Suchergebnisse

Why have many regional organizations adopted common markets and customs unions? This article proposes a cognitive diffusion mechanism – termed frame diffusion – to explain convergent institutional choices across structurally diverse settings. Using Strang and Meyer's (1993) notion of 'theorization' to combine foundational work on framing with the literature on diffusion, I argue that processes of theorization transform the experience of successful institutional innovators into abstract cognitive schemas, which link a particular understanding of a cooperation problem to specific institutional solutions. As policymakers in other contexts encounter similar cooperation problems, they adopt framed institutional solutions, which results in institutional convergence at the macro level. I further suggest that this process of frame diffusion is conditional on ideational affinities in social purpose between the innovating organization and other regional organizations. Where other organizations pursue a distinct social purpose, policymakers rely on alternative frames and thereby cement institutional variation. After developing this argument theoretically, I illustrate it in an exploratory comparison of institutional choice in three most different regional organizations: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Common Market of the South, and the Southern African Development Community. The argument points to significant 'blind spots' and conceptual complementarity between prominent mechanisms of diffusion.

This book gathers leading international scholars to examine the institutional choices and innovations of the Lisbon Treaty and discuss the likely effects that of the changes that it set out to accomplish. Will the changes meet the declared goals of a more efficient and democratic Union which will allow the EU to act internationally with greater coherence and efficiency? If institutions matter, how much do they matter? How significant is the Lisbon Treaty? What kind of leadership will be available in the post-Lisbon EU?

This work uses incomplete contracting theory to account for variation in the specific and residual powers of post-Communist presidencies. It uses evidence from 24 post-Communist countries to test theories of institutional choice that link presidential powers to economic reform, institutional legacies, party systems, and social cleavages. It argues that two factors can account for variation in presidential powers: the bargaining power of the electoral favorite and the degree of uncertainty over the electoral outcome. It tests this model in greater detail against four cases: Russia, 1991; Estonia, 1992; Russia, 1993; Belarus, 1994. Three insights flow from these cases. First, political institutions can be analyzed as the by-products of power-seeking politicians making choices under varying degrees of uncertainty. Second, despite the great uncertainty of the transition, actors understand their interests and strategies. Third, high uncertainty compels political actors to hedge their bets when designing political institutions.

AbstractI investigate the extent to which reputational incentives affect policy choices in the context of a controlled laboratory experiment. In theory, asymmetric information and outcome unobservability undermine electoral delegation by creating incentives for politicians to pander. Under the right conditions, it may be preferable to remove such incentives by removing accountability altogether. The data suggest that subjects playing the role of politicians fail to take advantage of voters even though voters indeed create the predicted electoral incentives, albeit in a weaker form than predicted by the theory. When given the choice of institutions via a novel elicitation method, subjects prefer to retain electoral accountability or to make decisions themselves through direct democracy, even though both institutions yield lower expected payoffs than delegation to unaccountable agents.

This paper examines whether an institution has a differing impact on cooperation if it is introduced by a representative of the affected parties rather than exogenously imposed. The experimental design is able to control for selection effects arising from the democratic policy choice. I find evidence of a large democracy premium in the sense that endogenously implemented institutions lead to more cooperation than iden- tical exogenous institutions. Especially the subjects who initially did not prefer the policy comply if it was brought about by an elected representative. The results have implications for the analysis of decision-making processes and policy recommendations in general.

Defence date: 5 December 2016 ; Examining Board: Professor Marise Cremona (supervisor), EUI; Professor Miguel Maduro, EUI; Professor Francesco Maiani, University of Lausanne; Doctor Günter Wilms, Legal service, European Commission and Legal Advisor, EUI ; The Commission's policy of selective enforcement rests on four pillars: confidentiality, bilateralism, flexibility, and autonomy. For years, the European Parliament, the Ombudsman and stakeholders have put pressure on the Commission to reform its enforcement policy in order to increase its legitimacy in the eyes of EU citizens by, inter alia, allowing complainants access to documentation from its investigations and securing their rights by means of legally-binding measures. They have sought to replace the Commission's existing discretionary model of enforcement with a new approach characterized by such standards as transparency, trilateralism, objectivity, and accountability. The Commission, however, supported by the Court of Justice, has in most part resisted these challenges, changing its policy of selective enforcement only to such a degree that does not substantially interfere with its four pillars. This thesis seeks to explain the reasons for the Commission's commitment to the existing discretionary model of enforcement. By means of the Comparative Institutional Analysis, it is argued that the proposed reforms would distort the balance between the Commission's demand and supply sides. The Commission's capacity to enforce EU law is limited, and burdening it with new responsibilities in order to introduce transparency or objectivity to its operation would lead to the formalization of enforcement measures, increasing its administrative burden and decreasing its efficiency. It would skew its attention towards complainant-relevant violations and transform its enforcement into a vehicle for individual grievances running counter to the Commission's understanding of its enforcement function as guardian of the Treaties. The Commission's opposition to the accountability approach does not, however, mean a rejection of its demands. The EU Pilot is an example of the Commission's effort to address some of these expectations while maintaining the balance between the forces of supply and demand. Selective enforcement thus may not be as much about prioritizing cases as it is about assigning appropriate enforcement measures.