Introduces sports aid and sports organizations as a form of foreign policy that demands more attention from political scientists. In Norway, a redefinition (1972-1973) of culture provided sports a political arena for the first time, which eventually expanded into the foreign aid territory and thus became a part of overall foreign policy. A similar kind of shift has taken place internationally as the UN declared year 2005 as "The International Year of Sport and Physical Education". The main goal for Norwegian sports aid is to enhance peace and democracy by providing opportunities for the people to engage in sporting activities by mainly building sporting infrastructure. A case study of this policy in action is provided. L. Pitkaniemi
One in a series of articles on the topic of empires, this article briefly outlines the rise and fall of the Roman Empire. The article addresses the timing of formation of the Roman Empire and the emergence of imperialistic patterns. The maintenance of the empire is examined to identify political mechanisms or systems that supported the empire. Roman foreign policy is credited as an essential factor to maintaining the power of the Roman Empire. The article examines central institutions of power in the period of Augustus (BC 27 to AD 14) and Hadrian (AD 117 to AD 138). The articles' discussion of Augustus' rule include his extensive travels to establish relationships with local rulers that buffered Rome and reduced the cost of direct management and his investments in infrastructure such an advanced road system, which to an extent decreased the empire's reliance on military power and increased reliance on adherence to laws dictated by the Emperor. Identifying factors of an empire are identified, including military power, political cohesiveness, and an inherently hierarchical organization. The identifying factors of the Roman Empire are compared to the identifying factors of present-day Russia and the United States. References. E. Sundby
The paper examines the conflict between indigenous people living in Numto Nature Park in the Khanty-Mansy region of Russia and the oil company Surgutneftegaz, which is trying to expand to new areas of the Park for industrial development. We analyse this conflict by looking at different perceptions concerning the threats and benefits underpinning the conflicting parties' arguments. We show that the oil company, whose approach is based on the principles of benefit sharing, seeks to provide economic benefits as well as infrastructure to ensure development in the indigenous community. In contrast, the indigenous people in Numto prioritise environmental safety and the possibility of maintaining their traditional ways of life, which means eliminating the negative impacts of oil development on fisheries, reindeer herding and the general state of the environment. The study indicates that focusing on indigenous peoples' and oil companies' differences concerning perceptions of threats and benefits provides a better understanding of desirable benefit-sharing arrangements between oil companies and indigenous peoples in areas that have so far only been marginally affected by industrialisation and modernisation. This insight suggests that the introduction of community-centred perspectives emphasising cultural and environmental security in benefit-sharing policies in oil companies could improve practices. The analysis draws on interviews with members of the indigenous Nenets and Khanty peoples of Numto Park as well as representatives of Surgutneftegaz, NGOs, the regional administration and the Numto Park administration
This comparative article reveals how the general focus of Canadian and Russian threat perceptions in the Arctic have shifted from a Cold War fixation on hard defence to accommodate soft security issues over the last three decades. Both countries now pay greater attention to threats and challenges stemming from climate change, security, and safety risks associated with resource development and increasingly accessible sea routes. Although concern about military conflict arising from Arctic disputes continues to frame some media discussions in both countries, most strategic analysts and academics have moved away from this line of argument. Instead, military functions now include assertion of Canadian and Russian sovereignty over their respective internal waters, as well as protection of resources in their exclusive economic zones and on and in extended continental shelves; protection of economic interests in the North, including mineral and bio-resources; prevention of potential terrorist attacks against critical industrial and state infrastructure; and dual-use functions, such as search and rescue operations, surveillance of air and maritime spaces, support to safe navigation, and mitigation of natural and human-made catastrophes.
The authors argue that analysts should parse two forms of military modernization in the Arctic: one of capability development related to the global strategic balance, where the Arctic serves as a bastion or a thoroughfare; and a second intended to address emerging non-traditional security challenges. They contend that these modernization programs do not inherently upset the Arctic military balance and need not provoke a regional arms race.
The Arctic is saturated with nuclear facilities bringing both benefits for regional economic and social development and risks of nuclear and radiological accidents and concerns about radioactive wastes. There is every reason to expect the Arctic will remain a nuclearized region during the foreseeable future. This makes it important to direct attention to issues of nuclear safety and security in the region. We identify several clusters of these issues in the Arctic, including the challenges of potential nuclear accidents, the handling of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, the cleanup of radiological contaminants, and concerns about nuclear security. An analysis of international conventions and voluntary codes of conduct shows that they are applicable to Arctic nuclear safety and security, but only in general terms. This suggests a need for an Arctic-specific agreement on nuclear and radiological safety, emergency preparedness and response, and cleanup of radiological contaminants. The outbreak of military hostilities in Ukraine in February 2022 has disrupted normal procedures for addressing issues of common concern in the Arctic. But the need for co-operation regarding matters like nuclear safety and security will not go away. Assuming it is possible to devise "necessary modalities" for restarting the work of the Arctic Council following the acute phase of the Ukraine crisis, an Arctic-specific agreement on nuclear safety and security could be developed under the auspices of the Arctic Council, which already has taken an interest in nuclear safety through the activities of its Working Group on Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response. Once such an agreement is in place, it will become important to consider the infrastructure needed to ensure that its provisions are implemented effectively.
