Suchergebnisse

Ziel der Untersuchung ist die Formulierung einer realistischen Theorie sozialer Institutionen, die zugleich die Anwendung von Methoden der künstlichen Intelligenz in den Sozialwissenschaften ermöglicht. Ausgehend von Grundproblem sozialer Ordnung stellt der Verfasser einem spieltheoretisch formulierten Harmoniemodell sozialer Institutionen ein machtorientiertes Institutionenmodell gegenüber. Er behandelt Handlungen als Grundelemente sozialer Systeme und diskutiert ihre Abbildung in Mikro- und Makromodellen. Im Zusammenwirken beider Modelltypen werden zentrale Züge sozialer Institutionen sichtbar gemacht. Machtbeziehungen stellen das wesentliche Charakteristikum sozialer Institutionen dar. Abschließend werden Entstehung und Wandel sozialer Institutionen behandelt. (ICE)

"Verhaltenserwartungen, deren Verwirklichung nicht kontrollierbar ist, bedürfen der Vertrauensbildung. Die Vertrauensvermutung stützt die Stabilität der Erwartung und schützt vor der Enttäuschungsangst. Vertrauen überbrückt Unsicherheit. 'Moralvertrauen' zu Personen stützt sich auf beobachtete Indikatoren, die das Vertrauen bestärken, rationalisiert Enttäuschungen und löst kognitive Dissonanzen im Sinne der Selbstbestätigung. Vertrauensbildung ist insofern ein reflexiver Prozeß der Wahrnehmungsselektion. Vertrauen zu Institutionen unterscheidet sich von Vertrauen zu Personen. Es ist abstrakter und indirekter, bezieht sich auf 'Systemeigenschaften'. Über welche Systemeigenschaften bildet sich Institutionenvertrauen? Welche Indikatoren dienen der Bestätigung der Vertrauensvermutung? Der Analyse liegt ein Institutionenverständnis zugrunde, das die Übertragung normativer Leitideen in handlungsbestimmende Orientierungen thematisiert. Die Homogenisierung von Erwartungen und normativem Selbstanspruch der Institutionen einerseits und die je kontextspezifische Symmetrie von Beobachtungsselektion und Institutionenperformanz andererseits sollen als Grundlagen für eine Vertrauensbildung zu Institutionen gelten. Für Vertrauensverlust wird insbesondere die Wahmehmung von unbearbeiteten Kontingenzen der institutionellen Differenzierung herausgearbeitet. Die anwendungsbezogenen Beispiele werden aus dem Institutionalisierungsprozeß der Europäischen Union mit noch nicht gewonnenem 'Systemvertrauen' und verlorenem 'Moralvertrauen' gewählt." (Autorenreferat)

A precise model of social institutions is described comprising four dimensions: first, a macro-level of groups, types of actions, and related notions, second, a micro-level of underlying individuals and actions, together with suitable relations of intention, causal belief and power. Power is characterized in a new way emending proposals discussed recently. Third, the model contains intellectual representations of items on the macro- and micro-level. Fourth, it contains a dimension including the origin and development of what we call "social practices" (smallest units of socially relevant behaviour) which gives the model some historical depth. By putting all these items together, a powerful model with a wide range of applications is created. The claim associated with this model is that it applies to all social institutions which are similar to systems listed up in the introduction. The way of applying the model is discussed in detail on the basis of an abstract example.

"This paper aims at explaining the role and importance of the evolution of institutions for sustainable agri-environments during the transition process by referring to examples of agri-environmental problems faced in Central and Eastern European countries. It is often stated that the replacement of institutional structures in post socialist countries would bring a unique opportunity to implement new policies and institutions needed to ensure that economic growth is environmentally sustainable. This idea stems from the assumption that the breakdown of the socialist system resembles that (of the Schumpeterian type) of creative destruction - a process that incessantly revolutionizes economic structures from within. However, not all kinds of institutions, especially at local level, can simply be implemented, and even more, not incessantly. Instead, they evolve as a response to ecosystem and social system characteristics, and this is a rather slow process. A central question therefore is whether the required institutional arrangements for achieving sustainability in the area of agri-environmental resource management can be built more easily in periods of transition as they fill institutional gaps, or whether processes of transition make institution building a more difficult and far more time consuming task than previously thought. Above all, we want to find out, how these two processes of institution building at different scales affect the sustainable management of resources such as water and biodiversity in agriculture? It will become clear that the agri-environmental problem areas faced during transition are complex and dynamic and require adequate institutions both by political design and from the grassroots, to be developed by the respective actors involved. Transition from centrally planned to pluralistic systems has to be considered as a particular and in some respect non-typical process of institutional change. Popular theories of institutional change do not necessarily apply. The privatisation experience from many CEE countries will serve as an example. Finally, we will provide some examples of missing or insufficient interaction between political actors or agencies and people in CEE countries. Substantial investments into social and human capital, particularly regarding informal institutions are needed for institutions of sustainability to evolve." (author's abstract)

"This paper uses data from 20 OECD countries to investigate the impact of welfare state institutions (especially employment protection, wage bargaining and work incentives) on the functioning of the labour market both theoretically and empirically. It shows that the impact of welfare state institutions is not as clear-cut as the deregulationists' view suggests. This result may be surprising against the background of the common view that welfare state measures cause European employment problems but it is in line with the outcomes of many other economic studies. The reasons for the ambiguous effects of welfare state institutions are manifold but the most important reason is the complexity of the impacts. There are many side-effects or second-round effects of welfare state institutions which, although often neglected, prove to be very important in the real 'imperfect market' world. Many welfare state institutions only have a clear-cut negative effect against the background of the theoretical perfect market model." (author's abstract)