The subject of this article is the presentation of the essence of Russian imperialismin the thought of Władysław Studnicki. It seems that in today's geopolitical situationtheissues related to the analysis of Russia's expansion have become extremely importantThe author of this article assumed that the thoughts formulated on the subject by theabove-mentioned thinker remain valid today. The method used to verify the hypothesis wasa critical analysis of source texts and an aspect analysis of one of the Polish researchersof the history and political system of Russia
Die Existenzbedingungen des Imperialismus haben sich qualitativ verändert. Der Imperialismus sieht sich dem Zwang ausgesetzt, sich diesen neuen Bedingungen anzupassen und das ist der Hauptfalktor für seine heutingen Besonderheiten. Anpassungsprozesse sind sowohl in der Aussenpolitik, besonders gegenüber den sozialistischen Staaten, als auch im Innern zu beobachten. In dem zweiten Fall reagiert die Monopolbourgeoisie auf den Zwang zur Anpassung vor allem mit einer Politik, die darauf gerichtet ist, die Arbeiterklasse mit zum Teil neukonstituierten alten, zum Teil mit neuen Mitteln und Methoden von ihrer revolutionären Rolle abzuhalten, sie von innen heraus zu untergraben und sie ,;in das System des Kapitalismus zu integrieren". Die Integrationspolitik, wie sie derzeit von dem Monapolkapital der BRD durchzusetzen versucht wird, stellt weder ein Abgehen von den Hauptmethoden imperialistischer Herrschaftstausübuing dar, noch bedeutet sie den Verzicht auf eine dieser Methoden. Sie erfasst, so wie in jeder Phase der kapitalistischen Entwicklung, zwei Hauptimethoden. Auf der einen Seite die Methode der Gewalt, auf der anderen Seite die Methode des "Libenalisimus" (die Richtung der Reformen, Zugeständnisse usw.). Der Rang dieser Methoden verändert sich abhängig von den jeweiligen Bedingungen. Die Bourgeoisie versucht zwar; der Gewaltandrohung gegenüber der Gewaltanwendung Vorrang zu geben und strebt mach einer neuen Vorstellung vom Gewaltapparat. Gleichzeitig jedoch wird dieser ausgebaut, um, falls notwendig, auch mit offenem Terror zu reagieren. Im sozial-ökonomischen Bereich des gesellschaftlichen Lebens versucht man, im Rahmen der Integrationspolitik solche Mittel anzuwenden, wie vor allem "Volksaktien", die Veränderung der Rolle der Gewerkschaften, verschiedene "Mitbestimmungs"- Modelle und man bemüht sich auch damit, dass die bourgeoisen Parteien grösseren Einfluss auf die Werktätigen ausüben. Die Integrationsbestrebungen können zwar vorübergehende Erfolge haben, aber letzlich können sie nicht die tiefen Widersprüche und Konflikte der heutigen kapitalistischen Gesellschaft überwinden. Dier Integrationspolitik steht der Widerspruch entgegen, "dass sie einem unerreichbaren Ziel nachjagt, mit Mitteln, die das Ziel ständig widerlegen". Von anderer Seite ausgehend gibt diese Politik dem Klassenkampf neue Impulse, weil sie auf den Versprechungen beruht, die nicht erfült werden können. ; Digitalizacja i deponowanie archiwalnych zeszytów RPEiS sfinansowane przez MNiSW w ramach realizacji umowy nr 541/P-DUN/2016
After the end of the World War II neoconservatism has become the most significant political doctrine in the United States of America. Many neoconservatists were Trotskyists in the beginning, however, lately they have become associated with the Republicans. The neoconservative ideology's main aim is to justify the imperial role of the USA. Neoconservative intellectuals believe in the values of American policy (like liberal democracy and economic freedom) and are concerned about the necessity of promoting it in the rest of the world, which is usually accompanied by distrust towards states opposing those values. They support increasing defence and military spending. Neoconservatists influenced politics of majority of American presidents elected after 1945, especially Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush. ; Fundacja Studentów i Absolwentów Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego "Bratniak"
The aim of the article is to analyze the theory of capitalist imperialism in the context of the challenges of the war in Ukraine. The main theoretical positions in the face of this war, related debates and doubts are outlined. A thesis is put forward about the adequacy of the diagnosis treating capitalist imperialism as a phenomenon rooted in the essence of capitalist states and the specificity of their rivalry. When analyzing the war in Ukraine against the backdrop of multipolar imperialism, an attempt is also made to concrete the analysis of Russian imperialism in relation to the failure of Russia's economic reconstruction and attempts to change this state's place in global capitalism.
Official Development Aid as an idea is an implement of assistance, a kind of redistribution of the global income on the governmental level. Nevertheless, it is also a source of influence and as a result peculiarly understood imperialism. The opposition between political vision and reality is the factor which backs up this thesis. Political plans and prospects of the EU aid policy, such as "The European Consensus of Development" or "The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership", are concerned about supporting good governance and providing fair conditions of international trade. On the other hand, introducing this policy often, more or less, increases dependency of poor economies on the rich. It is also not eradicated from the European Union policy, for example in the case of the European Development Bank. However, EU development aid, coming to 49 billions euro, could be named munificent when compared to the United States. U.S. Official Development Aid amounts to only 0,19% of GDP, when the obligations confirmed by the government in a few declarations, among which is the Millennium Declaration of the United Nations, are about 0,7% of GDP. Secondly it is commonly shaped as an interrelated aid, which augment dependency of the recipient country. International institutions established in Bretton Woods, like International Monetary Fund and World Bank Group, have also a huge impact on the way of development of poor countries. There are a lot of groups of interest whose opinions are clear – above-mentioned institutions are the U.S. instruments of imperialism. It is caused by American predominance in these institutions and the line of policy which it supports. In the XXI century imperial aspirations are also present in recently developing countries – like China or Brazil. Changing roles in the system of international relations are now coming, creating a diffusion between clubs of rich North and poor, developing South. Leaders of development from developing countries are trying to build a strong position in relations with recipients of ODA. It is easier for them than for the West, mostly because of the lack of bad, colonial past relations. Their imperialism is not linked with history whatsoever, making their role of foreign relations easier to build up. Despite these cases of using development assistance in order to build up an imperium, there are a lot of non-governmental institutions whose perception of aid is beyond politics and burdens of imperialism. Best example of that is Grameen Bank – an institution founded by M. yunus, a Noble Prize winner. Its way of helping people is mainly intended to being unprofitable. There are a lot of ideas about how to describe development aid – more like a charity or kind of imperialism. Some aspects of business are desirable in ODA, partly because of increasing efficiency. It is economically proved that the return of capital in any way of benefit will strengthen willingness to providing aid. On the other hand, people are naturally liable to help and perform activities which do not give them any interest or gain. What is most interesting – nowadays developing countries are strengthening and they are evaluating theirs powers as equal partners of the rich, developed world. It comprises change in the system of international relations. Moreover United Nations should find a way of enforcing obligations of donors – like 0,7 percent of GDP for ODA to 2015. If the line of politics is steady, similar to current line, this goal will not be reached, so ODA will be more seen as a way of imperialism than help. In general, there are a lot of aspects of development which indicate that ODA is an implement of imperialism. On the other hand – some kind of interest improves the willingness of donors to provide aid. Besides that question – imperial or not – development aid is still increasing the number of people whose conditions of living are better because of ODA.
Official Development Aid as an idea is an implement of assistance, a kind of redistribution of the global income on the governmental level. Nevertheless, it is also a source of influence and as a result peculiarly understood imperialism. The opposition between political vision and reality is the factor which backs up this thesis. Political plans and prospects of the EU aid policy, such as "The European Consensus of Development" or "The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership", are concerned about supporting good governance and providing fair conditions of international trade. On the other hand, introducing this policy often, more or less, increases dependency of poor economies on the rich. It is also not eradicated from the European Union policy, for example in the case of the European Development Bank. However, EU development aid, coming to 49 billions euro, could be named munificent when compared to the United States. U.S. Official Development Aid amounts to only 0,19% of GDP, when the obligations confirmed by the government in a few declarations, among which is the Millennium Declaration of the United Nations, are about 0,7% of GDP. Secondly it is commonly shaped as an interrelated aid, which augment dependency of the recipient country. International institutions established in Bretton Woods, like International Monetary Fund and World Bank Group, have also a huge impact on the way of development of poor countries. There are a lot of groups of interest whose opinions are clear – above-mentioned institutions are the U.S. instruments of imperialism. It is caused by American predominance in these institutions and the line of policy which it supports. In the XXI century imperial aspirations are also present in recently developing countries – like China or Brazil. Changing roles in the system of international relations are now coming, creating a diffusion between clubs of rich North and poor, developing South. Leaders of development from developing countries are trying to build a strong position in relations with recipients of ODA. It is easier for them than for the West, mostly because of the lack of bad, colonial past relations. Their imperialism is not linked with history whatsoever, making their role of foreign relations easier to build up. Despite these cases of using development assistance in order to build up an imperium, there are a lot of non-governmental institutions whose perception of aid is beyond politics and burdens of imperialism. Best example of that is Grameen Bank – an institution founded by M. yunus, a Noble Prize winner. Its way of helping people is mainly intended to being unprofitable. There are a lot of ideas about how to describe development aid – more like a charity or kind of imperialism. Some aspects of business are desirable in ODA, partly because of increasing efficiency. It is economically proved that the return of capital in any way of benefit will strengthen willingness to providing aid. On the other hand, people are naturally liable to help and perform activities which do not give them any interest or gain. What is most interesting – nowadays developing countries are strengthening and they are evaluating theirs powers as equal partners of the rich, developed world. It comprises change in the system of international relations. Moreover United Nations should find a way of enforcing obligations of donors – like 0,7 percent of GDP for ODA to 2015. If the line of politics is steady, similar to current line, this goal will not be reached, so ODA will be more seen as a way of imperialism than help. In general, there are a lot of aspects of development which indicate that ODA is an implement of imperialism. On the other hand – some kind of interest improves the willingness of donors to provide aid. Besides that question – imperial or not – development aid is still increasing the number of people whose conditions of living are better because of ODA.
Many times over the centuries torn turbulence Euro-Atlantic space accounted for decades one of the quieter regions of the globe. There was a belief that it is susceptible primarily to other threats than military. Consolidated confirmed that the stabilization of the economic situation around the EU, as well as selective expeditionary political and military commitment to NATO and the US in the Middle East, and made towards the reorientation of East Asian steps of the American superpower. Redefining attitudes forced the Russian neo-imperialist expansiveness, amending the procedures and rules has led a quiet rivalry for the post-Soviet space, which Russia wants to rebuild the new reality. The challenge Putin exacted the need to revive the Euro-Atlantic partnership-owned delve into instruments to restore the status quo, which does not help, sparking a wider context of global tectonics Euro-Atlantic security and diversification of raisons d'etat. ; Wielokrotnie na przestrzeni wieków targana turbulencjami przestrzeń eu-roatlantycka stanowiła przez ostatnie dekady jeden ze spokojniejszych regionów globu. Istniało przekonanie, iż jest ona podatna głównie na inne zagrożenia niż militarne. Potwierdzały to skonsolidowana wokół stabilizowania sytuacji ekono-micznej UE, jak również selektywne, ekspedycyjne zaangażowanie polityczno-militarne NATO i USA na Bliskim Wschodzie oraz poczynione w kierunku reorientacji wschodnio-azjatyckiej kroki amerykańskiego mocarstwa. Redefinicję postaw wymusiła rosyjska neoimperialna ekspansywność, zmieniająca tryb i reguły prowadzonej dotąd cichej rywalizacji o przestrzeń poradziecką, którą Rosja chce w nowych realiach odbudować. Wyzwanie Putina wyegzekwowało potrzebę ożywienia euroatlantyckiego partnerstwa – sięgnięcia do posiadanego instru-mentarium w celu przywrócenia dotychczasowego status quo, czego nie ułatwia szerszy kontekst iskrzenia globalnej tektoniki bezpieczeństwa oraz zróżnicowanie euroatlantyckich raison d'etat.
This article is dedicated to the memory of Professor Andrzej Walicki, who died in August 2020 – an outstanding Polish historian of ideas and Russian scholar. It is an attempt to summarize the enormous scientific achievements of a representative of the Warsaw school of the history of ideas. His scientific activity has gained wide recognition in the West, being an prominent Polish contribution to world Russian studies. The subject of the scientist's research were Russia, Poland and Marxism. Andrzej Walicki explained to a wide audience in the West, Poland and Russia issues related to the formation of Russian ideas and philosophy, the development of various ideologies in Russia: imperialism, Marxism, liberalism, or the shaping of the platform and the main problematic network of intellectual relations between Poland and Russia. He also researched Polish thought in response to the Russian question, and tried to participate in debates on Polish-Russian relations after the fall of communism and the collapse of the USSR. He devoted much attention to the reception of Marxism in Russia – to what extent it was an ideological import from the West, and to what extent it was based on the native ideological and religious tradition. In the context of Russia's strong utopian predispositions, Andrzej Walicki showed Marxism as a utopia that transformed Russia into its tragic testing ground and whose goals turned out to be unattainable. As a result, his led to the collapse of the moral legitimacy of the communist system and became the fundamental premise for the disintegration of the Soviet empire.
It seemed that after the end of the Cold War the democratization process would spread freely ensuring world peace. However, a number of worrying events occurring in international relations have not confirmed these hopes. Robert Kagan asserts that the announcement about world peace in the early nineties of the twentieth century did not come true. In fact, the states have never stopped competing each other just like before the fall of communism. Kagan emphasizes that the characteristic feature in international relations is a rivalry between democratic and authoritarian states. He fears the growing importance of autocracy, especially in China and Russia. Therefore, he urges to promote of democracy and even to build a league of democratic nations as a forum where international disputes could be resolved. On the other hand, there are opinions saying that the importunate promotion of democracy, especially in the form of the "preventive war" in the region reluctant to adopt Western values, such as the countries of the Middle East, may cause more conflicts and no less. Democratic system is a hallmark of the West and not a universal truth. The success of the stabilization of democracy in countries with different culture can't be the results of "preventive war" but a long process. Benjamin R. Barber proposes a noninvasive method to disseminate democracy. He believes that the best way to stabilize democracy in non-Western countries is a civic education. Development of education can eliminate those who may in the future become terrorists. Education reduces the strength of prejudice and moderates hate. Moreover, Barber stresses that support for local democracy through teaching is less costly than the force of arms. When Barack Obama took over power in the United States, it seemed that the strategy of "preventive war", supported by neoconservatives, would be rejected. But the new president's actions indicate that he doesn't intend to negotiate with the enemies of freedom. It has turned out that Obama continues the tradition of American "democratic imperialism". The implementation of neoconservative strategy ignoring the principle of "preventive democracy" portends a permanent conflict, which dismisses the prospect of world peace.
It seemed that after the end of the Cold War the democratization process would spread freely ensuring world peace. However, a number of worrying events occurring in international relations have not confirmed these hopes. Robert Kagan asserts that the announcement about world peace in the early nineties of the twentieth century did not come true. In fact, the states have never stopped competing each other just like before the fall of communism. Kagan emphasizes that the characteristic feature in international relations is a rivalry between democratic and authoritarian states. He fears the growing importance of autocracy, especially in China and Russia. Therefore, he urges to promote of democracy and even to build a league of democratic nations as a forum where international disputes could be resolved. On the other hand, there are opinions saying that the importunate promotion of democracy, especially in the form of the "preventive war" in the region reluctant to adopt Western values, such as the countries of the Middle East, may cause more conflicts and no less. Democratic system is a hallmark of the West and not a universal truth. The success of the stabilization of democracy in countries with different culture can't be the results of "preventive war" but a long process. Benjamin R. Barber proposes a noninvasive method to disseminate democracy. He believes that the best way to stabilize democracy in non-Western countries is a civic education. Development of education can eliminate those who may in the future become terrorists. Education reduces the strength of prejudice and moderates hate. Moreover, Barber stresses that support for local democracy through teaching is less costly than the force of arms. When Barack Obama took over power in the United States, it seemed that the strategy of "preventive war", supported by neoconservatives, would be rejected. But the new president's actions indicate that he doesn't intend to negotiate with the enemies of freedom. It has turned out that Obama continues the tradition of American "democratic imperialism". The implementation of neoconservative strategy ignoring the principle of "preventive democracy" portends a permanent conflict, which dismisses the prospect of world peace.
Category of enemy presented in the program documents of the communist parties, was an inherent feature of the communist way of thinking, then reflected in the political system of the People's Poland. Political regimes modeled on the Soviet Union needed enemies. Mobilization, which in the first phase of development of the state served reconstruction of the country, and then defend the status quo, required activation against all kinds of enemies. It was evident the need for the existence of the enemy, which was permanent. Changed only the image of the enemy. Enemies were sought inside and outside the communist movement. Communist world was composed mainly of enemies. The enemy was necessary, even mythical. Fight against real or mythical enemies allowed to pursue various goals: differentiate society, to explain various failures, eliminate inconvenient persons, to justify the existence of the security services and the need to strengthen it, to build a party of a new type. The communist movement had created two categories of enemies. The first included the kind of traditional, "class" enemies of the communist movement, "acquired" along with the state in 1944, and treated as a real enemies, which were various types of: 1) social groups as a "capitalist elements" – traders, farmers; 2) political and military organizations and institutions; 3) ideologies and doctrines competitive with Marxism. The U.S. and English imperialism was the constant enemy which was located outside of the state. The second category consisted of enemies which were created in Polish People's Republic – "objective" and "potential" enemies. ; Kategoria wroga, obecna w dokumentach programowych partii komunistycznych, była immanentną cechą komunistycznego stylu myślenia, odzwierciedloną następnie w systemie politycznym Polski Ludowej. Reżimy polityczne wzorowane na reżimie radzieckim, w swej istocie mobilizacyjne, potrzebowały wrogów. Mobilizacja, która w pierwszej fazie rozwoju państwa służyła przebudowie kraju, a następnie obronie status quo, wymagała aktywizacji przeciwko różnego rodzaju wrogom. Widoczne było zapotrzebowanie na istnienie wroga, który był stały, a zmieniał się jedynie jego obraz. Wroga poszukiwano wewnątrz i na zewnątrz ruchu. Świat komunistyczny złożony był przede wszystkim z wrogów. Wróg był niezbędny, nawet mityczny. Walka z rzeczywistymi bądź mitycznymi wrogami pozwalała realizować różne cele: różnicować społeczeństwo, tłumaczyć niepowodzenia, eliminować osoby niewygodne dla aktualnie rządzących, uzasadniać istnienie służby bezpieczeństwa i potrzebę jej wzmocnienia, budować partię nowego typu. Ruch komunistyczny wykreował dwie kategorie wrogów. Do pierwszej zaliczyć należy niejako tradycyjnych, "klasowych" wrogów ruchu komunistycznego, "przejętych" wraz z państwem w 1944 roku, a traktowanych jako wrogów realnych, czyli różnego rodzaju: 1) grupy społeczne w postaci tzw. elementów kapitalistycznych – przedsiębiorców, chłopów, 2) organizacje i instytucje polityczne oraz wojskowe; 3) konkurencyjne wobec marksizmu ideologie i doktryny. Stałym wrogiem ulokowanym poza państwem był amerykański i angielski imperializm. Drugą kategorią byli wrogowie wykreowani w PRL, tzw. wrogowie obiektywni i potencjalni.
Poland towards Russia between 1992 and 2015 and outline their specifics. The author attempted at a synthesis of major manifestations of Polish-Russian cooperation and most sticking points in the intergovernmental (international) relations during that period. An important objective was to show the sources and examples of a divergence of interests, and point to the goals, which were based on these premises, established by the foreign policy-makers in Poland and Russia and pursued in mutual relations and international affairs. Between 1992 and 2015, in Poland's foreign policy towards the East and national security policy, the relations with Russia and the Ukraine were of utmost importance. On the economic level, considering the volume of mutual trade turnover, Poland's main partner in the East was the Russian Federation, whereas on the political level, the Ukraine was seen as a strategic partner. Along with the Ukraine, Russia played a key role in Poland's security policy in the discussed period. It should be emphasized that Polish-Russian and Polish-Ukrainian relations were very closely linked, and so was Poland's policy towards Russia and the Ukraine. In Poland's foreign policy towards Russia, or in broader terms, in Polish-Russian relations between 1992 and 2015, seven stages can be distinguished; each having their own characteristic. Despite some new specifics in each particular stage, they all shared an element of continuity. The constant theme was a great divergence of interests between Poland and Russia, particularly with regard to the European security system, and the role of NATO in shaping this security, as well as further stages of the alliance's enlargement, especially by countries of the post-Soviet area; energy security and Poland's strive for diversification of fuels supplies faced with Russia's actions aimed at the diversification of routes of sending its gas and crude oil to Western Europe bypassing the Ukraine and Poland; a historic dispute, in which a thorough, satisfying for the Poles, explanation of the Katyn Forest massacre was particularly high on the agenda among other issues; opposing visions of building an order in Eastern Europe, and first and foremost, in the Ukraine. With the passing of time, especially after Poland's NATO and the EU accession, the future of Eastern European countries, particularly the Ukraine and Belarus, has become a fundamental issue in Polish-Russian relations. Both Russia and Poland treated Eastern European countries as a sort of a safety buffer. However, the two countries had entirely different visions of how this buffer ought to be shaped. The political leadership in Poland saw the strenghtening of national security in the strenghtening of the Ukrainian buffer through the Ukraine's membership in NATO and the EU, whereas for the political leadership in Russia, the strenghtening of national security through Ukrainian buffer meant preserving its outside NATO status, or incorporating it in the the security system built under the aegis of Russia on the area of CIS. A characteristic of the Polish-Russian relations in that period was a great imbalance to Poland's disadvantage, resulting from the differences in broadly understood physical potential of the two countries and, consequently, their international roles (Poland being a medium-size country situated in Central Europe and Russia being a superpower in Central Eurasia). The capacities of Poland to shape the situation in Eastern Europe on its own were incomparably lower than Russia's. Therefore, Poland was trying to make use of European and Euro-Atlantic multirateral structures, mainly through the Eastern Dimension realized by the EU and NATO, to have as much influence as possible, on the desired developments in Eastern Europe. The eastern policy under successive RP governments was characterized by their overrating, frequently, of their own capacities, lack of objectivity in assessment of the situation across our eastern border, and application of double standards, particularly in the policy towards Russia. Polish-Russian political relations throughout the post-Cold War period were critical, and improvements were relatively short-lasting. Not only Russia, but also Poland is to blame for such a state of events. The Polish side, due to historical reasons and imbalance of potential, expected Russia to take more initiative in coming to an agreement with Poland. However, it has to be admitted that in many activities undertaken by Poland with regard to European security, in particular Eastern European subregion, the interests of Russia were completly disregarded, although they did not have to be accepted fully. An example of this was Polish diplomacy in the second half of 2013 intended not to allow Russia to be included in the negotiations on the EU association agreement with the Ukraine about issues that had economic implications for Russia's interests. In their policy towards Russia, foreign policy-makers in Poland, forgot, all too often, or, were unwilling to remember, about the principle that in order to meet the security needs of one's own country, one should also consider the security needs of other countries, the neighbouring ones in the first place. Analyzing the policies under succesive III RP governments on European security and relations with the post-Soviet countries, it is hard to share the view prevailing in our country that Poland did its best to develop partnership and good neighbourly relations with Russia. Among politicians, publicists and the Polish society, there was a large group of people who took a stance, though it was not always formally articulated, that Poland has a right, or even a duty to remain hostile towards Russia. On the other hand, Russia should not act unfavourably towards Poland, regardless of Poland's anti-Russian policy, although, obviously, it was declared otherwise. One of the few stages showing a distinct improvement in Poland's policy towards Russia and a mutual willingness to normalize our political relations, was the one between 2008 and 2010, when an unsuccesful attempt was made at pragmatizing foreign policy towards Russia. Since the end of 2007, this new foreign policy, gradually encompassing other areas, led to a greater or lesser modification of the policy to date towards Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia by basing it on the so-called positive realism. These new trends increased cooperation between Poland and Russia and, eventually, a considerable progress was achieved in normalizing our relations. Between 2008 and 2010, Polish policy towards the East not only changed in practice, it was also a conceptual change. The crash of the presidential plane at Smoleńsk (April 10th, 2010), in which 96 peple were killed, including President of RP Lech Kaczyński and His Spouse, was a major, if not primary reason why the normalization process (2008–2010) was seriously hampered to the point of a standstill between 2011 and 2013. The Smoleńsk air disaster, and conflicting stands over its causes in particular, exacerbated divisions in the Polish society and strenghtened reluctance, if not hostility, towards Russia. A large part of the Polish political class and society did not accept a version of an inadvertent air disaster (plane crash), whose causes, like not following correct procedures, lay on both Poles and Russians. The surveys conducted during the years following the Smoleńsk air disaster showed that over 30% of the Polish society were convinced that it had been an attempt on the life of the Polish delegation en route to a commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Katyn Forrest massacre, and that the Russian government and secret services had been involved. After the Smoleńsk air disaster, foreign policy towards Russia and Polish-Russian relations became a ground for political struggle in our country. For many politicians and conservatist right-wing journalists, a demonstrated degree of anti-Russian sentiment became the main criterion of patriotism. In a large part of the Polish society, a belief was strenghtened that actions should be taken to weaken and isolate Russia, and to minimize, rather than increase cooperation between the two countries. This meant that internal conditions within our country, which could possibly motivate the foreign policy-makers to stop viewing Russia as the main threat and encourage a breakthrough in thinking about that issue, deteriorated markedly. Consequently, Polish-Russian relations between 2011 and 2013 remained in a state of deadlock. In the foreign policy of Poland between 1992 and 2015, Russia played the leading role. This, however, stemmed from Russia being perceived by the policy-makers as the main threat to our national security, not a recognized partner in pursuing this security. Throughout that period, in all successive stages of Polish security policy, Russia was regarded as the main threat. Each political leadership in Poland, especially since the mid 1990s, treated Russia in this way, and these were not merely anti-Russian declarations, but a guiding principle of the foreign policy. Behind it, was a conviction that Russian imperialism was timeless and Russia would never accept the sovereignty of Poland. It was an obvious reference to the classical Polish geopolitical thought about Russia posing main threats to our national security. During the crisis and conflict in eastern Ukraine, between 2014 and 2015, the foreign policymakers in Poland revived the stance of a military threat on the part of Russia. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, such loud voices were heard about a possible military attack on Poland. Unlike the earlier periods, when there was an informal presumption that Russia was a threat to the security of Poland, in 2014, for the first time, in III RP's security policy, Russia was formally pointed to as a direct military threat. It was articulated in official state documents, including Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej from November, 2014, and in addresses delivered by the Polish government officials (for instance in exposé of Foreign Minister R. Sikorski and his follower G. Schetyna). The crisis and conflict in south-eastern Ukraine did not substantially change Poland's policy towards Russia. What did change between 2014 and 2015, however, was that much more emphasis than ever was placed on Russia being a threat to our national security, and there being a serious risk of a Russian direct invasion of Poland. During 2014 and 2015, the process of politicizing fear (policy of fear) of Russia was at its height. For Poland, a major outcome of the Ukrainian conflict and crisis was decreased national security and growing fears, among them the fear of Russian invasion, which does not mean that such a threat was real. During the years 2014 and 2015, Polish-Russian political relations at the highest level came almost to the point of being frozen. Important direct implications of the Ukrainian conflict for Poland's security were, apart from a growing fear of Russia, increased desires towards strenghtening its own defense capability, strenghtening NATO cohesion, increased involvement of NATO in our sub-region's security and closer bilateral Polish-American cooperation regarding military security. Resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine as quickly as possible was in the interests of Poland. However, Polish diplomacy did not engage much in the conflict deescalation. They were very sceptical about the successive agreements aimed at ending the military operations negotiated within the frames of the so-called Normandy format (Mińsk I and Mińsk II). It seems that, considering the geopolitical situation in the Ukraine and divisions of the Ukrainian society, this country should remain a buffer state. Alternatively, coming out of this role should occur gradually, through a simultaneous Europeization of the Ukraine and Russia. Poland should not be interested in the "revolutionary" speeding up of the processes occuring in the Ukrainian society. Responsible politicians willing to serve the best interests of their nation should be aware of the limitations in pursuing even the most support worthy goals. The policy of every country, the foreign policy of Poland and the Ukraine included, should be founded on a realistic assessment of one's own capabilities so that aspirations would not outgrow the real possibilities of their attainment. Poland, aspiring to the role of the EU main expert in Russian and the post-Soviet area affairs, through insisting in the EU on the earliest possible Ukraine association with the EU, contributed in a way to the situation when the Ukraine had to choose between the EU and Russia. Polish politicians did not anticpate the negative outcomes of such acceleration for the Ukraine itself (including the loss of Crimea and strong separatist tendencies in the East of the Ukraine), as well as for Russian- Ukrainian relations and the security of Poland. Therefore, the firm support and involvement of the Polish political class in the so-called democratic revolution in the Ukraine during 2013 and 2014, can hardly be regarded as a succcess. Polish policy towards the East ended in yet another failure, which was shown as confirmation when Poland was not included in the talks aimed at resolving the Ukrainian crisis, which were held by officials from the Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France since the middle of 2014. The Ukrainian crisis and conflict was a turning point in Polish security policy and Polish-Russian relations. The Polish government officially began to treat Russia as the largest threat to the national and international security. A considerable part of the political elites in Poland did not see the threat in excessive dependence of Polish economy on Russian energy resources or other economic threats, but in a direct military attack. Generally speaking, it is unknown to what extent the Ukrainian crisis and conflict will, in the long run, have an impact on changes in Polish policy towards the East, particularly towards Russia and the Ukraine. It exposed the ineffectiveness of our foreign policy to date towards the East. In this context, a question arises: What will be mid- and long-term implications of the Ukrainian conflict for the modification or a radical alteration to Polish foreign policy towards the East? Another fundamental question pertains to Polish-Russian relations: What policy should Poland pursue towards Russia now and in the future? Will the foreign policy and security policy be directed, like in 2014 and 2015, at instransigence and confrontation, or will the normalization tendency prevail as regards Russia, and will the relations with the Ukraine be redefined? However, at the end of 2015, nothing implied that the foreign and security policy-makers intended to transform in any way the policy towards Russia and the Ukraine to date. It does not mean that changes will not be implemented in the years to come. It will be closely connected with the impact of the Ukrainian conflict on the modification of the policy of Germany and the entire European Union as well as the policy of the United States on the post-Soviet area. The crisis and conflict in eastern Ukraine strenghtened the legitimacy of argumentation that the main player in the post-Soviet area is Russia. None of the serious problems in this area can be resolved without the participation of Russia, and all the more, against Russia, which obviously, does not mean that the proponents of this stance overrate the capabilities of Russia in terms of shaping the closer and farther international environment. On this account, Polish policy will be hardly effective if at least some of Russia's interests in the post-Soviet area, especially in Eastern Europe, are taken into consideration, as was proven to date. Bearing in mind long-term consquences, the strategic conceptions of the Polish policy towards the East, should opt for the closest possible ties of Russia with political and economic structures of the EU and Euro-Atlantic structures (Europeization of Russia). This, in turn, should result in the evolution of the economic-political system of Russia into liberal democracy. The Ukrainian crisis and conflict classified the effectiveness of the Polish conception aimed at occidentalizing the Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova without simultaneously occidentalizing Russia. As was indicated by the proponents of this conception, its implementation assumed an inevitable cost such as a political conflict with Russia. The crisis and conflict in the Ukraine between 2014 and 2015 should be a good reason to change this stance. The biggest price for its implementation was paid by the Ukraininas themselves. Therefore, in the context of these experiences, Poland should suport not in opposition to Russia, but together with Russia, which does not imply that this process has to be fully synchronized. The direction of actions in this matter is of key importance. Despite the many contentious issues in Polish-Russian relations and different historical memory of Poles and Russians, in the long-term interests of Poland's security, lies implementing a cooperative and integrating, not a confrontational conception. For the normalization of Polish-Russian relations, it is essential that the successive governemnets of Poland and Russia should have a political will to a less confrontational approach towards disputable issues and resolve emerging problems in a compromising way, which is one of the "scarcest commodities" in the Polish-Russian relations. A compromise should not be treated as a failure, as is often believed, also by the Poles. It also requires changes in mutual perception. A true normalization of mutual relations between Poland and Russia will not be possible if the majority of political elites, media and society in both countries will see the other not even as a difficult partner of rival, but an enemy. The divergence of interests does not have to lead to hostility. The governing groups in Poland and Russia face a challenge in improving Polish-Russian relations. They can either attempt to broaden the area of common interests or to highlight the discrepancies and divergence of interests, and thus strenghten social attitudes prone to either cooperation or confrontation.
