Suchergebnisse

The paper presents the methods and means of conducting information policy by the Ukrainian authorities after the outbreak of the full-scale Russian invasion on 24 February 2022. The analysis is presented in institutional and functional terms using the method of functional analysis, which demonstrated that the information policy of Ukraine during the period of martial law is effective and provides the state (with) information security in terms of military aggression.

The system of protection of historical monuments in Poland, including Monuments of History, is not fully adapted to the political changes after 1989. An underestimated, important element of this system determining effective protection is professional architectural heritage management combining conservation with contemporary use of historical buildings. Interdependencies between conservation and non-conservation conditions force us to perceive the protection of monuments as a complex and interdisciplinary process – mutually correlated interactions on the historic object, in which conservation measures are the key, but not the only, activity. The organizational entirety of these activities is management. Monuments of History as the most valuable heritage should be a model of management of the national, historical resources. Fifteen years of experience of the Srebrna Góra (Silver Mountain) Fortress monument allow us to bring closer the objectives and complex conditions of related management activities as well as applications addressed to national authorities responsible for the protection of cultural heritage. ; System ochrony zabytków w Polsce, w tym pomników historii nie jest w pełni dostosowany do zmian ustrojowych po 1989 roku. Niedocenianym, istotnym elementem tego systemu determinującym skuteczną ochronę jest profesjonalne zarządzanie architektonicznym dziedzictwem łączące konserwację ze współczesnym użytkowaniem historycznych obiektów. Współzależności konserwatorskich i pozakonserwatorskich uwarunkowań wymuszają dziś postrzeganie ochrony zabytków jako złożonego i interdyscyplinarnego procesu – skorelowanych ze sobą oddziaływań na zabytkowy obiekt, w którym zabiegi konserwatorskie są kluczową, ale nie jedyną działalnością. Całością organizacyjną tych działań jest zarządzanie. Pomniki historii jako najcenniejsze dziedzictwo powinny być wzorem zarządzania dla krajowego, zabytkowego zasobu. Piętnastoletnie doświadczenia pomnika Twierdza Srebrna Góra pozwalają przybliżyć cele i złożone uwarunkowania powiązanych ze sobą działań zarządczych oraz wnioski adresowane do władz krajowych odpowiedzialnych za ochronę kulturowego dziedzictwa.

The objective of this study is to identify and analyse the methods of disinformation utilized by Russia to disseminate information in the Ukrainian information field. The main tasks include defining the concept of disinformation and explaining its societal dangers, characterising Information-Psychological Operations (IPSO) as a component of Russia's disinformation campaign against Ukraine and investigating the most prevalent elements utilised by Russia in the dissemination of disinformation. This study is aimed at the synthesis and combination of methods of monitoring, content analysis, and comparative analysis. The article selects publications that exhibit disinformation targeted at Ukrainian society. Disinformation propagated by Russia is subsequently refuted by either foreign or Ukrainian publications, including the "NotaEnota" organisation. The study reveals that Russian disinformation aims to propagate specific narratives and manipulate mass consciousness. Disinformation involves intentionally creating misleading and manipulative content, often in the form of artificially created fakes. The information field of Ukraine has become the primary battleground for Russia's hybrid warfare tactics, which include disinformation, propaganda, and fakes. To effectively counter these tactics, society needs to develop critical thinking skills and media literacy to discern and evaluate information critically. Future research aims to delve deeper into the methods employed in creating disinformation, their objectives, and potential strategies to prevent or counteract their influence.

The Conference on "Recovering Forgotten History" is one of the oldest attempts undertaken in the III Republic to defend Poland's (and East- Central Europe's) image abroad, especially in the US. From 2006, the Conference has organized its seminars, originally bi-annually and now annually, to provide a forum for discussions between the authors of English-language history textbooks and monographs, and Polish historians who review those publications. Arguments are scholarly, grounded in evidence of primary sources and historiography, therefore, they are convincing in combatting Western prejudices and clichés about Poland and East-Central Europe. Additionally, the Conference provides opportunities for sightseeing of Poland's historical places. As a result, the work of the Conference leads not only to the removal of countless mistakes and misinterpretations in the reviewed books but also to a change of guests' attitudes toward this part of Europe. For the most part, they are academic teachers, who can also influence students through their classes. The Conference achieves all of this while having very modest means at its disposal.

Information in the modern world is a strategic resource that decisive the competitive advantage of countries on the international arena. In order to ensure the appropriate quality of the information resources held as well as the processes and mechanisms of their acquisition, processing and protection, individual countries develop and implement an information security policy. The implementation of this policy is supported by various instruments, among which the supervision and control of the Internet deserve attention. The aim of the article is to discuss the supervision and control of the Internet as an instrument of information security policy, considering the specificity of democratic, totalitarian and authoritarian states. For the purposes of the research, the method of analyzing the literature and the method of synthesis were used. It has been proven that, regardless of the political regime, state-owned entities use Internet supervision and control, while the main objectives of these activities are different. In democratic countries, it is primarily for the protection and defense of cherished social values and goods, in totalitarian and authoritarian countries for the realization of the particular interests of those in power.

In the public discourse on issues of international security in the context of threats created by the Russian Federation, such threats are determined primarily by actions below the threshold of "war" (of a hybrid nature) and are made using non-military means, e.g. in relation to cyberspace. Actions of this nature are carried out by the aggressor's special services or groups of hackers and activists associated with them whose aim is to paralyse the functioning of the attacked state (its administration, critical infrastructure). Such activities are multilateral; activity is undertaken in many fields (social media, provocative events, establishing pro-Russian organizations, creating information portals) and is still escalating. The purpose of the research, the results of which are presented in this article, is to identify the activities and assess the impact of Russian information warfare conducted by the Russian Federation in cyberspace in 2014 and 2022 on the security of Ukraine. The research used general-methodological research methods – primarily, analysis and critique of literature. The case study method was used to identify specific examples of information warfare used by the Russian Federation against selected countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Keywords: security, information warfare, cyberspace, Ukraine, Russian Federation Streszczenie: W dyskursie publicznym zagadnienia bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego w kontekście zagrożeń kreowanych przez Federację Rosyjską determinowane są przede wszystkim przez akcje z użyciem działań poniżej progu wojny (o charakterze hybrydowym) za pomocą środków niemilitarnych, m.in. w odniesieniu do cyberprzestrzeni. Działania o takim charakterze prowadzone są przez służby specjalne agresora lub powiązane z nimi grupy hakerów oraz aktywistów, których celem jest paraliżowanie funkcjonowania państwa atakowanego (jego administracji, infrastruktury krytycznej).