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Tilting the Wrong Firms? How Inflated ESG Ratings Negate Socially Responsible Investing Under Information Asymmetries
In: MIT Center for Real Estate Research Paper No. 22/12
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When ignorance is bliss: information asymmetries enhance prosocial behavior in dictator games ; presented at CESifo Conference on Social Economics, March 2014
In: CESifo working paper series 4750
In: Behavioural economics
In most laboratory experiments concerning prosocial behavior subjects are fully informed how their decision influences the payoff of other players. Outside the laboratory, however, individuals typically have to decide without such detailed knowledge. To assess the effect of information asymmetries on prosocial behavior, we conduct a laboratory experiment with a simple non-strategic interaction. A dictator has only limited knowledge about the benefits his prosocial action generates for a recipient. We observe subjects with heterogenous social preferences. While under symmetric information only individuals with the same type of preferences transfer, under asymmetric information different types transfer at the same time. As a consequence and the main finding of our experiment, uninformed dictators behave more prosocially than informed dictators.
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Market failures and costs of intermediation cause obstacles to the delivery of transactions: A critical discussion on the impact of information asymmetries and conflicts of interest on contractual relationships
To understand economic growth, this paper looks at transaction costs and how they affect how much money people make. It shows transaction costs, market failure, and economic underdevelopment. Many people think that the problems with development are because markets can't do their job of allocating resources. Some people don't believe that the market doesn't work and blame the government instead. If you look at the people who say that market failure is the root of economic backwardness, very few, if any, look at transaction costs and how they are linked to market failure. People who read this paper want to connect development economics with transaction cost theory and new institutional analysis.
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Do Local Forecasters Have Better Information?
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Reputation vs Selection Effects in Markets with Informational Asymmetries
In: MPI Collective Goods Discussion Paper, No. 2022/8
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The Information Dilemma: Private Information as a Cause of Transaction Failure in Markets, Regulation, Hierarchy, and Politics
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 31, Heft 1, S. 139-163
ISSN: 1552-8766
Information asymmetries persist because in certain situations the value of information cannot be appropriated by the one who has it. A game-theoretic model of information asymmetries is presented, showing that under certain conditions there exists a prisoner's dilemma. The model is used to clarify the failure of markets to transmit certain types of information, to explain policy failure in regulation without recourse to government failure, and to identify new types of transaction failure in hierarchy and politics.
Domestic Banks as Lightning Rods? Home Bias and Information During the Eurozone Crisis
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 7939
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Working paper
Domestic Banks as Lightning Rods? Home Bias and Information During Eurozone Crisis
In: Bank of Finland Research Discussion Paper No. 3/2019
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Working paper
Domestic Banks as Lightning Rods? Home Bias and Information during Eurozone Crisis
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Working paper
Information consequences of accounting conservatism
We study the information consequences of conservatism in accounting. Prior research shows that information asymmetries in capital markets lead to firm-level increases in conservatism. In this paper, we further argue that increases in conservatism improve the firm information environment and lead to subsequent decreases in information asymmetries between firm insiders and outsiders. We predict and test if this decrease in information asymmetries manifests itself through: (a) a decrease in the bid-ask spread and in stock-returns volatility, and (b) an improved information environment for financial analysts, leading to more precise and less dispersed forecasts, and to more analysts following the firm. Using a large US sample for the period 1977-2007 and several proxies for conservatism we find robust evidence consistent with our expectations. Our results are in line with conservatism being useful not only for debt-holders, but also for equity-holders. ; We acknowledge financial assistance from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science (ECO2010–19314, ECO2008–06238/ECON and SEJ2007-67582/ECON), the ICJCE/AT1 UAM-Auditores Madrid Chair, IESE Research Division, the Government of Comunidad de Madrid (Grant CCG10-UC3M/HUM-4760) and the AECA Chair in Accounting and Auditing.
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Essays on Information and Conflict
This dissertation explores the relationship between informational asymmetries and costly conflict in the international system. While it is well-known that information asymmetries may cause conflict, little research explores the origins of such asymmetries. This dissertation explores the role of intelligence, diplomacy, and military strategy in revealing information. I show that, under broad conditions, states will often fail to disclose information about themselves and fail to gather information about their opponents. In consequence, the ability to gather information does not undermine the link between uncertainty and war.
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Busy Voters, Agenda Control, and the Power of Information
In: American political science review, Band 86, Heft 2, S. 390-403
ISSN: 1537-5943
The correspondence between individual preferences and electoral outcomes is often affected by the existence of information asymmetries among electoral participants and the presence of individuals or groups who exercise some form of agenda control. While the effects of agenda control in political decision making are widely recognized, the effects of information asymmetries are not as well understood. Since information asymmetries are fundamental characteristics of most elections, a deep understanding of the correspondence between individual preferences and electoral outcomes requires a serious consideration of the "effects" of information. I develop a generalizable agenda control model that takes as given the observation that most voters are not naturally inclined to invest in political information. The model allows me to provide a dynamic description of how voters and political elites can adapt to the information problems that characterize political decision making. It also allows me to demonstrate the effect of these adaptations on electoral outcomes.