The policy of pressure on Croatia as an illustrative -- although not isolated -- example has not inspired empirical & theoretical studies of this phenomenon. The discussion has remained at the level of everyday political discourse, even "coffee-house politics." Due to its extreme topicality, as well as its theoretical "solvency," the author has attempted with this essay to come up with a theoretical definition of the concept of pressure & to demonstrate on the Croatian example its goals, scope, dynamics, & future prospects & outcomes. Among the existing approaches, the author has chosen the "politico-economic approach" which defines the policy of pressure as a specific form of political communication between the "center" & the "periphery" in Wallerstein's "world system." The example of Croatia serves the author as an ideal-type model of such communication through a combination of political science & sociological analysis. In his opinion, & due to certain favorable contingencies, Croatia is the nearest to the ideal type of such communication. Due to a lack of systematic empirical data, the discussion naturally remains at the theoretical-hypothetical level, & should be understood as an invitation to further discussion & as an incentive for more extensive empirical research. However, since this is a very dynamic phenomenon, the question is: is the author's argumentation still valid today as it was at the time when the essay was written? There have been two changes: (1) the war on Kosovo which proves the author's hypotheses; & (2) a certain "thaw" in the relations between the international community (particularly USA) & Croatia (it is still unclear whether this change concerns the fundamental strategic trends or is solely a "politico-meteorological" phenomenon (the alteration of colder & warmer periods). This is why the author did not deem any alterations in the text necessary; one should wait & in the meantime expose the (hypo)theses to some critical scrutiny. 12 References. Adapted from the source document.
The cognitive worth of the concept of totalitarianism is constantly refuted. In this text, the author begins by confronting his perception of totalitarianism as a new social formation, which he advocated in many of his works, with four scientific arguments raised by historians against totalitarianism as a political category or in favour of a limited use thereof. The first is that communism and fascism are fundamentally different, that the ideologies which characterize them are radically opposed to one another. This argument overlooks the fact that in such regimes ideology is not merely the prevalent discourse -- it has a new function and efficiency, it establishes a totalitarian "regime" of language and thought in which the power of discourse and the discourse of power are made equal. The second argument is that totalitarianism is evident, in Germany and Russia, only during limited periods. To this the author replies that it is a "realistic" illusion to assume that the totalitarian project was ever fully realized in history. According to the third objection, the concept of totalitarianism is of no cognitive worth to the historian, and totalitarian regimes belong to the order of contingency, and not of historical necessity. On the other hand, the author stresses the historical novelty of totalitarianism, which does spring and can spring only from the modern "democratic revolution" (in Tocqueville's sense) as a radical refutation thereof. The final objection of a methodologically aware historian (F. Furet) is that the concept of totalitarianism can be analytically fruitful only if used as an "ideal type", as a common trait of regimes established in atomized societies through total domination by way of ideology and terror. To this the author replies that we cannot be satisfied with the use of the concept "ideal type", although it is true that it liberates the historian from the naivety of positivistic descriptive historiography. The making of an ideal type thus makes it possible to avoid the choice between philosophy and descriptive history, but only inasmuch as the historian is transformed into a cognizant subject which is external with regard to history. In the second part of the text, the author provides a critical evaluation of the theory of totalitarianism by H. Arendt, particularly her central thesis that totalitarian society comes into being in modern atomized society. Namely, totalitarianism is characterized, on the one hand, by an artificialist project of organization, and, on the other, by a substantialist ideal of incorporation: both are realized in the Party, which is not only devised as an organization, but is also a "mystical person" in which all its members are brought together. As such, it incorporates the people. The figure of the indivisible people is put forward in the Party; the figure of the indivisible party is put forward in the figure of the people. In the first, organizational aspect the Party contains the project of an organisable whole, while in the other, substantialist aspect it contains the project of an incorporable whole. Adapted from the source document.
The work General Theory of Modernity prompts us to reflect on & understand modernity as a fusion of two constitutive moments: the declarative moment, as an affirmation of the right to emancipation which is capable of constant revolutionary extension, & capitalism, which is simultaneously dynamic & revolutionary, a system both destructive & exploitative. There are two wrong ways of understanding this fusion. According to the liberal understanding, the declarative moment is accomplished in capitalism. According to the vulgar Marxist understanding, the emancipatory moment is a mere ideological illusion. Bidet's concept of "metastructure" offers a possibility of a more adequate understanding of the fusion. In Bidet's understanding of the metastructure of modernity, which is based on a specific reading & reconstruction of Marx's Capital, the metastructure designates a general matrix of possibilities of combining market & organization, as basic structural characteristics of modern society. The author critically disproves such an approach. It is better to start from the structure, from an analysis of capitalism, & show that capitalism also opens up emancipatory horizons which make it possible to refute capitalism. An adequate understanding of modernity requires an adequate theory of capitalism rather than a general theory of modernity. Such an approach does not reduce the normative discourse to some sort of super-structural epiphenomenon. It is logically quite possible to assert that certain principles & ideals emerge in a concrete historical context, but one can also assert that the contents of those principles & ideals transcend that context. Adapted from the source document.
The author reviews the interchange between Jurgen Habermas & John Rawls, published in The Journal of Philosophy in Mar 1995. Habermas's criticism of Rawls's theory of justice as fairness is constructive & immanent. Habermas raises three objections against Rawls's theory. The first is that Rawls's design of original position is not adequate to clarify & secure the standpoint of impartial judgment of the principles of justice. The second is that Rawls should make a sharper distinction between the question of justification & that of acceptance of a theory of justice. The third is that Rawls does not succeed in bringing the liberties of moderns into harmony with the liberties of pre-moderns. The first two of Habermas's objections reveal the main thought of his criticism of Rawls, which is that Rawls's theory of justice as fairness is substantive, not procedural, & therefore is wrong. The third of Habermas's objections refers to a consequence of Rawls's theory of a rigid boundary between the political & non-political identities of citizens. In his reply to Habermas, Rawls emphasizes two main differences between his own & Habermas's theory. The first is that Habermas's theory is "comprehensive," while Rawls's is "political." The is that Habermas uses as means of representation the situation of ideal discourse, which is a part of his theory of communicative action, while Rawls uses the original position. Rawls answers in turn Habermas' objections & defends his liberal theory of justice as fairness as substantive justice. Adapted from the source document.
The author reviews the interchange between Jurgen Habermas & John Rawls, published in The Journal of Philosophy in Mar 1995. Habermas's criticism of Rawls's theory of justice as fairness is constructive & immanent. Habermas raises three objections against Rawls's theory. The first is that Rawls's design of original position is not adequate to clarify & secure the standpoint of impartial judgment of the principles of justice. The second is that Rawls should make a sharper distinction between the question of justification & that of acceptance of a theory of justice. The third is that Rawls does not succeed in bringing the liberties of moderns into harmony with the liberties of pre-moderns. The first two of Habermas's objections reveal the main thought of his criticism of Rawls, which is that Rawls's theory of justice as fairness is substantive, not procedural, & therefore is wrong. The third of Habermas's objections refers to a consequence of Rawls's theory of a rigid boundary between the political & non-political identities of citizens. In his reply to Habermas, Rawls emphasizes two main differences between his own & Habermas's theory. The first is that Habermas's theory is "comprehensive," while Rawls's is "political." The is that Habermas uses as means of representation the situation of ideal discourse, which is a part of his theory of communicative action, while Rawls uses the original position. Rawls answers in turn Habermas' objections & defends his liberal theory of justice as fairness as substantive justice. Adapted from the source document.
The author claims that in Hegel's Philosophy of Law there are two convergent, overlapping, & concurrent tendencies. The first asserts that the state is such a condition of society in which the universal will of citizens is paramount. It is the sole source of positive law, since only the state warrants the laws that do not do injustice to its subjects. In this theory, the state is considered an ideal universal entity, adjusted to the speculative shifts of auto-reflection. The second claims that as the rational state, the state is a union of different interests, providing good life for its citizens. The principle of their union is a particular benefit; not self-determination as the absolute principle but mutual compromise, mutual achievement & relatively equal contribution that creates interdependence. These two tendencies have entirely defined the understanding of the state in the German cultural space: at one time it is an ideal association among reflective individuals, & at other an apparatus of power. These two abstract solutions may only be overcome via a forceful democratic mediation of the civil society. Adapted from the source document.
Pokrovčeva knjiga Slobodno stvaranje prava: Herman U. Kantorowicz i slobodnopravni pokret (2018) nameće pitanje izraženo naslovom ovog rada na koje rad odgovara u tri koraka: prvo, pretpostavkom da je pitanje odgovorivo samo idealnim tipovima pravnih disciplina / funkcija; drugo, upućivanjem na kontekst Kantorowiczevih gledišta, osobito na objavu presuda; treće, ocjenom da je Kantorowicz podijelio pravnu znanost u prepletene funkcije a ne u odvojene discipline. U tu svrhu rad nudi idealne tipove disciplina i funkcija pravne dogmatike, pravne historije, pravne teorije i, kao najsloženiji i najkorisniji skup funkcija, pravnopolitičku analizu. Pretpostavka je, koja se ne dokazuje, da ne postoji ni oštra granica između pravne znanosti i susjednih znanosti: sociologije, ekonomije, psihologije, filozofije. ; Is Herman U. Kantorowicz's classification of legal disciplines - which includes general legal science, legal dogmatics, legal history, sociology of law, philosophy of law, and legal policy - a division of scholarly knowledge of law into distinct disciplines/sciences or into intertwined functions of a single scholarly discipline/science? The question is prompted by the book written by Zoran Pokrovac entitled Slobodno stvaranje prava: Hermann U. Kantorowicz i slobodnopravni pokret (Free Law: Hermann U. Kantorowicz and the Free Law Movement ) and published by "Breza" and the Faculty of Law of the University of Split in 2018. Answering this question may assist Croatian legal scholars in finding standards of scholarly excellence, especially of research de lege ferenda. This paper offers an answer in three steps. The first is the recognition that scholarly practices differ considerably, which means that the question may be answered only by construing and correlating ideal types of legal disciplines / functions that are compatible with Kantorowicz's general ideas, prominent interpretations of legal scholarship, and Croatian mainstream legal scholarship since. The second step provides a context of Kantorowicz's ...
The author analyzes Rawls's concept of the overlapping consensus in the light of the recently published set of instructions of the Vatican's Congregation for the doctrine of the faith about the participation of Catholics in political life. Rawls introduces the idea of the overlapping consensus as an institutional mechanism aimed at avoiding imposing a comprehensive moral, philosophical, or religious doctrine on all citizens & thus preserving the pluralism of values of contemporary liberal-democratic societies. By comparing the basic outlines of Rawls's theory of political liberalism with the set of instructions of the Catholic Church about the participation of its flock in political life, signed by Cardinal Ratzinger, the author challenges the viability of this concept of Rawls's, as well as the possibility of reconciling the liberal notion of the citizen with the Catholic ideal of the participation of believers in the political life of their communities. 6 References. Adapted from the source document.
The text problematizes Hobbes's relation towards republicanism. This is carried out in three stages. The first stage shows the form in which republican ideas were present in English political thought in the first half of the 17th century. It turns out that, prior to the publication of Leviathan in 1651, there was no coherent anti-monarchic republican theory in England. Still, English political thought was familiar with its individual elements and those elements had a major influence on the course of the constitutional crisis and the civil war itself. The second stage provides an analysis of Hobbes's criticism of two republican ideas which he deems particularly fatal to the survival of the state. The first idea is the ideal of mixed government, which Hobbes rejects as incompatible with the fundamental condition of state preservation, namely indivisible sovereign power. Thereafter, relying on Skinner's analysis, the author outlines Hobbes's criticism of the republican conception of liberty, which is at the core of the attack on monarchy as a form of state incompatible with the liberty of citizens. In contrast to such a perception, Hobbes constructs a completely novel definition of liberty, which enables him to show that the liberty of citizens is equal in democracy, aristocracy and monarchy. Finally, the third stage inquires into the implications of Hobbes's criticism of republicanism with regard to the conceptual field of his mature theory of the state. Emphasis is put on the assertion that this criticism does not also imply a rejection of democracy as a form of state. Indeed, the analysis shows that, within the framework of Hobbes's theory of the state, criticism of republicanism, perceived as vindication of the state, is prerequisite to the existence of democracy itself. Adapted from the source document.
This article explains the characteristics of Chinese aesthetics through the basic concepts of original Confucianism and original Daoism. These theories all regard aesthetic activities as a whole integrated with life cultivation. But the Confucian view believes that from the individual to the country, harmony between all people and the imperial power can be achieved through musical education. The Daoist view believes that abandoning secular utilitarian thinking can remove all obstacles to the development of human nature and connect human nature with nature to achieve spiritual freedom. This attitude has become the process of the artist's pursuit of the highest artistic achievement. For further explanation, this article introduces the theories of figure painters Gu Kaizhi and Xie He, and the theories of landscape painters Guo Xi and Jing Hao. The change from figure painting to landscape painting is not only due to the influence of political reality, but also to the development of the theory of artistic creation based on the ideal realm advocated by Confucianism and Daoism. ; Ovaj članak objašnjava karakteristike kineske estetike kroz osnovne koncepte izvornog konfucijanizma i izvornog daoizma. Ove teorije promatraju estetske aktivnosti kao cjelinu integriranu s kultivacijom života. No, konfucijansko gledište vjeruje da se od pojedinca do države sklad između svih ljudi i imperijalne moći može postići glazbenim obrazovanjem. Daoističko gledište vjeruje da napuštanje sekularnog utilitarnog mišljenja može ukloniti sve prepreke razvoju ljudske prirode i povezati ljudsku prirodu s prirodom radi postizanja duhovne slobode. Ovaj je pristup postao proces umjetnikove težnje za najvišim umjetničkim dostignućem. Za daljnje objašnjenje, ovaj članak predstavlja teorije slikara figura Gua Kaizhija i Xiea Hieja, te teorije pejzažnih slikara Gua Xija i Jinga Haoa. Promjena od slikarstva figura do pejzažnog slikarstva nije samo posljedica utjecaja političke stvarnosti, već i razvoja teorije umjetničkog stvaralaštva utemeljene na ...
The paper reports partial findings of a research project into Croatian ethnonationalism (Croatian: narodnjastvo) as a religion (in the sense of a human invention of the sacred). The practical problems are as follows: ethnonationalism as a religion, which implies inter alia that an ethnic community (Croatian: narod) has the potential and/or capability to develop into, and ought to become, the substratum of a (nation-)state; consequences of ethnonationalism, which include the unattainability of ethnic democracy, ethnic economy and ethnic maturity; conditions of Croatian ethnonationalism, primarily the Catholic Church as a condition in 1961-71, and also before and after the period, especially since 1990. Theoretical problems, i.e. inadequacies in scholarly knowledge of the practical problems, include the following: firstly, Croatian Constitutional Court jurisprudence on ethnic and religious communities; secondly, systematic history of law and state in Croatia and Yugoslavia 1945-90; thirdly, transformation of both communism and catholicism into ethnonationalism; fourthly and fifthly, social structure and representation/agency. To attain the general goal of the research project, which is the use of reason in public affairs, the research is carried out within the theoretical and methodological framework of an integral theory of law and state which includes a modified Lasswell and McDougal's policy analysis expanded by historical institutionalism and critical theory. The subject-matter are the following features of Catholicism as an institutionalized religion, especially in Croatia 1961-71: (1) law, i.e. (1.1) sources of law; (1.2) internal law (organs, members, means); (1.3) external law (relations with the state and non-Catholics); (2) the Church and economy; (3) the Church and nation; (4) Catholicism on theory and practice. The hypotheses (which are ideal-types and as such cannot be either verified or falsified conclusively) are that ethnonationalism in Croatia is a consequence of, inter alia, the following beliefs maintained by the Catholic Church in Croatia in the 1960s and to a significant degree later on: 1. the only acceptable relationship between the Church and the state is the partnership of two legally equal public orders over the same subjects within which the Church has the exclusive power to regulate matrimonial and other family relations, and the power to control education in public schools; 2. peasant family is the basic organic human community; 3. the subjects to the ecclesiastical -- originally feudal -- power tied in fact to land make the ethnic community (Croatian: narod), which is united with the clergy into the Christian community (Croatian: krscanski narod); 4. since fundamental truths are accessible by theology only, and practice is an application of theory, practical knowledge, especially on the appropriate relationship between the Church and the state, is valid only if in accord with Church teaching. The evidence presented in the paper supports to a significant degree the hypotheses. The research findings contribute to the solution of all the theoretical problems, providing major contributions to the second and the third: the most probable reason why the Catholic Church in Croatia was rather silent in the Yugoslav and Croatian Spring 1961-71 and quite vocal since the 1990 is the Croatian Church's allegiance in matters of Church and state more to the First than to the Second Vatican council (which abandoned the Church's "divine" right to be co-sovereign with the state, exposing the "right" as a human invention of the sacred); the Church's ethnonationalism, which facilitates the political partnership of the Church and the state and ensures the dominant position of the clergy within the Church, has coincided with the interest of Yugoslav communists to retain their might and power by a metamorphosis, with the Church's assistance honoured by a concordat, into Croatian ethnonationalists, who, as newly born capitalists, have appropriated the greater part of the former socialist property and continue appropriating the greater part of present public goods. Adapted from the source document.
Ovaj rad polazi od manjkave osmišljenosli uloge suvremene demokratske države sa željom da nastavi diskusiju o demokratskoj državi kao jednom idealu koji u potpunosti još nigdje nije do kraja realiziran. Autor kritizira neprikladan odnos prema državi koji je pod okriljem Marxove teorije razvijan u jednom duljem razdoblju kod nas. Ljudima koji bi htjeli olako ukinuti državu, ili je svesti na samo jednu dimenziju, po autorovu mišljenju, treba stalno obraćati pažnju na činjenicu da je život u čitavoj ovoj našoj civilizaciji vezan uz cjeline koje traže neprekidno rješavanje određenih zadataka. Država prema tome nije po sebi loša, već je loša samo u slučaju ako djeluje protivno javnim interesima. U suvremenosti je posebno interesantna uloga države u rješavanju ekološke problematike, što autor ističe kao primjer potrebe razumijevanja države kao regulator zajedničkih poslova. Po autorovom mišljenju država kao regulator zajedničkih poslova ima još mnogo zadataka i treba je stalno usavršavati i osposobljavati da ih izvrši na najbolji način. ; Having in mind a deficiently elaborated role of the contemporary democratic state, in this paper the author attempts to continue the discussion about the democratic stale as an ideal not yet fully realized anywhere. The author criticizes the inadequate relationship towards the state, developing in Yugoslavia for a long lime, under the wing of Marx's theory. According to the author those who wish to easily abolish the stale or reduce it to only on only one dimension must be constantly warned of the fact that life in our entire civilization is linked to issues requiring incessant settling. Therefore, the state is not bad in itself but only when acting against public interests. Today, an especially interesting role of the state is in solving environmental problems, which the author stresses as an example of the need to look upon the slate as a regulator of communal affairs. According to the author, the state as regulator of communal affairs has many other tasks to fulfill and should be constantly perfected as well as enabled to carry out those tasks in the best way.
Contemporary educational practice demands that we seek new strategies in articulation of lessons and realization of educational aims. These new approaches are necessitated by the post-modern times we live in, with all the pertaining cultural, economic, political, technical and technological changes. The role of the institutions has been revised, as well as the roles of parents, teachers and pupils. In the time we live and work pupils' achievements are described and measured according to competences. Some of these numerous competences stand out as an educational ideal: critical thinking, cooperative learning, assuming responsibility, ability to act as individuals and members of society. Such achievements are also prescribed in the curriculum, more precisely, in the National Curriculum Framework. Cooperative learning, where pupils organized in groups join forces to learn during their school lessons, is often viewed as an especially interesting and productive learning method. The atmosphere among pupils who learn through cooperation is characterized by positive interdependence, that is, they are aware of the fact that the only way for them to succeed is by joining forces. Process drama is a method of using drama in education. Absence of an audience is one of its characteristics. As it does not focus on performance but on examining and searching for answers to questions (issues), it represents a method for quality teaching and learning, which is exactly why it should be an integral part of the National Curriculum Framework. This paper posits a theory that process drama is a form of cooperative learning because the important characteristics of process drama and cooperative learning overlap. Therefore, their common characteristics, such as the teacher's/leader's different engagement, changing of the fixed patterns of thinking, acting and reflexive observation will be listed, compared and explained using a comparative method. The purpose of this paper is to offer a method suitable for the requirements of contemporary school classes. ; Suvremena odgojna i obrazovna praksa zahtijeva pronalaženje novih pristupa artikulaciji nastavnoga sata i ostvarivanju odgojnih i obrazovnih ciljeva. Te nove pristupe nameće postmoderno vrijeme u kojem živimo sa svim svojim kulturološkim, gospodarskim, političkim, tehničkim i tehnološkim promjenama. Preispituje se uloga institucija, ali preispituju se i pojedinačne uloge roditelja, učitelja i učenika. Vrijeme u kojem živimo i djelujemo postignuća učenika opisuje i mjeri kompetencijama. U mnoštvu sposobnosti neke se nameću kao odgojno-obrazovni ideal: kritičko mišljenje, suradničko učenje, preuzimanje odgovornosti, sposobnost djelovanja kao individue i dijela društva. Takva postignuća propisuje i kurikulum, točnije Nacionalni okvirni kurikulum. Iako su jezične nedoumice oko kurikuluma i kurikula dokinute pa struka preporuča oblik kurikul, u ovom će se radu koristiti oblik kurikulum jer je on potvrđeniji u pedagogijskoj literaturi, a samim time će se izbjeći moguće nejasnoće, nesporazumi i nelogičnosti. Kao posebno zanimljiv i produktivan oblik učenja sve se češće ističe suradničko učenje u kojem učenici organizirani u grupe zajedničkim naporima svladavaju nastavno gradivo. Među učenicima koji uče surađujući vlada pozitivna međuovisnost, odnosno svijest da mogu uspjeti samo zajedničkim naporima. Procesna drama je metoda dramskoga odgoja. Odsustvo publike jedno je od njezinih obilježja. Kako nije usmjerena na predstavljanje već na propitivanje i traženje odgovora na postavljena pitanja (probleme), predstavlja metodu za kvalitetno poučavanje i učenje. U ovom radu postavlja se teza da je procesna drama oblik suradničkoga učenja jer se u bitnim obilježjima procesna drama i suradničko učenje preklapaju te će se komparativnom metodom zajednička obilježja popisati, usporediti i objasniti. Svrha je ovoga rada ponuditi metodu koja odgovara zahtjevima suvremene nastave
Carl Schmitt je jedan od najposvećenijih protivnika liberalnog univerzalizma sa svojim pojmom pluralističke, racionalne i uključive konsenzualne politike kao progresivnog demokratskog projekta i svojeg razumijevanja političke arene kao pročišćene, od sukoba slobodne, i na taj način progresivne kretnje demokratske logike. U ovom radu nastojat ću pokazati Schmittove pesimističke i negativne stavove, zasnovane na ontološkim i teološkim temeljima, o deliberativnom modelu politike koja tvrdi da partikularna volja može doći do koncepta zajedničkog javnog interesa ili zajedničkog dobra kroz raspravu i dijalog. Nadalje, pokušat ću pokazati da unutar Schmittovog projekta koncept diktature suverena postoji kao nužni kontrapunkt pojmu politič- kog. Schmitt odbija razumijevati politički život kao medij dijalog koji vodi razumskom konsenzusu. U ovom kontekstu, suveren iz Schmittove teorije mora se razumijevati upravo kao sila napravljena da proizvodi homogenost kroz hegemoniju. Hegemonija, u Gramscijevom smislu, nije gola opresivna sila. Namjesto toga, odnosi se na vladajuću silu sposobnu upisati vlastitu ideologiju i pogled na svijet u javnost kroz uvjeravanje. U tom okviru, ljevičarski mislitelji poput Mouffea, koji preporuča da moramo misliti »sa Schmittom protiv Schmitta« kako bismo razvili novo demokratsko političko razumijevanje, svraćaju pozornost na Schmittovu tezu da je svaki politički identitet u funkciju »mi–oni« antinomije, ali im promiče činjenica da je nemoguće deducirati koncept zbiljski demokratske javne sfere iz Schmittove teorije. Kao što će biti naglašenu u radu, demokracija u Schmittovom smislu može biti savršena forma suverenosti, takva kakva usuprot liberalnoj demokraciji rezultira homogenizacijom i isključenjem heterogenosti, te na taj način mora biti začeta kao fundamentalno hegemonijski sistem. Schmittov ideal demokracije zahtijeva da politički identiteti, javno mišljenje, javna sfera i formiranje volje vudu rezultati suverenove volje i bez prostora za raspravu. ; Carl Schmitt is one of the most dedicated opponents of liberal universalism, with its notion of pluralist, rational and non-exclusivist consensus politics as a progressive democratic project and its understanding of the political arena – "purified", being free from struggles and conflict – as the progressive move of democratic logic. In this paper I will first try to show Schmitt's pessimistic and negative stance based on ontological and theological grounds on the deliberative model of politics with its claim about the possibility of making particular wills reach the conception of common public interest or the common good through discussion and dialogue. Secondly, I'll try to show that, within Schmitt's project, the concept of the sovereign dictatorship exists as the necessary counterpoint to the concept of the political. Schmitt refuses to understand political life as a medium of dialogue leading to a rational consensus. In this context, the sovereign in Schmitt's theory should be precisely understood as a force constructed to reproduce homogeneity in a hegemonic manner. Hegemonia, in a Gramscian sense, is not a bare oppressive force. Rather, it refers to a ruling force which is able to inject its own ideology and world view into the public through persuasion. In this framework, leftist thinkers like mouffe, who recommended that we should think "with Schmitt against Schmitt" in order to develop a new democratic political understanding, draw attention to Schmitt's thesis that every political identity functions as "we-they" antinomy, yet they miss the fact that it is impossible to deduce a conception of a truly democratic public sphere from Schmitt's theory. As it will be emphasized in this paper, democracy in the Schmittian sense can be the perfect form of sovereignty, one which in contrast to liberal democracy results in homogenization and the exclusion of the heterogeneous and thus must be conceived as a fundamentally hegemonic system. The Schmittian ideal of democracy requires that political identities, public opinion, public sphere and will formation are the products of a sovereign will and not of open and free discussion. ; Carl Schmitt est l'un des opposants les plus puissants de l'universalisme libérale de par sa notion de consensus politique pluraliste, rationnel et non exclusiviste en tant que projet démocratique progressiste, mais aussi de par sa compréhension de l'arène politique - « purifiée », libre de toutes luttes et de tout conflit – en tant que mouvement progressiste de la logique dé- mocratique. Dans cet article, je vais en premier lieu tenter de montrer l'opinion pessimiste et négative de Schmitt – basée sur des fondements ontologiques et théologiques – concernant le modèle délibératif de la politique et sa prétention à penser que la formation de volontés particulières pourrait toucher l'intérêt public commun ou le bien commun à travers la discussion et le dialogue. En second lieu, je vais tenter de montrer qu'à l'intérieur du projet de Schmitt le concept de dictature souveraine existe comme contrepartie nécessaire au concept du politique. Schmitt refuse de penser la vie politique comme instrument de dialogue menant au consensus rationnel. Ainsi, le souverain dans la théorie de Schmitt doit précisément être compris comme une force construite pour reproduire une telle homogénéité de manière hégémonique. Hegemonia, au sens gramscien, n'est pas une simple force oppressive ; il s'agit plutôt d'un terme qui se réfère à une force dirigeante capable d'injecter sa propre idéologie et vision du monde dans le domaine public à travers la persuasion. Dans ce contexte, certains penseurs de gauche telle que mouffe qui nous recommande de penser « avec, et contre, Schmitt » dans le but de développer une nouvelle compréhension de la politique démocratique, attirent notre attention sur la thèse de Schmitt où chaque identité politique fonctionne par l'antinomie « nous/eux ». Toutefois, ces penseurs passent à côté du fait qu'il est impossible de déduire une conception de réelle sphère publique démocratique sur la base de la théorie de Schmitt. Comme cet article le souligne bien, la démocratie au sens schmittien peut être la forme parfaite de souveraineté, une forme qui – en contraste avec la démocratie libérale – aboutit à une homogénéisation en excluant l'hétérogé- néité, et ainsi doit être conçue comme un système fondamentalement hégémonique. Selon l'idéal schmittien de démocratie, les identités politiques, l'opinion publique, la sphère publique et la formation de volontés doivent être les produits, non pas d'une discussion ouverte et libre, mais d'une volonté souveraine. ; Carl Schmitt ist einer der mächtigsten Gegner des liberalen Universalismus mit dessen Vorstellung von pluralistischer, rationaler und nicht exklusivistischer Konsenspolitik als einem progressiven demokratischen Projekt und dessen Verständnis der politischen Arena – "gereinigt", frei von Kämpfen und Konflikten – als eines progressiven Schritts der demokratischen Logik. In diesem Beitrag werde ich zunächst versuchen, Schmitts pessimistische, negative und auf ontologischer und theologischer Grundlage ruhende Haltung zum Beratungsmodell der Politik darzulegen, mit dessen Behauptung über die möglichkeit, partikulare Willen zu veranlassen, durch Diskussion und Dialog die Konzeption des gemeinschaftlichen öffentlichen Interesses oder Gemeinwohls zu erreichen. Zweitens werde ich versuchen zu zeigen, dass im Rahmen des schmittschen Projekts der Begriff der souveränen Diktatur als notwendiger Kontrapunkt zum Begriff des Politischen existiert. Schmitt weigert sich, das politische Leben als ein medium des Dialogs zu begreifen, das zu einem rationalen Konsens führt. In diesem Zusammenhang soll das Souveräne in der schmittschen Theorie eben als eine Gewalt aufgefasst werden, die konstruiert ist, um eine solche Homogenität in einer hegemonialen Art zu reproduzieren. Die hegemonia im gramscischen Sinne ist nicht eine bloß repressive Kraft; vielmehr bezieht sie sich auf eine herrschende Kraft, die imstande ist, durch Überzeugungsvermögen ihre eigene Ideologie und Weltanschauung in die Öffentlichkeit zu injizieren. Linksorientierte Denker wie mouffe, die empfohlen haben, wir sollten "mit Schmitt gegen Schmitt" denken, um ein neues demokratisches politisches Verständnis zu entwickeln, lenken in diesem Kontext das Augenmerk auf Schmitts These, jede politische Identität funktioniere durch die "wir – sie"-Antinomie, doch sie übersehen die Tatsache, dass es unmöglich ist, aus der schmittschen Theorie die Vorstellung von einer wahrhaft demokratischen öffentlichen Sphäre abzuleiten. Wie es in dieser Arbeit betont wird, kann die Demokratie im schmittschen Sinne die perfekte Form der Souveränität sein, die – im Gegensatz zur liberalen Demokratie – in der Homogenisierung und Ausgrenzung des Heterogenen resultiert und daher als ein grundlegend hegemoniales System erachtet werden muss. Das schmittsche Ideal der Demokratie erheischt, dass politische Identitäten, öffentliche meinung, öffentliche Sphäre und Willensbildung keine Produkte einer offenen und freien Diskussion, sondern eines souveränen Willens sind.
Rad iznosi djelomične nalaze istraživanja hrvatskog narodnjaštva, tj. etnonacionalizma kao religije (u smislu ljudskog izmišljanja svetog).* Praktični su problemi sljedeći: narodnjaštvo kao religija, koja među ostalim uključuje to da narod ima mogućnost i/ili sposobnost da se razvije u nositelja države i da treba to i da postane; posljedice narodnjaštva, a to su nedostižnost narodne demokracije, narodne privrede i narodnog sazrijevanja; vjere u narod, i to prvenstveno Katoličke crkve u Hrvatskoj kao uvjeta od 1961. do 1971. te prije i nakon toga, naročito nakon 1990. Teorijski su problemi, tj. neodgovarajuće znanstveno znanje o praktičnima, sljedeći: prvo, odluke Ustavnog suda Republike Hrvatske o etničkim i vjerskim zajednicama; drugo, sustavna historija prava i države Hrvatske i Jugoslavije 1945.-1990.; treće, preobrazba komunizma i katolicizma u narodnjaštvo; četvrto i peto, društvena struktura i predstavljanje/zastupanje. Da bi se postigla opća svrha istraživačkog projekta, a to je upotreba razuma u javnim poslovima, istraživanje je provedeno u teorijsko-metodologijskom okviru integralne teorije prava i države koji uključuje prilagođenu Lasswellovu i McDougalovu političku analizu proširenu historijskim institucionalizmom i kritičkom teorijom prava. Glavna je hipoteza da je vjera u narod kao nositelja države izražena i ustanovljena odredbama Ustava RH da je RH nastala samoodređenjem naroda i/ili da je nacionalna država jednog ili više naroda; da je narod suveren; da pravo na državljanstvo RH imaju pripadnici određenog ili određenih naroda; da pripadnici određenog ili određenih naroda imaju posebna politička prava itd. Dopunska je hipoteza da je puku RH ili, pravno određenije, da je stanovnicima RH s biračkim pravom u RH smanjena vlast, a time i moć u odlučivanju o članstvu RH u transnacionalnim organizacijama, naime NATO-u i EU, te su oni sami svedeni na pravno neprepoznatljiv sastojak time što se u RH ne zna tko čini bilo puk bilo ustav. ; The paper reports partial findings of a research project into Croatian ethnonationalism (Croatian: narodnjaštvo) as a religion (in the sense of a human invention of the sacred). The practical problems are as follows: ethnonationalism as a religion, which implies inter alia that an ethnic community (Croatian: narod) has the potential and/or capacity to develop into, and ought to become, a substratum of the (nation-)state; consequences of ethnonationalism, which include the unattainability of ethnic democracy, ethnic economy and ethnic maturity; conditions of Croatian ethnonationalism, primarily the Catholic Church as a condition in 1961-1971, and also before and after the period, especially since 1990. The theoretical problems, i.e. inadequacies in scholarly knowledge of the practical problems, include inter alia Croatian Constitutional law, esp. jurisprudence of the Croatian Constitutional Court, on powers of ethnicities and disabilities of the people. To attain the general goal of the research project, which is the use of reason in public affairs, the research is carried out within the theoretical and methodological Framework of an integral theory of law and state which includes a modified Lasswell and McDougal's policy analysis expanded by historical institutionalism and critical theory. The paper attempts to demonstrate that there is strong evidence to support the following two chiefly descriptive hypotheses, which are ideal types and as such cannot be supported by conclusive evidence. The main hypothesis is that the faith in a narod as a substratum of the state is expressed and established by the provisions of the Croatian Constitution stating that the Republic of Croatia was created by the self-determination of a narod and/or is a nation-state of a narod, or of two or several narodi; a narod is sovereign; adherents of a narod have the right to Croatian nationality; adherents of a narod have special political rights, etc. The auxiliary hypothesis is that the people (Croatian: puk) or, juridically more precise, inhabitants of the Republic of Croatia with the right to vote have lost a part of their power to decide on the membership of the Republic of Croatia in transnational organisations, namely, NATO and EU, and have been reduced to a legally unrecognizable entity by virtue of the fact that in the Republic of Croatia it is not known what makes either its people or its constitution.
