Suchergebnisse

Von Gerechtigkeitstheorien wird gemeinhin erwartet, dass diese handlungsleitend sein können. Gleichzeitig dominierten in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten sogenannte ideale Theorien den Diskurs um Gerechtigkeit, die auf kontrafaktischen Annahmen basieren, welche nicht die Realität abbilden. Gemäß der Mainstream-Auffassung konfligiert dieser ideale Charakter nicht mit dem Desideratum der Handlungsleitung: Ideale Theorien zeichnen die (vollkommen) gerechte Gesellschaft als ein Ziel, dem es entgegenzustreben gilt. Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen, brauche es darüber hinaus eine nicht-ideale Theorie, die mehr an der empirischen Wirklichkeit ausgerichtet ist und es als Ziel hat, bestehende Ungerechtigkeiten durch entsprechende Handlungsanweisungen zu beseitigen. Dieser Auffassung nach ist ideale Theorie somit zwar nicht selbst handlungsleitend, wohl aber eine notwendige Bedingung für Handlungsleitung. Dass ideale Theorie dieser Funktion gerecht werden kann, stößt hierbei zunehmend auf Widerspruch. Dabei lassen sich im Wesentlichen drei Gruppen von Fundamentalkritiken unterscheiden, die alle drei in der Konklusion münden, dass ideale Theorie nicht zur Handlungsleitung unter Realbedingungen beitragen kann: Erstens, Kritiken, denen entsprechend ideale Theorie nicht zur Genese von Handlungsanweisungen fähig und nötig ist; zweitens, Kritiken, denen entsprechend ideale Theorie nicht anwendbar auf das Hier-und-Jetzt ist; drittens, Kritiken, entsprechend denen idealer Theorie der Bezug zur Gerechtigkeit fehlt. In der vorliegenden Arbeit verteidige ich ideale Theorie gegen jede dieser drei Kritiken. Dafür (re-)konstruiere ich als erstes die Unterscheidung in ideale und nicht-ideale Theorie, stelle dann die Kritiken dar und formuliere schließlich entsprechende Entgegnungen. Dabei akzeptiere ich das Desideratum der Handlungsleitung und argumentiere dafür, dass alle drei Kritiken scheitern. ; Theories of justice are commonly expected to be able to guide actions. At the same time, the debate led on justice during the last decades was dominated by so called ideal theories. These theories are based on contrafactual assumptions, which do not portray the reality. According to the mainstream-view, this ideal character is not detrimental for the desideratum of action-guidingness: ideal theories describe the (fully) just society as an aim one ought to strive for. To accomplish this goal, however, a non-ideal theory is needed, which is rooted in the empirical reality and seeks to eliminate injustices through recommendations of actions. On this account, ideal theory is not action-guiding itself, albeit a necessary condition for action-guidingness. However, the idea that ideal theory can fulfil this function is increasingly disagreed with. Three main groups of fundamental critiques can be distinguished, which all three lead to the conclusion that ideal theory cannot contribute to action-guidingness under real-life conditions: Firstly, critiques, according to which ideal theory is neither able nor necessary to create recommendations for actions; secondly, critiques, according to which ideal theory is not applicable to the here-and-now; thirdly, critiques, according to which ideal theory does not connect to justice. In this thesis I defend ideal theory against each one of these three critiques. To do so, I, firstly, (re-)construct the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory. Thereafter, I present the three critiques and formulate replies to them. In doing so, I accept the desideratum of action-guidingness and argue that all three critiques fail.

All of us have an idea of the ideal conditions in which we would like to live. They will vary according to the degree of ambition and level of education. However, people have common wishes since we don't live in isolation (perhaps with rare exceptions) and we require guarantees from other people that they are willing to accept certain rules and conditions for the best possible coexistence. Plato was the first to look for such general or even necessary requirements to create an ideal social structure. He considers different aspects of social reality – the division of society into classes, the specifics of upbringing and education, even the physical structure of the city and its religion. The article is devoted to the consideration of religious practices, associated cult activities and holidays. In ancient Greece, religion permeated all areas of human life. It would be more correct to say that religion simply did not exist separately from everyday life. Of course, we can distinguish major religious events in the form of solemn organised processions marking the change of seasons, dedicated to the harvest or some other memorable dates. But more often, religious practices were tightly woven into people's lives, so that even political and military actions were accompanied by an offering to the gods or consultation with the oracle. Understanding the role that religious activity plays in educating citizens, Plato does not seek to create an entirely new popular religion, but as a philosopher interested in the common good, he begins to interpret the images of traditional Greek gods differently. He focuses most of his attention on Zeus, Dionysus and Aphrodite. By comparing traditional notions of the gods with the way Plato portrays them, we conclude that the philosopher has done serious work to rationalise their images. Zeus ceases to be a famous womanizer and head of Olympus, and acquires the traits of a creator, the only good god who is incapable of any evil or injustice. The raucous fun, dancing and intoxication that used to be the cause of many misfortunes and associated with Dionysus are now being declared useful in terms of testing strength and honesty on the one hand, and, on the other, are understood as a necessary means of getting rid of negative energy and bringing people together. The uncontrolled erotic desire sent by Aphrodite is seen by Plato as behavior that is unacceptable in the citizens of an ideal state, and so he develops the doctrine of the two Aphrodites, heavenly and vulgar, in which the heavenly Aphrodite is declared to be a certain stimulus that leads the soul to the supreme good.

This paper deals with the ideal of conduct of judges. This reflection is developed on the basis of an examination of the ethical dimension, where the government of the judge's actions takes place. The overall objective of these notes is to show the inconvenience of a society governed by emotional states, conduct, and desires to seek justice, which entails the establishment of desiderative thinking, in the figure of the legal operator. ; En este trabajo se aborda el ideal de la conducta de los jueces. La reflexión se desarrolla sobre la base de un examen de la dimensión ética, donde el gobierno de las acciones de juez se lleva a cabo. El objetivo general de estas notas es demostrar la inconveniencia de una sociedad gobernada por los estados emocionales, de comportamiento y los deseos de justicia. Lo que implica el establecimiento de un pensamiento por deseos, en la figura del operador jurídico.

Many of the recent methodological debates within political theory have focused on the ideal/non-ideal theory distinction. While ideal theorists recognise the need to develop an account of the transition between the two levels of theorising, no general proposal has been advanced thus far. In this article, I aim to bridge this conceptual gap. Towards this end, I first reconstruct the ideal/non-ideal theory distinction within a simplified two-dimensional framework, which captures the primary meanings usually attributed to it. Subsequently, I use this framework to provide an algorithm for the bidirectional transition between ideal and non-ideal theory, based on the incremental derivation of normative models. The approach outlined illuminates the various ways in which principles derived under highly idealised assumptions might be distorted by the circumstances of our current world and illustrates the various paths which we can pursue in moving from our current state of the world to an ideal one.

The distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory is a tool that can help us understand how to make moral and political progress. Ideal theory provides a goal for us to reach, and non-ideal theory tells us what to do in our current, non-ideal state. Throughout my dissertation, I argue that we need both of these kinds of theory in order to make progress. I also argue that we need to apply these tools to particular problems in order to get a better understanding of the theoretical questions at stake. To that end, I investigate three particular problems. Chapter One is devoted to showing that we need ideal theory to make sustained societal progress over time. But because we are unable to agree on a complete ideal, we should work together to create incomplete ideal theory, which can then guide our progress. Chapter Two shows how we can use the ideal/non-ideal distinction to resolve two longstanding tensions in moral and political philosophy. We disagree about how much our moral theories should yield to our flaws, and we also disagree about how to interpret the voluntarist constraint: what it means for "ought" to imply "can." I show that we need ideal theory of morality, which uses a thinner version of the voluntarist constraint and does not yield to our flaws, to provide an ultimate standard. But we also need non-ideal theory, which uses a thicker version, to guide our actions. Chapter Three tackles beneficence. Does our duty to the very poor increase when others inevitably fail to comply with that duty? It may be that we only have to do our fair share—that even in the non-ideal world, we only have to do what we would have had to do in the ideal. I show that this view is plagued by counterexamples. Many consequentialists hold the alternative view, that we must pick up others' slack, but their interpretation of this view is extremely demanding. I argue that we should look to an alternative moral theory. Two versions of deontology, intuitionism and Kantianism, require us to do more when others are doing less without also making extreme demands.