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Discusses US foreign policy, militarism, and geopolitics, focusing on the Middle East and Iraq War, and international activism in opposition to US global hegemony; 14 articles. Based mostly on papers presented at a conference organized in honor of Harry Magdoff's 90th birthday, held in Burlington, Vermont, May 3, 2003. Contents: The new age of imperialism, by John Bellamy Foster; Confronting the empire, by Samir Amin; U.S. weakness and the struggle for hegemony, by Immanuel Wallerstein; U.S. hegemony today, by Peter Gowan; The new geopolitics, by Michael Klare; The global minotaur, by Joseph Halevi and Yanis Varoufakis; The two wings of the eagle, by William K. Tabb; The grid of history: cowboys and Indians, by Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz; Can U.S. workers embrace anti-imperialism? by William Fletcher, Jr.; Notes on the antiwar movement, by Barbara Epstein; Prospects for anti-imperalism: coming to terms with our own bourgeoisie, by Sam Gindin; Construction of an enemy, by Eleanor Stein; Homeland imperialism: fear and resistance, by Bernardine Dohrin; The parameters of resistance, by Amiya Kumar Bagchi.

The United States, since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, has often been accused of exhibited a new imperialism or new militarism. However, the author argues that the United States has long had both imperialistic & militaristic designs on the rest of the world & that little actually changed with U.S. actions after 9/11. The most important change that he does see as having occurred is that the U.S. is more overt in its imperialistic actions & philosophy than it was before 9/11. A continuation of its current imperialism, & its current openness about this philosophy, will lead to "global barbarism or worse." However, while imperialism has long been the U.S. mode of action, the United States does not have to continue in this vein, for nothing in human history is inevitable. D. Knaff

Scholars of modern imperialism have conventionally defined it in clear contrast against the ostensibly legitimate rule of the sovereign territorial state. From this conventional perspective, the theoretical distinctiveness of imperialism as a phenomenon appears in juxtaposition against normal sovereign state rule and effectively 'begins' at the transgressions of state power beyond some accepted space of normalized sovereign dominion. While the spatial and temporal dimensions of sovereignty have been well explored and the spatial distinctiveness of imperialism has mirrored that of sovereignty, the temporality of imperialism has not been as carefully considered. While the problems of what imperialism 'is' and what it 'does' have been thoroughly examined, 'when' imperialism is has not. This article aims to correct this by offering a critique of the conventional temporality of imperialism and its subjection to a spatial ideology, and instead articulating a critical temporality of imperialism that avoids some of the conventional conception's limitations, especially that of naturalizing state rule and its claims to legitimacy.

"How does control of media resources serve political and economic ends? What is the impact of media concentration and monopoly in the era of technology convergence, with not just traditional and 'new' media but also consumer electronics, telephony and computing industries? Revisiting the classic concept of media imperialism, Oliver Boyd-Barrett presents a thorough retake for the 21st century, arguing for the need to understand media and empires and how structures of power and control continue to regulate our access to and consumption of the media. It's no longer just Disney and Dallas--it's also now Alibaba, Apple, Facebook, Google, Samsung and Huawei. Examining the interplay between communications industries and the hierarchies and networks of political, corporate and plutocratic power in a globalized world, the book explains: the historical context of the relationship between media and imperialism; contestation and collaboration among new media empires; the passion for social justice that inspired the original theories of media and cultural imperialism, and how it has been embraced by a new generation. Digging deeply into the global landscape and emerging media markets to explore how media power works across transnational boundaries, this book gives a clear and sophisticated argument for why media imperialism still matters."--Publisher description

Lenin, Bukharin, Stalin, and Trotsky in Russia, as well as Mao, Zhou Enlai, and Den Xiaoping in China, shaped the history of the two great revolutions of the twentieth century. As leaders of revolutionary communist parties and then later as leaders of revolutionary states, they were confronted with the problems faced by a triumphant revolution in countries of peripheral capitalism and forced to revise the theses inherited from the historical Marxism of the Second International. With the benefit of hindsight, the author will indicate the limitations of their analyses. Lenin and Bukharin considered imperialism to be a new stage of capitalism associated with the development of monopolies. The revolution, made in the name of socialism (and communism), was, in fact, something else: mainly a peasant revolution. In his opinion, Trotsky would certainly not have done better. His attitude towards the rebellion of the Kronstadt sailors and his later equivocations demonstrate that he was no different than the other Bolshevik leaders in government. Adapted from the source document.

"Sonderabdruck aus 'Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik' Band 46 Heft 1 und 2." ; Mode of access: Internet.

This article examines the political economy of French imperialism from a critical Marxist perspective. It demonstrates how France has maintained a major role on the international scene, especially militarily, despite experiencing a relative decline in world economic power since the 1990s. In this regard, three features have marked the French imperial project: (1) the core role of state institutions and corporate elites in making French capitalism, and the protracted closeness of the state-capital nexus; (2) the strength of militarism in economic, political, and social realms; and (3) the consolidation of rentier interests not only in the corporate power bloc, but also at a political level. Over the past century, these three dynamics have underpinned and reinforced a particular project of empire in France – one that bears relevance to current debates on globalisation and the 'new imperialism'. By examining these issues, this paper seeks to further develop the Marxist theory of international political economy.

The globalization of production (and finance)—which emerged along with neoliberalism out of the economic stagnation of the mid–1970s and then accelerated with the demise of Soviet-type societies and China's reintegration into the capitalist world system—has generated a more generalized monopoly capitalism, ushering in what can be called late imperialism. Late imperialism refers to the present period of monopoly-finance capital and stagnation, declining U.S. hegemony and rising world conflict, accompanied by growing threats to the ecological bases of civilization and life itself. It stands at its core for the extreme, hierarchical relations governing the capitalist world economy in the twenty-first century, which is increasingly dominated by mega-multinational corporations and a handful of states at the center of the world system. Just as it is now common to refer to late capitalism in recognition of the end times brought on by simultaneous economic and ecological dislocations, so it is necessary today to speak of late imperialism, reflecting the global dimensions and contradictions of that system, cutting across all other divisions, and posing a "global rift" in human historical development: an epochal crisis posing the question of "ruin or revolution."