social instability. For how, indeed, could "1917" have happened without such kind of overwhelming phenomena ? But as is well known, historical logic does not always follow the logic of the common sense.
What have we learnt (about the present as well as about the past) from the recurrent and pervading ase of historical analogies as, for instance, between Gorbachev and Alexander I, or Yeltsin and Kerenski ? Do we need the constant evocation of reforms (failed or successful) in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in order to gauge the chances of success of the reforms in today's Russia ? Is Russian history repeating itself, or is there something atavistic in its course ? And is it the historian's task to predict the future instead of explaining the past ?
Are these new problems a symptom of the discipline's growth and maturity ? Or rather non-issues indicating a malaise and perhaps a crisis ?

The author examines the way in which recent dialogue surrounding "redemocratization" of former authoritarian political systems has been shaped. Proponents of economic liberalization in Latin America claim that this policy is essential to any plan to stimulate economic development, and they consider "democratic liberalism" the only political ideology conducive to growth. The author points out that this assumption is based on historical analogies to the massive growth in the economies of the USA and Western Europe after World War II, and that these analogies cannot be applied to the current situation in Latin America. (DÜI-Sen)

This study examines the rise of discourse on uncertainty in organization theory during the period 1879-1932. It offers qualitative analyses that are based on primary data collected from the American Machinist and the Engineering Magazine, central sources of documentation of management during this period. Introducing a social-constructivist approach to the empirical study of organizations, we argue that discourse on `uncertainty' has its roots in the technical sphere of industrial America. With time, elements of the concept were `translated' (metaphors, analogies, and paradigms) from the technical field to the management of organizations, thereby creating homologies between previously unrelated entities. Furthermore, claims to organizational reality depend, not only on metaphors and analogies borrowed from the technical realm, but also on the presence of an enabling social context. In this study, the context consists of (a) a network of mechanical engineers which diffused the concept, (b) the cultural spirit of the Progressive Era, and (c) the politics of labor unrest. We argue that the concept of uncertainty may be regarded as socially constructed knowledge that was created in a unique historical context and enacted by organizational actors and management theorists. The implications of this approach for contemporary organization theory are discussed.