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In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 51, Heft 2, S. 421-446
ISSN: 1756-2171
AbstractAntitrust authorities view the exchange of information among firms regarding costs, prices, or sales as anticompetitive. Such exchanges allow competitors to closely monitor each other, thereby facilitating collusion. But the exchange of aggregate information, perhaps via a third party, is legal. The logic is that collusion is difficult if the identity of a price‐cutting firm cannot be ascertained. Here, we examine this logic using Stigler's model of secret price cuts. We first identify circumstances such that when no information exchange is possible, collusion is difficult. We then show that if firms' aggregate sales are made public, nearly perfect collusion is possible.
In: Information economics and policy, Band 5, Heft 1, S. 5-29
ISSN: 0167-6245
In: Social & environmental accounting journal, Band 18, Heft 1, S. 13-14
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 275-295
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: American journal of political science, Band 56, Heft 3, S. 731-744
ISSN: 1540-5907
Information exchange in policy networks is usually attributed to preference similarity, influence reputation, social trust, and institutional actor roles. We suggest that political opportunity structures and transaction costs play another crucial role and estimate a rich statistical network model on tie formation in the German toxic chemicals policy domain. The results indicate that the effect of preference similarity is absorbed by institutional, relational, and social opportunity structures. Political actors choose contacts who minimize transaction costs while maximizing outreach and information. We also find that different types of information exchange operate in complementary, but not necessarily congruent, ways.
In: PS: political science & politics, Band 5, Heft 2, S. 167
ISSN: 1537-5935
In: PS: political science & politics, Band 5, Heft 2, S. 167-167
ISSN: 1537-5935
SSRN
Working paper
In: The Japanese Economic Review, Band 70, Heft 3, S. 394-402
SSRN
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 56, Heft 3, S. 731-745
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: Shakaigaku hyōron: Japanese sociological review, Band 51, Heft 1, S. 104-119
ISSN: 1884-2755
In: Journal of economics, Band 63, Heft 3, S. 259-278
ISSN: 1617-7134