INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE IN THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
In: The review of politics, Band 58, Heft 1, S. 165
ISSN: 0034-6705
In: The review of politics, Band 58, Heft 1, S. 165
ISSN: 0034-6705
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 4, Heft 3, S. 349-366
In: Journal of policy analysis and management: the journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Band 6, Heft 4, S. 604
ISSN: 1520-6688
In: Journal of policy analysis and management: the journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Band 6, Heft 4, S. 607
ISSN: 1520-6688
In: 73 Hastings Law Journal 1461 (2022)
SSRN
In: East European politics and societies: EEPS, Band 25, Heft 2, S. 296-317
ISSN: 1533-8371
Choices of political institutions have been subject to increasing examination in recent years. The literature on these choices generally argues that they are driven primarily by politicians' power interests, with impartial values playing at most a subservient role. Yet there are circumstances in which that may not be the case, in which values do come more to the fore. This article examines two propositions: that a principal legacy of significant democratic dissident activity is that it enhances the direct role of impartial values in initial choices of political institutions; and that the values involved have a specifically dissident hue. It begins by exploring theoretically the reasons for expecting these patterns. It then examines the propositions empirically through analysis of institutional choice in East-Central Europe in 1989 and 1990. The third section expands the analysis, first by using Linz and Stepan's typology of nondemocratic regimes to consider the circumstances under which the posited mechanisms may operate, and then by tentatively exploring evidence from a broad range of cases. The article concludes that the circumstances in which dissident values matter significantly in institutional choices are rare but nevertheless generalizable. The analysis therefore provides a valuable addition to our understanding of institutional choice processes as well as of dissident legacies.
In: Institutions And The Fate Of Democracy, S. 78-113
In: Institutions And The Fate Of Democracy, S. 26-77
In: Locational Tournaments in the Context of the EU Competitive Environment, S. 212-234
In: West European politics, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 101-124
ISSN: 0140-2382
Although the delegation of government functions to non-majoritarian bodies such as independent agencies has accelerated throughout the OECD, Germany has followed a different path so far. In particular, administration agencies have only rarely been granted autonomy from direct political control. The main argument is that a genetic code, inherent to the system of government institutions, has routinely auto-piloted choices that involved the design & control of agencies away from principal-agent-like considerations. The elements of this genetic code are outlined & the likelihood of their future persistence is assessed. Even if the pressure to create new agencies at arms length from government has increased, there are still strong incentives to keep them in a subordinate position. Adapted from the source document.
In: West European politics, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 101-124
ISSN: 0140-2382
Although the delegation of government functions to non-majoritarian bodies such as independent agencies has accelerated throughout the OECD, Germany has followed a different path so far. In particular, administrative agencies have only rarely been granted autonomy from direct political control. The main argument is that a genetic code, inherent to the system of government institutions, has routinely auto-piloted choices that involved the design and control of agencies away from principal-agent-like considerations. The elements of this genetic code are outlined and the likelihood of their future persistence is assessed. Even if the pressure to create new agencies at arms length from government has increased, there are still strong incentives to keep them in a subordinate position. (West European Politics / FUB)
World Affairs Online
In: West European Politics, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 101-124
"Although the delegation of government functions to non-majoritarian bodies such as independent agencies has accelerated throughout the OECD, Germany has followed a different path so far. In particular, administrative agencies have only rarely been granted autonomy from direct political control. The main argument is that a genetic code, inherent to the system of government institutions, has routinely auto-piloted choices that involved the design and control of agencies away from principal-agent-like considerations. The elements of this genetic code are outlined and the likelihood of their future persistence is assessed. Even if the pressure to create new agencies at arms length from government has increased, there are still strong incentives to keep them in a subordinate position." (author's abstract)
In: West European politics, Band 24, Heft 3, S. 65-88
ISSN: 0140-2382
World Affairs Online
In: Economics and commerce discussion papers 1/91
In: APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper
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Working paper