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ABSTRACTMass customization provides a mechanism by which firms can better target a broad scope of consumer preferences and thus, in so doing, potentially increase their profits. We study product‐design and price competition between two mass‐customizing firms that serve consumers with varying tastes and finite reservation prices. Mass customization has recently received notable attention in both industry and academia, but yet there have been few studies concerning its impact in competitive settings. We contribute to this sparse literature by analyzing a two‐stage non‐cooperative game between two firms serving a Hotelling linear city. By comparing symmetric equilibrium results in settings with and without mass customization, we find that customization changes the nature of competition. More specifically, we show that with customization, a symmetric equilibrium emerges only if the firms' customization cost lies below a threshold, however, the magnitude of that cost does not influence product design decisions in equilibrium. We find that the equilibrium with customizing firms will not sustain cost levels above that threshold. Furthermore, we show that mass customizers earn higher equilibrium profits when consumers' fit sensitivity either significantly or only slightly exceeds the product valuation. On the contrary, traditional firms are better off when facing moderate fit sensitivity. We also establish that competition with mass customization may lead to lower profits and consumer surplus.

I had the good fortune to grow up in a wonderful area of Jerusalem, surrounded by a diverse range of people: Rabbi Meizel, the communist Sala Marcel, my widowed Aunt Hannah, and the intellectual Yaacovson. As far as I'm concerned, the opinion of such people is just as authoritative for making social and economic decisions as the opinion of an expert using a model. Part memoir, part crash-course in economic theory, this deeply engaging book by one of the world's foremost economists looks at economic ideas through a personal lens. Together with an introduction to some of the central concepts in modern economic thought, Ariel Rubinstein offers some powerful and entertaining reflections on his childhood, family and career. In doing so, he challenges many of the central tenets of game theory, and sheds light on the role economics can play in society at large. The book is as thought-provoking for seasoned economists as it is enlightening for newcomers to the field. Sylvia Nasar, author of A Beautiful Mind, describes Economics Fables as a "wonderfully inviting introduction to game theory, rich in personalities, history and sense of place. Ariel Rubinstein is not only a brilliant theorist with a knack for lucid exposition, but a gifted storyteller. Students will find the ideas surprisingly accessible. Aspiring scholars, wondering whether a life of the mind is worth pursuing, will find his personal journey of intellectual discovery thrilling".

I had the good fortune to grow up in a wonderful area of Jerusalem, surrounded by a diverse range of people: Rabbi Meizel, the communist Sala Marcel, my widowed Aunt Hannah, and the intellectual Yaacovson. As far as I'm concerned, the opinion of such people is just as authoritative for making social and economic decisions as the opinion of an expert using a model. Part memoir, part crash-course in economic theory, this deeply engaging book by one of the world's foremost economists looks at economic ideas through a personal lens. Together with an introduction to some of the central concepts in modern economic thought, Ariel Rubinstein offers some powerful and entertaining reflections on his childhood, family and career. In doing so, he challenges many of the central tenets of game theory, and sheds light on the role economics can play in society at large. The book is as thought-provoking for seasoned economists as it is enlightening for newcomers to the field. Sylvia Nasar, author of A Beautiful Mind, describes Economics Fables as a "wonderfully inviting introduction to game theory, rich in personalities, history and sense of place. Ariel Rubinstein is not only a brilliant theorist with a knack for lucid exposition, but a gifted storyteller. Students will find the ideas surprisingly accessible. Aspiring scholars, wondering whether a life of the mind is worth pursuing, will find his personal journey of intellectual discovery thrilling."

A study of manufacturer-retailer marketing strategies: A differential game approach -- The feedback Stackelberg equilibrium in the cartel-versus-fringe model -- A Stackelberg-Nash model for the design of deregulated transit system -- A game theoretical approach to public investment versus private investment -- Entry with new multiproduct technologies -- Distributed hierarchical team resource allocation -- Incentive strategies in an inter-firm coordination arrangement -- Strategic bargaining and difference games -- Game-theoretic modelling in the dynamic pricing of electricity -- On intertemporal cooperation — A dynamic stochastic problem with nonadditive group utility function -- Differential games and the optimal management of transboundary fisheries -- Economic planning and uncertainty in renewable resources -- Pollution Vs. Nature - differential game models -- A nonzero-sum game with variable final time -- Environmental problem as a commonproperty resource game -- The environmental-economic planning model with the dynamic stackelberg game -- Heterogeneous discount rates: A generalization of Hotelling's rule -- Investment, harvest, and taxation strategies of the forest sector: A differential game approach with a computational decision-aid -- Transboundary air pollution between Finland and the USSR — A dynamic acid rain game -- The derivation of feedback stackelberg equilibria in dynamic economic games -- Dynamic game strategies for corporate demand models in national economy -- Hierarchical dynamic planned-economy models with central government coordination of one-step delay information -- Non-cooperative equilibrium solutions for a stochastic dynamic game of economic stabilization policies -- Dynamic hierarchical N-Person games theory with coalitions -- Approaching core solutions by means of continuous bargaining -- Optimal portfolio selection as a bargaining game -- A note on the dynamic risk sensitive nash games -- Equilibrium points in constrained minimization and games -- A cooperative game governed by a differential inclusion -- Regulation of linear quadratic games -- The time consistency of the optimality principles in non-zero sum differential games.

Abstract
In this paper, a general framework is built up to model the dynamic of consumer health plan choice and individual health insurance market competition. A primary goal is to identify driving forces to individual health insurance equilibrium market coverage and premium. In the baseline model, we introduce plan quality information search cost as an additional determinant to consumer's plan choice. Health insurers compete under the Hotelling's game theory framework. Equilibrium solutions of the baseline model highlight the importance of budget limit and information search cost to health plan enrollment. The more important objective is to examine the impact of market entrants on equilibrium insurance market coverage and plan prices. In the model with market entry, we add an additional dimension to the baseline model. Equilibrium solutions and numerical studies show positive impact of higher insurance market coverage and lower health plan prices. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) brought multiple unprecedented changes to the health insurance market and provided opportunities to study market dynamics and driving forces. The ACA health insurance exchange market experience shows consistency with our model findings even at the early stage of implementation. More importantly, market observations suggest that entry barriers of claim costs and information search cost are high for entrants.

Harold Hotelling's work, from natural resources economics to optimal taxation, and from spatial to welfare economics, was deeply influenced by his Georgist affiliation and by a Georgist game that we now call Monopoly, which at the time was known as the Landlord's Game. We explore this influence, its history, and the role it played in Hotelling's work and ideas. We show that political beliefs deeply shaped Hotelling's approach to economics and that the rules of the Landlord's Game helped him think about economic mechanisms.

International audience ; We study a linear location model (Hotelling, 1929) in which n (with n ≥ 2) boundedly rational players follow (noisy) myopic best-reply behavior. We show through numerical and mathematical analysis that such players spend almost all the time clustered together near the center, re-establishing Hotelling's " Principle of Minimum Differentiation " that had been discredited by equilibrium analyses. Thus, our analysis of the best-response dynamics shows that when considering e.g. market dynamics as well as their policy and welfare implications, it may be important to look beyond equilibrium analyses

International audience We study a linear location model (Hotelling, 1929) in which n (with n ≥ 2) boundedly rational players follow (noisy) myopic best-reply behavior. We show through numerical and mathematical analysis that such players spend almost all the time clustered together near the center, re-establishing Hotelling's " Principle of Minimum Differentiation " that had been discredited by equilibrium analyses. Thus, our analysis of the best-response dynamics shows that when considering e.g. market dynamics as well as their policy and welfare implications, it may be important to look beyond equilibrium analyses

We thank participants of the WEHIA meeting in Nice, the SAET conference in Rio de Janeiro and the Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society in Hong Kong, as well as seminar participants at King's College for comments and discussions. Part of this research has benefited from financial support from the French government managed by l'Agence Nationale de la Recherche under Investissements d'Avenir UCAJEDI(ANR-15-IDEX-01). In particular, we thank the UCAinACTION project. ; International audience ; We study a linear location model (Hotelling, 1929) in which n (with n ≥ 2) boundedly rational players follow (noisy) myopic best-reply behavior. We show through numerical and mathematical analysis that such players spend almost all the time clustered together near the center, re-establishing Hotelling's " Principle of Minimum Differentiation " that had been discredited by equilibrium analyses. Thus, our analysis of the best-response dynamics shows that when considering e.g. market dynamics as well as their policy and welfare implications, it may be important to look beyond equilibrium analyses

We thank participants of the WEHIA meeting in Nice, the SAET conference in Rio de Janeiro and the Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society in Hong Kong, as well as seminar participants at King's College for comments and discussions. Part of this research has benefited from financial support from the French government managed by l'Agence Nationale de la Recherche under Investissements d'Avenir UCAJEDI(ANR-15-IDEX-01). In particular, we thank the UCAinACTION project. ; International audience ; We study a linear location model (Hotelling, 1929) in which n (with n ≥ 2) boundedly rational players follow (noisy) myopic best-reply behavior. We show through numerical and mathematical analysis that such players spend almost all the time clustered together near the center, re-establishing Hotelling's " Principle of Minimum Differentiation " that had been discredited by equilibrium analyses. Thus, our analysis of the best-response dynamics shows that when considering e.g. market dynamics as well as their policy and welfare implications, it may be important to look beyond equilibrium analyses