Suchergebnisse

The presidential press conference has rapidly developed in the last 2 decades from a highly informal, semi-private encounter between the Chief Executive & the reporters into a formalized public institution. The 'mediating' role performed by the reporters between President & public has diminished. Now the President speaks directly to the public from this forum. Institutionalization has not substantially reduced the usefulness of the conferences as measured by front page news in the New York Times thus generated. It may have reduced its usefulness in terms of some of the more subtle benefits to be reaped by the President from intimate contact with reporters. The institutionalized press conference may well be less dependent upon accidental factors of personality than in the past. IPSA.

The problem of converting world-war industry to peacetime enterprise is being seriously posed for the first time since the outbreak of WWII. Of major concern has been the econ feasibility of the transition process for an industrial complex, but there are also nonecon factors which produce a lag between technical know-how & the practical implementation of steps toward industrial reconversion(IR). 5 major nonecon deterrents are: (1) absence of consciousness of the IR problem, (2) rise of new industrial activities heavily dependent on continuation of arms spending, (3) belief in armaments as a bulwark of soc solidarity, (4) acculturation to patterns of secrecy & coercion, & (5) fear that IR would lead to deterioration of the Western alliance. These factors prove to be insubstantial on critical examination. Disarmament & III to peacetime policies would have to be phased in sociol'ly as well as econ'ly. A policy of heavy arms expenditures has generated profound SP disorientation. No major US IR will occur until doubts about the future of the US economy are either assuaged or overcome by still greater trepidations re the future of the human community as such. AA.

The problem of converting world-war industry to peacetime enterprise is being seriously posed for the first time since the outbreak of World War II. Thus far, the cen ter of concern has been the economic feasibility of the transition process for an industrial complex. There are also noneco nomic factors which produce a lag between technical know-how for the reconversion process and the practical implementation of steps toward industrial reconversion. Five major noneco nomic deterrents are: absence of consciousness of the problem of conversion; rise of new industrial activities heavily depend ent upon continuation of arms spending; belief in armaments as a bulwark of social solidarity; acculturation to patterns of secrecy and coercion; fear that industrial reconversion would lead to deterioration of the Western alliance. Under critical examination, these factors prove to be insubstantial. How ever, disarmament and conversion to peacetime industrial poli cies would have to be phased in sociologically as well as eco nomically. A policy of heavy arms expenditures has gener ated profound social and political disorientation. No major shifts in the production orientation of American industry will occur until doubts about the future of the American economy are either assuaged or overcome by still greater trepidations about the future of the human community as such.

Expansion of paper presented before the Am. political science association, Sept., 1954.