In this analysis, the Turkish Stream pipeline project infrastructure will be presented.We will concentrate on the gas transportation route from Russia to the Turkish energy market and then to the Southern European states. The Russian Federation, as the main exporter of the energy resources in the global scale, is interested to restore its strategic position in its relations with Turkey and the Southern European states. Such policy is corresponding with Turkish aspirations, to be much more influential in the region. Therefore, the joint strategic energy project will combine the interests of Russia and Turkey and will be important for both countries in terms of strengthening their position not only in the energy market, but also in the geostrategic dimension. ; Przedmiotem analizy artykułu jest budowa Turkish Stream, gazociągu eksportowego z Rosji, który będzie docierał na rynek energetyczny Turcji, a następnie ma przekroczyć granicę tego państwa z Grecją i kierować się do Europy Południowej. Działania Federacji Rosyjskiej demonstrują chęć odzyskania strategicznej pozycji w relacjach z T urcją i państwami Europy Południowej kosztem Unii Europejskiej. Propozycje Rosji są zgodne z polityką Turcji, która dąży do wzmocnienia swojej roli w regionie. Wspólny strategiczny projekt energetyczny połączy znacząco interesy Rosji i Turcji pomimo wielu sprzeczności oraz zwiększy znaczenie tych państw nie tylko w wymiarze energetycznym, lecz także geostrategicznym.
Presented article is focused on the analysis of forced evictions caused by the organization of sport megaevents. The development of sport arenas and associated urban infrastructure usually resulted in forced displacement of many thousand of local inhabitants from its direct neighbourhoods. The first cases of such evictions were observed already during the first half of the twentieth century. During the last three decades mass displacment associated with the sport events becomes a particularly negative sosial issue. We have observed several cases of mass displacement caused by preparation of summer olympic games in Seoul, Atlanta, Athens, Beijing, and Rio de Janeiro. Currently we are observing the growing scale of such evictions in many parts of the globe. The significant scale of such problem is observed in developing states (India, Brazil), as well as in countries ruled in non-democratic manner, charaterized by the low developemt of the institutions of human rights protection. Discussed facts and statistical analysis becomes a point of reference for the in-depth analysis of the economic, political, social, and legal context of this problem. Forced evictions associated with the sport events (so-called mega events) can be considered as a specific category of development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR). The article is focused on the most spectacular examples of such evictions observed between 1988 and 2016. My particular attention is devoted to the negative social consequences of this issue and its legal implications.
The following discussion took place in September 2018 at the Warsaw School of Economics. It focused on both senior politics, experts, and analysts. The discussion was moderated and planned by Andrzej Klimczuk, associated with the Warsaw School of Economics, and invited to the discussion: Barbara Szatur-Jaworska, social politician and gerontologist from the University of Warsaw, Paweł Kubicki, economist, Warsaw School of Economics, Marek Niezabitowski, sociologist from the Silesian University of Technology, Ryszard Majer, social politician , Agnieszka Cieśla, architect and urban planner, Warsaw University of Technology, Marzena Rudnicka, founder and president of the National Institute of Senior Management (biographical notes at the end of the debate). Panelists during the discussion analyzed the following issues: I. Beginnings of the senior policy, its definition, strategic documents of the state, II. The role of local governments in animating activities within the framework of senior policy and non-governmental organizations, III. Creation and role of the law on seniors, IV. Diversification of the environment of seniors, V. Activities in other countries within the framework of the senior policy, VI. Changes in social awareness, the evolution of attitudes towards older people, old age, ageing, VII. The market for products and services for seniors, VIII. Seniors' activity, formal and informal, activity infrastructure, IX. Housing for older people and ageing population X. The role of the state and self-government in the senior policy, dialogue with the authorities, public-private partnership, XI. Challenges and directions of development of the senior policy, XII. The deficit of care services, XIII. Senior and pension policy, XIV. Convergence and divergence in the senior policy.
The following discussion took place in September 2018 at the Warsaw School of Economics. It focused on both senior politics, experts, and analysts. The discussion was moderated and planned by Andrzej Klimczuk, associated with the Warsaw School of Economics, and invited to the discussion: Barbara Szatur-Jaworska, social politician and gerontologist from the University of Warsaw, Paweł Kubicki, economist, Warsaw School of Economics, Marek Niezabitowski, sociologist from the Silesian University of Technology, Ryszard Majer, social politician , Agnieszka Cieśla, architect and urban planner, Warsaw University of Technology, Marzena Rudnicka, founder and president of the National Institute of Senior Management (biographical notes at the end of the debate). Panelists during the discussion analyzed the following issues: I. Beginnings of the senior policy, its definition, strategic documents of the state, II. The role of local governments in animating activities within the framework of senior policy and non-governmental organizations, III. Creation and role of the law on seniors, IV. Diversification of the environment of seniors, V. Activities in other countries within the framework of the senior policy, VI. Changes in social awareness, the evolution of attitudes towards older people, old age, ageing, VII. The market for products and services for seniors, VIII. Seniors' activity, formal and informal, activity infrastructure, IX. Housing for older people and ageing population X. The role of the state and self-government in the senior policy, dialogue with the authorities, public-private partnership, XI. Challenges and directions of development of the senior policy, XII. The deficit of care services, XIII. Senior and pension policy, XIV. Convergence and divergence in the senior policy.
In the public discourse on issues of international security in the context of threats created by the Russian Federation, such threats are determined primarily by actions below the threshold of "war" (of a hybrid nature) and are made using non-military means, e.g. in relation to cyberspace. Actions of this nature are carried out by the aggressor's special services or groups of hackers and activists associated with them whose aim is to paralyse the functioning of the attacked state (its administration, critical infrastructure). Such activities are multilateral; activity is undertaken in many fields (social media, provocative events, establishing pro-Russian organizations, creating information portals) and is still escalating. The purpose of the research, the results of which are presented in this article, is to identify the activities and assess the impact of Russian information warfare conducted by the Russian Federation in cyberspace in 2014 and 2022 on the security of Ukraine. The research used general-methodological research methods – primarily, analysis and critique of literature. The case study method was used to identify specific examples of information warfare used by the Russian Federation against selected countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Keywords: security, information warfare, cyberspace, Ukraine, Russian Federation Streszczenie: W dyskursie publicznym zagadnienia bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego w kontekście zagrożeń kreowanych przez Federację Rosyjską determinowane są przede wszystkim przez akcje z użyciem działań poniżej progu wojny (o charakterze hybrydowym) za pomocą środków niemilitarnych, m.in. w odniesieniu do cyberprzestrzeni. Działania o takim charakterze prowadzone są przez służby specjalne agresora lub powiązane z nimi grupy hakerów oraz aktywistów, których celem jest paraliżowanie funkcjonowania państwa atakowanego (jego administracji, infrastruktury krytycznej).
Since 2005 an increased investment activity of territorial governments in Poland has been noticed. This was possible due to the availability of quite significant funds from the EU non--repayable aid. Investments that are being implemented have led, on the one hand, to the widening of the scope and the improvement of quality of local public services and, on the other hand, to the rise in the maintaining costs of the infrastructure that was brought to life. Investment needs of self--governments are still really high. This article aims to present financial investment opportunities of Polish self governments after the year 2012. Achieving such an aim was possible due to the analysis of historical data concerning revenues and expenses of LSE as well as their forecasts for the future. Study of theliterature was also carried out. Taking into consideration both the revenue and expenditure situation of self-governments and limitations in the indebtedness from 2014, it is possible to state that it is highly likely thata significant number of LSE will not be able to carry out investment activity, including this one, which can be financed from the EU non-repayable aid. Decreasing tax revenues together withincreasing running expenses caused by, among others, increase in the cost of debt service or salaries, will result in the higher difficulty for the self-governments to set investment funds aside.As the forecasted revenues and expenditures of LSE show, keeping the system of financing with no changes will lead to such a situation that LSE neither will be able to carry out investment activity nor pass the budget for the future years. According to the estimates, the number of suchLSEs can equal to 1300. Such a lingering situation in the long run will lead to the deepening of the infrastructural gap between Polish self-governments and better developed European countries.
For the last thirty years, we observe constant yet poorly coordinated changes in Poland's higher education. The changes result from national demographic, along with social and economic determinants. Moreover, the changes result from the impact of external factors [Antonowicz 2015, Wnuk-Lipińska 1996]. First, the public policy towards higher education institutions – especially typical universities – focuses on the problem of institutional effectiveness and related science funding regulations, Polish universities' participation in global competition, along with legal and institutional infrastructure and organisational culture adequate to new challenges [Jabłecka 2002, Kwiek 2010]. The direction of reforms in Polish science led to multiple fundamental changes in staff recruitment mechanisms (open competitions) research funding mechanisms (grant system and institutional evaluation), student education (courses accreditation), and academic career, i.e. the gradual abandonment of hierarchy in favourof scientific results. We notice changes in almost every sphere of universities' functioning, but in one of those spheres changes occur unusually slow, by which I mean the management structure analysed from the viewpoint of women and men in managerial positions. This article's goal involves the identification of barriers that limit women's access to the highest managerial positions at universities. In particular, I will elaborate the institutional barriers, according to both the subject literature and results of qualitative research that involved seventeen women: female rectors and vice-rectors of the 2016–2020 term of office. (fragment of text) ; Od trzydziestu lat szkolnictwo wyższe w Polsce przechodzi nieustanne, choć mało skoordynowane zmiany, powodowane krajowymi uwarunkowaniami demograficznymi, społecznymi i gospodarczymi, jak również wpływem czynników zewnętrznych [Antonowicz 2015; Wnuk-Lipińska 1996]. Polityka publiczna wobec szkolnictwa wyższego, zwłaszcza klasycznych uniwersytetów, ogniskuje się wokół problemu ...
The aim of this paper is to check how the different "starting" level to the market economy in 1990 and a different pace of economic reform introduction affect the level of development and use of communication infrastructure in former European socialist countries in 1999. In their analysis, the Authors have used six variables, as well as multifeature and monofeature classifications, and ranking. Four groups of countries with differentiated level of communication development have been distinguished: Slovenia and Estonia (relatively well developed communication); Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Bulgaria (distinguished by good accessibility to telephones); Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine (the most visible feature is a low number of telephone connections and a small number of hosts); Albania (with a very low level of communication development). As the result of ranking, the countries have been ordered from the countries that have the best conditions and abilities of their inhabitants' communication to the countries with the weakest conditions. The best situation in this respect is in the wealthy Slovenia, and Estonia that intensively co-operates with the Scandinavian countries. The second group comprises the remaining two of the wealthiest communities in the region: the Czech Republic and Hungary. The worst developed is communication in the countries that quite recently have been inflicted by acts of war, or their governments have not started fast economic reforms (Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Ukraine, Romania, Belarus, Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albania). The medium developed countries compose the last group, including Bulgaria, Slovakia, Croatia, Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania. These all countries are the ones that potentially could belong to the first or the second group, with a high level of communication development, but during the last decade a mistake was made somewhere. In Poland, such a mistake is the inconsistent policy of consecutive governments that have not carried out the actual demonopolisation of the market of telephone services and access to Internet. ; Marcin Polom
Negotiation is an important aspect of social and economic life. Skilful negotiators can stop wars, achieve a lasting peace, as well as resolve conflicts of various kinds for the benefit of all parties involved. With the onset of the pandemic, the inability of negotiating partners to meet in person, face-to-face, has led businesses and all other economic actors to turn to virtual negotiation applications that can be conducted remotely. The aim of this article is to identify the key success factors of remote negotiations, to show entrepreneurs and other economic actors good practices in this field, as well as to identify those areas in which in-person negotiations differ from virtual ones. The study was of a qualitative nature and consisted of a questionnaire survey carried out on a purposive sample. People for whom negotiation is an important part of their professional life were selected. The main conclusion of the research is that the success factors for remote negotiation are essentially the same as for in-person negotiation, but the latter needs taking more care about technology – both in terms of one's own skills in operating the equipment and in ensuring adequate quality of the infrastructure. ; Negocjacje stanowią ważny aspekt życia społecznego oraz gospodarczego. Wprawnym negocjatorom możemy zawdzięczać koniec wojny albo jej zapobiegnięcie, a także wiele innych korzystnych rozwiązań różnego rodzaju konfliktów. Wraz z początkiem pandemii niemożność spotkania się partnerów negocjacyjnych na żywo, twarzą w twarz, skłoniło przedsiębiorstwa, ale też inne podmioty, do sięgnięcia po aplikacje umożliwiające prowadzenie negocjacji w formule zdalnej, czyli na odległość. Celem artykułu jest zidentyfikowanie kluczowych czynników sukcesu negocjacji zdalnych, by wskazać dobre praktyki w tym zakresie, a także zidentyfikować te obszary, którymi różnią się negocjacje stacjonarne od zdalnych. Przeprowadzone badanie miało charakter jakościowy i polegało na badaniu ankietowym próby celowej. Wybrano do niej osoby, dla których ...
The aim of the article is to analyse the possibility of establishing a regional gas transmission and trade center in Poland, the so-called gas hub. The gas hub is described in many strategic documents adopted by the Polish authorities in recent years. For its creation, several key elements must be met. First of all, a strong, competitive, and diversified (energy sector, heating sector, industry, individual customers) natural gas market should be established in Poland. The natural gas distribution and transmission network should be able to balance supply and demand. Domestic production of natural gas should be supplemented by stable and diversified supplies. The domestic gas markets in the region should be integrated and the connection between the systems (interconnectors) should enable the gas transmission in both directions (import/export). The purpose of this article is to verify the possibility of establishing a regional natural gas transmission and trade center in Poland and to define the potential for cooperation with selected countries of our region. Keywords: natural gas, gas hub, gas infrastructure, regional cooperation Streszczenie: Celem artykułu jest analiza możliwości utworzenia w Polsce regionalnego centrum przesyłu i handlu gazem ziemnym, tak zwanego hubu gazowego. Aby koncepcja, która opisana jest w szeregu strategicznych dokumentów przyjmowanych przez polskie władze w ostatnich latach, mogła zostać zrealizowana, musi wystąpić kilka kluczowych elementów. Przede wszystkim powinien powstać w Polsce silny, konkurencyjny, zróżnicowany (energetyka zawodowa, sektor ciepłownictwa, przemysł, klienci indywidualni) rynek handlu gazem ziemnym. Sieć dystrybucji i przesyłu surowca powinna móc równoważyć popyt z podażą surowca. Krajowe wydobycie gazu ziemnego powinno być uzupełnione przez stabilne i zdywersyfikowane dostawy. Krajowe rynki gazu w regionie powinny być zintegrowane, a połączenia między systemami (interkonektory) powinny umożliwić przesył surowca w obie strony (import/export).
The paper presents the results of studies on the estate autonomy and accountability of publicly funded higher education institutions in Poland. An attempt has been made to answer the questions: "Was the level of HEI campus use in recent years the subject of public and administrative control? Were the decisions on significant extension of campuses economically viable?" The questions are of special importance in view of the deepening demographic decline, the lower level of public funding and the growing estate operating costs. An analysis of empirical data shows that when considerable resources, both national and European, were available for HEI infrastructure upgrading and development, Polish HEIs were not under an obligation to show how they manage the assets at their disposal. This may have contributed to a substantial, albeit not always judicious increase in the space available, which in turn may give rise to financial problems of individual HEIs and affect the future of the whole system of higher education. ; W artykule przedstawiono wyniki badań nad autonomią i rozliczalnością polskich uczelni publicznych w zakresie nieruchomości. Starano się w nim odpowiedzieć na pytanie: Czy w ostatnich latach uczelnie podlegały społecznej i administracyjnej kontroli poziomu wykorzystania posiadanych kampusów, a podejmowane przez nie decyzje o znacznej ich rozbudowie były ekonomicznie uzasadnione? Pytanie to ma szczególne znaczenie w dobie pogłębiającego się niżu demograficznego i zmniejszania stopnia finansowania szkolnictwa wyższego ze środków publicznych oraz rosnących kosztów utrzymania budynków. Analiza danych empirycznych pokazuje, że w okresie rozdzielania znacznych krajowych i europejskich środków publicznych na rozbudowę czy modernizację infrastruktury akademickiej uczelnie w Polsce nie były zobligowane do wykazywania, jak gospodarują powierzonym im majątkiem. W konsekwencji mogło przyczynić się to do istotnego (nie zawsze jednak uzasadnionego) wzrostu powierzchni uczelnianych zasobów, który może w kolejnych latach skutkować problemami finansowymi poszczególnych jednostek, a także determinować przyszłość całego systemu szkolnictwa wyższego.
Funkcjonowanie Grupy Wyszehradzkiej od początku jej istnienia nie było łatwym zagadnieniem. V4 powstała, dlatego aby państwa środkowoeuropejskie integrowały się ze strukturami euroatlantyckimi w atmosferze współpracy. Niemniej była to współpraca państw, które w wielu przypadkach kierowały się odmiennymi interesami. Wewnątrz Grupy od początku nie było sympatii, z czasem jednak to się zmieniało. Od momentu przystąpienia do Unii Europejskiej w tej koegzystencji bywały momenty mobilizujące takie jak: wspólne zmagania w ramach polityki spójności, walka o unijne budżety, czy ostatnio wspólny sprzeciw wobec przyjmowania uchodźców masowo przybywających do Europy. Trzeba przy tym zaznaczyć, iż poprawnie rozwija się współpraca państw wyszehradzkich na poziomie elementarnym, w takich obszarach jak: ochro¬na środowiska, infrastruktura, wspólne projekty transportowe i energetyczne czy turystyka. Ważnym nowym impulsem w tej kooperacji jest powołana do życia w 2016 r. Grupa Bojowa Unii Europejskiej państw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej licząca prawie 4 tys. żołnierzy. ; Functioning of the Visegrad Group since its beginning was not an easy issue. V4 was established to integrate East-Central European countries into Euro-Atlantic structures in the atmosphere of cooperation. However, it was a partnership of countries which in many cases guided by different interests. From the beginning, there was no sympathy inside the Group, but over time it changed. Since joining into the European Union in this cooperation experienced moments of common mobilizing such as: a struggle under the EU Cohesion Policy, the fight for the Union budgets, and the last one position against the welcome of refugees arriving to Europe. It should be noted that properly develop cooperation of Visegrad Group at the elementary level in areas such as: environmental protection, infrastructure, transport and energy projects and tourism. An important new motivation to this cooperation is founded in 2016 EU Battle Group of the Visegrad Group with almost 4 thousand soldiers.
After 1989, the Hungarian minority in Romania could receive basic rights, the execution of which — without mayor conflict — is followed by the subsequent governments. This was the result of an over two decades long process. In the first period, between 1989 and 1996, Romanian nationalism did not allow for substantial changes in the approach to the Hungarian minority. Only after the Hungarian-Romanian Treaty on Understanding, Cooperation, and Good Neighbourship, the two countries started their cooperation, which gradually reduced the tension on the international level and allowed for the creation of a legal system guaranteeing basic right of the Hungarian minority in Romania. Surely, the actions and skilfully created programme of the largest Hungarian political party in Romania, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (Romanian: Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România, UDMR, Hungarian: Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövets ég, RMDSZ), a regional party, that was able to secure a place on the political scene as a co-ruling party or lend its support to the government in order to achieve its goals through participation in politics on the central level, contributed to the creation of a well-functioning legal system in 1996–2011. The UDMR tries to use its participation in the elections to the European Parliament, in which it has two representatives, to implement its own policy, i.e. the elaboration appropriate programs of regional cooperation in the name of the idea of a "Europe of the regions". Accession to the EU, adopting the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages served as a basis for adopting a range of acts sought by the UDMR. In 2001, Victor Orbán's government established the Hungarian's Card, which led to ethnic tensions. Its amendment normalised the tense situation between Budapest and Bucharest. Currently, the aspiration to obtain political and territorial autonomy for Hungarians in Transylvania, which is contrary to the provision of the constitution of Romania — is increasing and causing conflicts, which antagonises the Romanians, who are afraid that such demands may result in losing a part of Transylvania, towards the Hungarian minority. Nationalist Hungarian parties in Parliament support these demands. The government does not reject them either. UDMR, officially emphasising the development of infrastructure in Transylvania and the education of the Hungarian minority, aims at decentralisation of power a self-governance in order to take over some competences of the central authorities. ; After 1989, the Hungarian minority in Romania could receive basic rights, the execution of which — without mayor conflict — is followed by the subsequent governments. This was the result of an over two decades long process. In the first period, between 1989 and 1996, Romanian nationalism did not allow for substantial changes in the approach to the Hungarian minority. Only after the Hungarian-Romanian Treaty on Understanding, Cooperation, and Good Neighbourship, the two countries started their cooperation, which gradually reduced the tension on the international level and allowed for the creation of a legal system guaranteeing basic right of the Hungarian minority in Romania. Surely, the actions and skilfully created programme of the largest Hungarian political party in Romania, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (Romanian: Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România, UDMR, Hungarian: Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövets ég, RMDSZ), a regional party, that was able to secure a place on the political scene as a co-ruling party or lend its support to the government in order to achieve its goals through participation in politics on the central level, contributed to the creation of a well-functioning legal system in 1996–2011. The UDMR tries to use its participation in the elections to the European Parliament, in which it has two representatives, to implement its own policy, i.e. the elaboration appropriate programs of regional cooperation in the name of the idea of a "Europe of the regions". Accession to the EU, adopting the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages served as a basis for adopting a range of acts sought by the UDMR. In 2001, Victor Orbán's government established the Hungarian's Card, which led to ethnic tensions. Its amendment normalised the tense situation between Budapest and Bucharest. Currently, the aspiration to obtain political and territorial autonomy for Hungarians in Transylvania, which is contrary to the provision of the constitution of Romania — is increasing and causing conflicts, which antagonises the Romanians, who are afraid that such demands may result in losing a part of Transylvania, towards the Hungarian minority. Nationalist Hungarian parties in Parliament support these demands. The government does not reject them either. UDMR, officially emphasising the development of infrastructure in Transylvania and the education of the Hungarian minority, aims at decentralisation of power a self-governance in order to take over some competences of the central authorities.
The article characterises selected aspects of Poland's housing situation during the interwar period, particularly in the Pomeranian Voivodeship, which was actually annexed to Poland in 1920. The largest urban centres were Toruń and Grudziądz for the first decade, with Gdynia coming to the fore in the 1930s. In 1938, the area of the voivodeship was significantly enlarged and its borders included, among others, Toruń. Bydgoszcz, as the largest city in the region, was added to the voivodeship, and the article made limited mention of the housing situation in this city. Most attention was devoted to the analysis of statistical data from from the two Polish censuses, including the housing situation, which were conducted in September 1921 and December 1931. For Pomerania, reference was also made to data from the German census of May 1918. Full data from the Polish censuses, including those for the area of Pomeranian Voivodeship, were published between 1927 and 1938. They made it possible to indicate that, against the national background, the situation of Pomeranian Voivodeship was one of the best in the whole of Poland. This was evidenced by a small group of the tightest single-room flats, as well as a very high index of good technical equipment of flats. Most had gas, electricity, sewerage and water supply. In the former Russian and Austrian occupied territories it was exactly the opposite. The towns there were much tighter and their technical equipment extremely modest. Despite the relatively good housing situation in the Pomeranian Voivodeship, social tensions also occurred in this area. There were social tensions over the housing situation. Above all, this concerned the lack of housing. In quantitative terms, this was not as acute as in Warsaw, Łódź or Lwów, for example, but it was also perceptible. The problem affected mainly cities, even not very large ones such as Chełmno or Chojnice. However, it was most acute in large centres such as Toruń or Grudziądz, and from 1938 Bydgoszcz, where the number of people without housing, nestling in makeshift conditions reached up to several thousand. The most difficult situation arose in Gdynia, as the extremely dynamic port city, with its increasingly strong industrial base and with a large number of jobs, could not keep up with the construction of housing infrastructure. The number of genuinely homeless people condemned to live in slums was reaching even over 20,000.
Die Festung Thorn war 1914 eine der wichtigsten Garnisonen im Bezirk des 17. Armeekorps. So ist es nicht verwunderlich, dass bei der Mobilisierung 1914 bedeutende Kräfte von ihr ins Feld rückten. An ihre Stelle traten Einheiten der Landwehr, die die Kriegsgarnison bilden sollten. Doch wenig später marschierten auch sie an die Front. Im Frühjahr 1915 wurden in Thorn zwei Infanteriedivisionen zusammengestellt, während die Infrastruktur der Festung auch zur Schulung von Luftbeobachtern und Artilleristen genutzt wurde. Nach der Niederlage Deutschlands im 1. Weltkrieg kehrte nur ein Teil der Einheiten in ihre Heimatgarnison zurück, doch auch dies reichte aus, um jeglichen bewaffneten Versuch einer Besetzung der Stadt durch die Polen zu verhindern. ; In 1914, the Toruń Fortress was one of the most important garrisons in the district of the 17th Army Corps. Not surprisingly, in 1914, as a result of the call-up, considerable forces set out from it. Landwehr units were brought instead, which were to be the military forces' war garrison. However, they also soon went to the front. In the spring of 1915, two infantry divisions were set up in Toruń, and the fortress infrastructure was also used to train air observers and artillerymen. After Germany had been defeated in World War I, only some of the troops returned to their parent garrison, but it was enough to prevent any armed attempt to capture the city by Poles. ; Twierdza Toruń była w 1914 r. jednym z ważniejszych garnizonów na terenie okręgu XVII Korpusu Armijnego. Nic zatem dziwnego, że w 1914 r. w wyniku mobilizacji wyruszyły z niej znaczne siły. W ich miejsce sprowadzono jednostki Landwehry, które miały stanowić jej wojenny garnizon. Jednakże wkrótce również i one wyruszyły na front. Wiosną 1915 r. w Toruniu zestawiono dwie dywizje piechoty, a infrastrukturę twierdzy wykorzystywano również do szkolenia obserwatorów lotniczych i artylerzystów. Po klęsce Niemiec w I wojnie światowej tylko część oddziałów wróciła do macierzystego garnizonu, jednakże i tak było to wystarczająco, żeby zapobiec jakiejkolwiek zbrojnej próbie opanowania miasta przez Polaków.