eGovernment and autoritative public data in Denmark are still mainly focused on the landside of Danmark. But the need of eloborating the coordinating effort of administration at sea is recognised and the development of maritime eGovernment is happening within the next years. This paper discusses the data involved in this administration and focuses on the need for understanding the function and hence value of data. Some maritime data are dealing with accurate placements of objects, and as a tricky part some are dealing with floating placement. Other data are handling non-visible areas in terms of zoning, e.g. planning and interest areas and finally some data are representation of legislation, whether it is rights or restrictions. These different data are not always usable in the same manner. This paper investigates the correlation between spatial data and legislation. Experience from many years of land administration can be used as part of this discussion as well as the conclusions from this paper can be discussion as input to the ongoing development on land.
eGovernment and autoritative public data in Denmark are still mainly focused on the landside of Danmark. But the need of eloborating the coordinating effort of administration at sea is recognised and the development of maritime eGovernment is happening within the next years. This paper discusses the data involved in this administration and focuses on the need for understanding the function and hence value of data. Some maritime data are dealing with accurate placements of objects, and as a tricky part some are dealing with floating placement. Other data are handling non-visible areas in terms of zoning, e.g. planning and interest areas and finally some data are representation of legislation, whether it is rights or restrictions. These different data are not always usable in the same manner. This paper investigates the correlation between spatial data and legislation. Experience from many years of land administration can be used as part of this discussion as well as the conclusions from this paper can be discussion as input to the ongoing development on land.
Internett er i dag verdens viktigste infrastruktur. Dets formidable suksess er bygget på prinsipper om åpenhet, frihet, robusthet og sikkerhet. Dette er prinsipper som viser seg stadig vanskeligere å forene. Internetts grunnleggende arkitektur er i liten grad konstruert for å ta hensyn til geografiske grenser. Staters behov for suverenitetshevdelse, kontroll og sikkerhet har likevel skapt en utvikling i retning av «cybersuverenitet» som er i ferd med å endre internett slik vi kjenner det, hvor nettverkene og deres underliggende arkitektur i økende grad inngår i staters geopolitiske ambisjoner. Dette er fortellingen om den viktigste globale konflikten du aldri har hørt om.
Abstract in English
The internet is the world's most important infrastructure. Its vast success has been built on principles of openness, freedom, resilience and security. These are principles that are increasingly difficult to combine. States' demand for control and security has developed the concept of "cyber sovereignty" which is about to change the internet as we know it, where the networks and their underlying architecture play an increasing role in the geopolitical ambitions of states.
Siden 2003 har regeringerne i Norge, Danmark, Sverige, Finland og Island arbejdet med at udvikle og implementere nationale strategier for cyber- og informationssikkerhed. Strategierne omfatter mange forskellige områder; f.eks. institutionel kapacitetsopbygning, uddannelses- og forsvarspolitik, internationalt samarbejde etc. Denne artikel skitserer landenes forskellige strategier per august 20181 for statens rolle i samfundets cyberresiliens, dvs. de kritiske samfundsfunktioners evne til at modstå og overkomme negative effekter af hændelser med udspring i cyberdomænet. Endvidere skitserer artiklen de udfordringer, som regeringerne har konstateret, at opgavefordeling og ansvarsplacering har givet, samt hvordan implementeringerne af strategierne reflekterer disse erkendelser. Her har den finske regering vist sig mest konsekvent ved at placere ansvaret for implementeringen af cyberresiliens centralt i en magtfuld organisation og udstyre den med konkrete styringsredskaber og en stor, velintegreret kontaktflade til den private del af Finlands kritiske infrastruktur.
Abstract in English
Since 2003, the governments of Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland have developed and implemented national strategies for cyber and information security. The strategies include several topics such as organisational and human resource capacity building, defence policy, international cooperation, etc. This article gives a thumbnail sketch of the countries' strategies for the state's role in societal cyber resiliens (the ability to resist and overcome negative effects of events emanating from the cyber domain). It then shortly describes the experienced challenges with distribution of tasks and responsibilities, and how the implementation of the strategies reflect attempts to overcome them. It concludes that the Finnish government has gone furthest by placing responsibility for implementation centrally in an influential organisation and giving it a centrally developed common matrix for assessing progress and a well-established formal network within the private segment of Finland's critical infrastructure.
Under 2017 och 2018 ökade Kinas direktinvesteringar i Sverige avsevärt till följd av ett antal stora förvärv, mestadels i fordonsindustrin. Samtidigt har den svenska offentliga debatten kring kinesiska investeringar blivit mer kritisk sedan 2017, då investeringarna överlag talades om i positiva ordalag. Under 2018 och 2019 har en rad aktörer inom statliga myndigheter, politiska partier, media och civilsamhället beskrivit Kinas investeringar som ett potentiellt säkerhetshot. Näringslivsrepresentanter är mindre synliga i debatten men även här finns det en tydlig trend av ökad uppmärksamhet på potentiella säkerhetsrisker kopplade till kinesiska investeringar. Den svenska synen på Kina tycks konvergera allt mer med vad EU har kallat för sin nya "mer realistiska" hållning gentemot Peking. Ett antal policyprocesser har inletts, vilket sannolikt kommer leda till att svensk lagstiftning stärks på flera områden för att öka kontrollen av Kinas investeringar och engagemang i Sverige, särskilt i kritisk infrastruktur såsom telekommunikationsnät men även vad gäller företag vars verksamhet anses som säkerhetskänslig i mer generell bemärkelse.
Abstract in EnglishChinese Investments in Sweden: From Fame to Fear?China's direct investment in Sweden surged in 2017 and 2018 due to a number of large acquisitions, mostly in the automotive industry. At the same time, the public debate on Chinese investments has become more critical since 2017, when they were typically seen in a positive light. Throughout 2018 and 2019, a number of actors in government authorities, political parties, the media and civil society have described China's investments as a potential security threat. Although less prominent in the public debate, business representatives have also become increasingly vocal about potential security risks associated with Chinese investment. The Swedish view of China seems to be aligning with what the EU has called its new "more realistic" approach to Beijing. Meanwhile, a number of policy processes have been launched which are likely to lead to the strengthening of existing legal frameworks to scrutinise Chinese investment and activity in Sweden, especially concerning critical infrastructure such as telecommunications networks, but also more generally concerning companies whose activities are regarded as sensitive from a security perspective.
Den fremvoksende supermakten og gigantøkonomien Kina har vist vilje og evne til å ta i bruk økonomiske virkemidler for å forme ikke bare egen region, men også for å skaffe global innflytelse. I dette bokessayet tar vi for oss fire bidrag om ulike sider ved Kinas økonomiske statshåndverk. Bøkene handler om graden av kontroll over kommersielle aktører i Kinas bruk av økonomisk statshåndverk (Norris, 2016), valutahåndverk og Kinas forsøk på å internasjonalisere sin valuta renminbi (Cohen, 2019), Kinas kollektive finanshåndverk gjennom BRICS-samarbeidet (Roberts et al., 2017) og Kinas gigantiske infrastrukturprosjekt (Clarke et al., 2020). Samlet viser bøkene spennet i økonomiske virkemidler Kina har til rådighet. Vi har en klar agenda med lesningen. Vi lurer først på hva som er de innovative aspektene ved bidragene. Dernest bruker vi bøkene til å svare på tre problemstillinger knyttet til Kinas fremvekst og dets økonomiske statshåndverk: (i) hva er Kinas ambisjoner?, (ii) hva gjør Kina? og (iii) leverer Kina på ambisjonene? Til slutt forsøker vi å løfte blikket og diskutere kort hvordan kunnskapstilstanden kan bedres fremover.
Abstract in English:China's Economic Statecraft: Ambitions, Behavior, and AchievementsThe rise of China as a superpower and economic giant has massive consequences for world politics. China has ambitions and capabilities to make use of its new economic muscles to not only shape its own region but also to increase its influence globally. In this book essay, we analyze four contributions to various facets of Chinese economic statecraft. The books concern the level of control of commercial actors in the Chinese leadership's economic statecraft (Norris, 2016), currency statecraft and China's attempts to internationalize its currency (Cohen, 2019), China's collective financial statecraft through the BRICS cooperation (Roberts et al., 2017), and China's enormous infrastructure project (Clarke et al., 2020). Taken together, the books show the extensive scope in the economic tools China has at its disposal. We have a clear agenda with our reading. We are predominantly interested in the innovative aspects of the contributions. We also use the books to answer three research questions concerning China's rise and its economic statecraft: (i) what are China's ambitions?, (ii) what is China's behavior?, and (iii) does China achieve its ambitions? Finally, we build on our reading of the contemporary literature on economic statecraft to outline some blind spots in the research field.
Norsk klima-utenrikspolitikk har ligget ganske fast frem til i dag. På 2020-tallet, i det avgjørende tiåret for klimapolitikken, blir imidlertid den norske linjen utfordret. Det skyldes at en nasjonal forutsetning som hittil har vært Norges fremste styrke, nemlig det fornybare kraftsystemet, ikke lenger opplagt kan ivareta den samme funksjonen i norsk klima-utenrikspolitikk. Det fornybare kraftsystemet og en aktiv utenrikspolitikk for fleksible ordninger i internasjonalt klimasamarbeid har ivaretatt den norske legitimiteten. Fremover vil derimot kravene til hva klimapolitikken skal levere skjerpes kraftig, når elektrifisering og industriell omstilling skal bidra til å nå klimamålene. En energiomstilling som svarer til ambisjonsnivået i klimapolitikken, vil bety at klima-utenrikspolitikken må balansere flere hensyn enn tidligere. Ingenting ved klimapolitikken er lenger kun innenrikspolitikk.
Nordsjøen står overfor en storstilt havvindutbygging. Uavhengig av hva Norge gjør vil europeisk havvindsutbygging dreie Europa i retning av økt gjensidig avhengighet, både fysisk i form av grenseoverskridende infrastruktur, og regulatorisk, gjennom felles regler for salg av kraft over landegrenser. Jo mer omfattende det grønne skiftet blir, jo tydeligere blir det at norsk og europeisk energiomstilling henger sammen, og at denne gjensidig avhengige energiomstillingen er av de aller viktigste komponentene i Norge og andre staters klimapolitikk. Denne omstillingen trigger imidlertid sterke suverenitetsimpulser i mange norske politiske partier. En storstilt norsk havvindutbygging reiser kontroversielle spørsmål om finansiering, ilandføring og kabelforbindelser, som alle med betydelig sannsynlighet åpner for vanskelige politiske dragkamper. Energiomstilling er nå en helt nødvendig del av en videreutviklet norsk klima-utenrikspolitikk. Det innebærer en utenrikspolitikk som utfordrer norsk suverenitet i langt større grad enn tidligere. Det beveger norsk klima-utenrikspolitikk potensielt fra kontinuitet og konsensus til uenighet og strid.
Abstract in English:Power Shortage on the Horizon: Norwegian Climate Foreign Policy from Consensus to Conflict?Until recently, Norwegian climate foreign policy has been relatively consensual. In the 2020s – the decisive decade for climate politics – the Norwegian stance is however being challenged. This is because a national precondition that until now has been Norway's foremost strength, i.e., the renewable power system, can no longer uphold the same function in Norwegian climate foreign policy. The renewable power system and an active foreign policy emphasizing flexible mechanisms in international climate cooperation have preserved the legitimacy of Norwegian climate policies. However, in the future, climate policies will face dramatically sharpened demands, as reaching the climate goals will now also depend on electrification and industrial change. An energy transition that corresponds to the upgraded climate policy ambitions implies a climate foreign policy that needs to balance more concerns than in the past. There is now no element of climate policy that is domestic politics only.
The North Sea is facing a major offshore wind power expansion. Irrespective of what Norway decides, a European offshore expansion will move Europe towards greater mutual interdependence, both physically in terms of border-crossing infrastructure, and regulatory, through common rules and regulations for the sale of power across national borders. The more extensive the green energy transition becomes, the more obvious it is that Norwegian and European energy transitions are connected, and that this mutually interdependent energy transition constitutes one of the most important components of the climate policies of Norway and other states. This transition, however, triggers strong sovereignty impulses in many Norwegian political parties. A major Norwegian offshore wind power expansion raises controversial questions about financing, how and where to connect the wind parks to the grid, and subsea cable connections. There is a considerable likelihood that Norwegian offshore wind policy will be characterized by major political tugs-of-war. Energy transition is now a completely necessary part of the development of Norwegian climate foreign policy. This implies a foreign policy that challenges Norwegian sovereignty to a far greater extent than before, which potentially moves Norwegian climate foreign policy from continuity and consensus to disagreement and strife.