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The theoretical case for industrial policy is a strong one. The market failures that industrial policies target in markets for credit, labor, products, and knowledge have long been at the core of what development economists study. The conventional case against industrial policy rests on practical difficulties with its implementation. Even though the issues could in principle be settled by empirical evidence, the evidence to date remains uninformative. Moreover, the conceptual difficulties involved in statistical inference in this area are so great that it is hard to see how statistical evidence could ever yield a convincing verdict. A review of industrial policy in three non-Asian settings El Salvador, Uruguay, and South Africa highlights the extensive amount of industrial policy that is already being carried out and frames the need for industrial policy in the specific circumstances of individual countries. The traditional informational and bureaucratic constraints on the exercise of industrial policy are not givens; they can be molded and rendered less binding through appropriate institutional design. Three key design attributes that industrial policy must possess are embeddedness, carrots-and-sticks, and accountability.

A symposium paper on the then Rhodesia government's industrial policy, originally presented at symposium on Industry in Rhodesia, 11th and 12th June, 1969. ; The basic objective in the economic field of all Governments, but particularly of Governments of developing countries such as Rhodesia, is to achieve the maximum long term, rate of growth of the real wealth of the country. There are differences of opinion in the world today as to the best method of achieving this growth, and as to how the national wealth should be shared among the inhabitants of a country, but the aim of raising the standard of living of all citizens is common to all. In Rhodesia, our economic philosophy favours the private enterprise, capitalistic system as against the centrally planned and controlled economy of socialism or communism. We believe that the greatest level of efficiency in production and distribution is achieved by free entrepreneurs who are motivated by the desire for profit. We do not attempt to plan the future course of the economy in more than broad outline because we believe that the alert merchant or industrialist will react more quickly to changing circumstances than any central planning machine and will extract the maximum benefit therefrom. Human nature being what it is, it is not practicable for Government merely to foster the conditions in which private enterprise can best operate and then keep out of the way; completely laissez-faire capitalism is a century or so out of date; and some degree of Governmental control is today accepted everywhere as necessary, but our tendency is to control as little as possible and to remove these controls if the need for them has passed.

China's current industrial policy has been pursuing long term objectives and can be traced back to the late 1970s. The new CCP leadership under General Secretary Xi Jinping has not altered in any fundamental way these objectives. These are part of a long-term policy defined in the framework of the 11th and 12th Five-Year Plans and other long-term programmes for scientific and technological development. Foreign investors have recently expressed concern due to negative media campaigns and government crackdowns on foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs) operating in China: the prosecution for bribery of GSK executives, fines imposed on Danone and five other MNEs under China's anti-monopoly regulations1 and shaming campaigns against GSK, VW, Samsung or Apple. At the same time, blatant privileged access to key PRC public procurements is granted to Chinese national champions, notably in the development of hundreds of thousands of 4G base stations.2 Moreover, Xi Jinping is explicitly rehabilitating Mao's legacy and CCP propaganda is encouraging virtuous and altruist behaviour, putting forward ideological icons from the 1960s.3 There has been a lot of speculation over whether this represents a change in policy on the part of the Chinese leadership that will restrict the room for manoeuvre of foreign investors in order to give more space for the development of Chinese national champions (as countries like Japan or South Korea once did) or simply a temporary leftist turn to strengthen Xi Jinping's hold on the CCP before he can actually proceed with an agenda of further liberalisation of the economy, as previously forecast by some analysts.

China's current industrial policy has been pursuing long term objectives and can be traced back to the late 1970s. The new CCP leadership under General Secretary Xi Jinping has not altered in any fundamental way these objectives. These are part of a long-term policy defined in the framework of the 11th and 12th Five-Year Plans and other long-term programmes for scientific and technological development. Foreign investors have recently expressed concern due to negative media campaigns and government crackdowns on foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs) operating in China: the prosecution for bribery of GSK executives, fines imposed on Danone and five other MNEs under China's anti-monopoly regulations1 and shaming campaigns against GSK, VW, Samsung or Apple. At the same time, blatant privileged access to key PRC public procurements is granted to Chinese national champions, notably in the development of hundreds of thousands of 4G base stations.2 Moreover, Xi Jinping is explicitly rehabilitating Mao's legacy and CCP propaganda is encouraging virtuous and altruist behaviour, putting forward ideological icons from the 1960s.3 There has been a lot of speculation over whether this represents a change in policy on the part of the Chinese leadership that will restrict the room for manoeuvre of foreign investors in order to give more space for the development of Chinese national champions (as countries like Japan or South Korea once did) or simply a temporary leftist turn to strengthen Xi Jinping's hold on the CCP before he can actually proceed with an agenda of further liberalisation of the economy, as previously forecast by some analysts.

Many scholars acknowledge that industrial policy can work well in countries with strong merit-based public services and political checks and balances. However, there are very few empirical studies available that analyse industrial policies in low and lower-middle income countries. This study intends to help fill this gap by assessing the quality of industrial policies and industrial policy making in Mozambique. To this end, the study draws on an extensive review of the relevant policy documents, expert interviews and two case studies about the promotion of the cashew industry and the promotion of linkages between foreign direct investment and small and medium-sized enterprises. The authors conclude that the Government of Mozambique lacks the vision, leadership and proper incentives needed to create an appropriate policy mix of investment climate improvements – to create the conditions for private investments and market competition – and targeted interventions – to accelerate productivity growth and enhance firms' competitiveness.

Tunisia's industrial policy is generally perceived as 'best practice' in its regional context. A semi-closed statist economy has increasingly been turned into an outward-oriented market economy which has consistently produced growth rates well above the regional average. This has mainly been due to consistent government investment in public infrastructure and particularly in the education sector, a comprehensive, incremental approach to socio-economic reforms, and a professional civil service able to 'deliver' and harness foreign financial inflows for development-oriented purposes. But the Tunisian 'miracle' is still rather fragile, and recent events have proven this. The main fault-lines are a high degree of vertical fragmentation, a strong dependency on a few foreign markets, a strong focus on simple assembly activities, and a correspondingly limited capacity to create qualified employment. A major obstacle for the regime's declared goal to achieve a qualitative breakthrough toward a fully developed economy and enhance upward mobility for the broad public has also been the fact that the country's political and economic elites are intertwined in numerous, intricate ways, and that there are thus few incentives for private businessmen to make the necessary long-term investments in knowledge-intensive sectors.

Theoretical analyses of industrial policy normally restrict the range of possible outcomes by abstracting from either market or government failures. This paper thus studies industrial policy and its effectiveness in a model that includes both market and government imperfections. We introduce a public agency responsible for industrial policy into the model of Hausmann and Rodrik (2003), and assume that this agency has limited information and is partly politically motivated. We further extend the model to allow the public agency to communicate with en- trepreneurs and the entrepreneurs to engage in rent seeking. We find that industrial policies are ineffective if the public agency is poorly informed, but that they are not necessarily ineffective if the public agency is highly politically motivated. Given a highly politically mo- tivated public agency, industrial policies are effective if and only if the institutional setting ensures that such policies are modest e.g. by re- stricting the public agency?s budget. Moreover, our model helps us to understand why the same industrial policies that have failed elsewhere have been relatively successful in South Korea and Taiwan.

The article by Adams and Brock is a welcome and important antidote to current government thinking about merger policy, both in the United States and in Europe. In both regions, the government approach presumes the efficiency-creating properties of mergers and, therefore, adopts an extremely permissive stance. The declared imperative of international competitiveness echoes the view towards mergers which prevailed in Europe during the 1960s. However, while the analysis of Adams and Brock is both important and correct, I believe it is also incomplete. If bigness is a problem created largely by the laxity of past merger policy, then it is certainly correct to argue for stricter merger policy now and in the future; yet such an approach is unlikely to suffice. Not only is a policy required to control the further growth in the dominance of the giant corporations, but the problems posed by that very dominance must be addressed. I believe those problems should not only be addressed as issues of regulation, but also as issues of development. As democratic communities, we must react to the accumulated power of the major actors on the economic scene by regulating their behavior or by divesting them of at least some of their power. We must also act strategically to counterpose our own vision of the future to that of the dominant corporations. Thus, the regulatory and developmental roles of government are complementary in the search for a dynamic and efficient economy, and these roles require the development of some sort of industrial policy.

Despite intense study as an attractive model for adjustment to slower worldwide growth and increasing competition from low-wage producers, the sources of German institutional comparative advantage remain controversial, particularly with regard to the role of the national state. This paper argues that the national state plays a key -- though mainly indirect -- role in supporting the modernization of industry. On the one hand, the national regulation of labor markets has discouraged price competition and imposed a "productivity whip" on companies; on the other hand, through the supply of resources to sub-national and sectoral actors, the federal government has supported the investments in skills, R&D and capital equipment needed for industrial modernization. This support of an institutional infrastructure is particularly important for the large and modern SME sector (the Mittelstand). The 1990s illustrate both the continued success of this infrastructure in supporting adjustment and the ultimate dependency of these institutions on strong domestic political support and adequate international demand for high quality, medium-tech products. ; Die institutionellen Regelungen in Deutschland wurden als ein attraktives Modell fürdie Anpassung an das langsamere weltweite Wirtschaftswachstum und denzunehmenden Wettbewerb durch Länder mit Niedriglohnniveaus bereits umfassend analysiert. Trotzdem bleiben die Ursachen für den durch seine Institutionenbedingten Vorteil Deutschlands kontrovers, vor allem im Hinblick auf die Rolle der Regierungspolitik. In diesem Diskussionspapier wird die Meinung vertreten, daß die Bundesregierung eine - wenn auch hauptsächlich indirekte - Schlüsselrolle bei beider Unterstützung der Modernisierung der Industrie spielt.Auf der einen Seite hat die bindende Regulierung der Arbeitsmärkte eine Billiglohnkonkurrenz verhindert und wie eine "Produktivitäts-Peitsche" auf die Unternehmen gewirkt; auf der anderen Seite hat die Bundesregierung durch Subventionierung an Unternehmen Investitionen in Weiterbildung, Forschung und Entwicklung und Kapitalausstattung zur Modernisierung der Industrie gefördert. Diese Unterstützung durch eine institutionelle Infrastruktur ist besonders für dengroßen und modernen Mittelstand wichtig. Die neunziger Jahre zeigen sowohl den fortdauernden Erfolg dieser die notwendigen Anpassungsprozesse unterstützenden Infrastruktur als auch ihre völlige Abhängigkeit von starker politischer Unterstützungund einer ausreichenden internationalen Nachfrage nach qualitativ hochwertigen Produkten eines mittleren technologischen Niveaus.

The differences registered in the early 90s between the economy of the European Union as compared to the economies of the United States and Japan, in regards of growth rates, investment rates, R&D and innovation, international trade, etc., as well as the fast changes of the world economy determined the European Commission to issue the white paper on "Growth, Competitiveness and Employment", underlining the meaning of the European economy's competitiveness in the new conditions, and the legal frame for EU's industrial policy was settled through the Treaty of Maastricht. The document was setting theobjectives, priorities and the six basic principles of the European industrial policy, in a unitary concept. In the spring of 2000, the European Council from Lisbon sets the objective of transforming the European Union in the most dynamic and competitive economy of the world, and, therefore, foresees a working agenda with specific actions going until the horizon of 2009. In December 2002, after EUs enlargement, the Commission forwards to the Council the document titled "Industrial Policy in an Enlarged Europe", in which theindustrial development at the moment of new member states integration is analyzed, as well as the effects of EU's enlargement over the industry, and it suggests actions for the future development of the sector. The industrial policy of the EU must offer solutions for industrial development, by answering the challenges concerning globalization, the technological and organizational changes, the increasing role of innovation and entrepreneurship, and the sustainable development taking into consideration the new socialrequirements. The development objectives set at European level cannot be reached without a tight interconnection of the industrial policy measures with those of some complementary policies, such as thecommercial policy, the single market policy, transport and energy policies, research and development policies, competition policy, regional and macroeconomic policies.

Our concern is about a firm-specific industrial policy. When R&D subsidies or taxes are differentiated among firms, the question arises which firms in an industry should receive such support. We analyze a situation where firms differ in their R&D to in two distinct ways. They differ both in the costs of performing R&D activities and in the output obtained from such activities. The introduction of several domestic firms creates a corrective motive for government intervention with the firms' R&D activities in addition to Spencer and Brander's strategic motive. We find that the optimal firm-specific industrial policy. is affected differently by the two sources of firm heterogeneity. Another finding is that a change in a firm's R&D productivity has an ambiguous effect on the optimal policy towards the firm. ; N/A

Regarding industry, the bank in broad acceptation it consists of all firms producing identical or substitutable goods and services, these companies are engaged in a close race to meet similar needs as the same type of buyers.The evolution of industries is influenced by several factors: the pace of structural adjustment, adaptability to market requirements, the level of technological endowment, technical and financial capacity to attract financial resources for investment and technological upgrading, attractiveness to investors, usability of effective workforce, the development of services for industrial activity.The main objective of EU industrial policy is to strengthen international competitiveness, while providing its customers quality products at competitive prices. In shaping industrial policy, EU experience can provide a benchmark reference for defining the objectives, ways of action, specific tools and concrete measures to implement the policy.

Our concern is with a firm-specific industrial policy. When R&D subsidies or taxes are differentiated among firms, the question arises which firms in an industry should receive such support. We analyze a situation where firms differ in their R&D technologies in two distinct ways: They differ both in the costs of performing R&D activities and in the output obtained from such activities. We find that the optimal firm-specific industrial policy is affected differently by the two sources of firm heterogeneity. Furthermore, a change in a firm's R&D productivity has an ambiguous effect on the optimal policy towards the firm.

Highlighting the revival of industrial-policy thinking in an era of globalisation and disenchantment with free trade, this paper reviews alternative and, in part, competing theoretical foundations of industrial policy: neoclassical foundations, structuralist approaches, and pragmatic approaches inspired by new growth and development theories. One of the main conclusions is that the industrial-policy debate is no longer between advocates of horizontal and vertical policies, but between those who deny any potential for state intervention to make economies more dynamic and those who seek to clarify the specific conditions for appropriate intervention. Another salient conclusion is that state intervention is especially important in a knowledge-based economy, as witnessed by successful industrial policies in - for instance - the United States, Germany and France, and Finland.

Competition policy has seen quite significant changes over the past years. With the reform of Merger Control and the application of Article 81 (agreements) an 'effects-based, economic approach' was formally introduced by the Commission. Two other areas of competition policy are under discussion, namely state aid control and the application of Article 82 (abuse of a dominant position). It will be one of the key questions whether and to what extent an 'economic approach' should be followed here too. Some issues of competition policy with regard to industrial policy will be analysed in view of this changes. As the 'economic approach' is based on neoclassical market form analysis and welfare economics, I will try to make these approaches more comprehensive before I point to some problems which occur if the 'theory' were to be applied in real cases.