Suchergebnisse

This article introduces the activity of the military commandant institutions (Lith. Karo komendantūros) in Lithuania and their significance after the takeover of 17 December 1926. It touches upon the network of the military commandant institutions; also, other military-related institutions (eg Lith. karo stovio reikalų referentūra). It analyses the military commandant institutions as the state-owned public-life-related regulatory and control institutions, the responsibilities of the commandants, interrelation among the said military commandant institutions and other institutions of the authoritative regime, and their efficiency and status during the first days of the Soviet occupation.

This article introduces the activity of the military commandant institutions (Lith. Karo komendantūros) in Lithuania and their significance after the takeover of 17 December 1926. It touches upon the network of the military commandant institutions; also, other military-related institutions (eg Lith. karo stovio reikalų referentūra). It analyses the military commandant institutions as the state-owned public-life-related regulatory and control institutions, the responsibilities of the commandants, interrelation among the said military commandant institutions and other institutions of the authoritative regime, and their efficiency and status during the first days of the Soviet occupation.

This article introduces the activity of the military commandant institutions (Lith. Karo komendantūros) in Lithuania and their significance after the takeover of 17 December 1926. It touches upon the network of the military commandant institutions; also, other military-related institutions (eg Lith. karo stovio reikalų referentūra). It analyses the military commandant institutions as the state-owned public-life-related regulatory and control institutions, the responsibilities of the commandants, interrelation among the said military commandant institutions and other institutions of the authoritative regime, and their efficiency and status during the first days of the Soviet occupation.

The aims of this article are to describe the fundamental connection between State government, counties and municipalities and to expose peculiarities of interaction of State government subjects and Local Self-government institutions. The survey method is grounded on the systemic research and analysis of the Lithuanian legal acts: Law on the Local Self-government, Law on the Governing of the County and Law on the Regional Development. The main conclusions of the article are following: a) the objects, functions and responsibility of Regional institutions and Counties are separated by legal acts, but in fact Regional institutions and Counties are indivisible unit; b) in reality municipalities become subordinate to the State government and restraint from Self-government institutions appreciable by limited liberty of decision making and finance resources, and intensive state inspection of procedures; c) there is not fully realized principle of decentralization. In the future State government system and Local Self-government reforms could take the way of self-governmental regions making and the power, functions and decision making competence of municipalities could be extended

The aims of this article are to describe the fundamental connection between State government, counties and municipalities and to expose peculiarities of interaction of State government subjects and Local Self-government institutions. The survey method is grounded on the systemic research and analysis of the Lithuanian legal acts: Law on the Local Self-government, Law on the Governing of the County and Law on the Regional Development. The main conclusions of the article are following: a) the objects, functions and responsibility of Regional institutions and Counties are separated by legal acts, but in fact Regional institutions and Counties are indivisible unit; b) in reality municipalities become subordinate to the State government and restraint from Self-government institutions appreciable by limited liberty of decision making and finance resources, and intensive state inspection of procedures; c) there is not fully realized principle of decentralization. In the future State government system and Local Self-government reforms could take the way of self-governmental regions making and the power, functions and decision making competence of municipalities could be extended

Though the Baltic Sea region appears to be an ideal place for the formation of classical regional security regime, this assumption appears to be substantially wrong for one simple reason - Russia cannot accommodate itself in this regional format. Therefore, only international institutions of a wider scope are capable of resolving the dilemma of Baltic security and performing the conflict prevention function. CSCE successfully coped with this task in 1991-1994. CSCE was the international format that ensured successful withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States. However it soon became clear that the organisation is of little use in further settlement and normalisation of the Baltic-Russian relations. Therefore, the regional Cold War could only be ended by the influence of international institutions capable of conducting equal dialogue with Russia. And NATO could became such institution. After uniting its former antagonists into NACC, then into EAPC and PfP, and after 2002 decision to invite the Baltic States to start accession talks, it managed to find a peculiar form of institutionalisation of relations with Russia. Therefore one may say that the security regime in the Baltic Sea region is becoming a NATO-centric regime because even countries formally not members of NATO will have established solid relations with this organisation. This applies to Finland and Sweden for a long time already. And there is a chance now that the same will soon apply to Russia.

Though the Baltic Sea region appears to be an ideal place for the formation of classical regional security regime, this assumption appears to be substantially wrong for one simple reason - Russia cannot accommodate itself in this regional format. Therefore, only international institutions of a wider scope are capable of resolving the dilemma of Baltic security and performing the conflict prevention function. CSCE successfully coped with this task in 1991-1994. CSCE was the international format that ensured successful withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States. However it soon became clear that the organisation is of little use in further settlement and normalisation of the Baltic-Russian relations. Therefore, the regional Cold War could only be ended by the influence of international institutions capable of conducting equal dialogue with Russia. And NATO could became such institution. After uniting its former antagonists into NACC, then into EAPC and PfP, and after 2002 decision to invite the Baltic States to start accession talks, it managed to find a peculiar form of institutionalisation of relations with Russia. Therefore one may say that the security regime in the Baltic Sea region is becoming a NATO-centric regime because even countries formally not members of NATO will have established solid relations with this organisation. This applies to Finland and Sweden for a long time already. And there is a chance now that the same will soon apply to Russia.

Though the Baltic Sea region appears to be an ideal place for the formation of classical regional security regime, this assumption appears to be substantially wrong for one simple reason - Russia cannot accommodate itself in this regional format. Therefore, only international institutions of a wider scope are capable of resolving the dilemma of Baltic security and performing the conflict prevention function. CSCE successfully coped with this task in 1991-1994. CSCE was the international format that ensured successful withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States. However it soon became clear that the organisation is of little use in further settlement and normalisation of the Baltic-Russian relations. Therefore, the regional Cold War could only be ended by the influence of international institutions capable of conducting equal dialogue with Russia. And NATO could became such institution. After uniting its former antagonists into NACC, then into EAPC and PfP, and after 2002 decision to invite the Baltic States to start accession talks, it managed to find a peculiar form of institutionalisation of relations with Russia. Therefore one may say that the security regime in the Baltic Sea region is becoming a NATO-centric regime because even countries formally not members of NATO will have established solid relations with this organisation. This applies to Finland and Sweden for a long time already. And there is a chance now that the same will soon apply to Russia.

For decades women/s organizations and government/s institutions in many countries have worked against family violence. Because of their efforts, violence against children and women has recently been recognised as a legitimate human rights issue by the United Nations and by European Union.

For decades women/s organizations and government/s institutions in many countries have worked against family violence. Because of their efforts, violence against children and women has recently been recognised as a legitimate human rights issue by the United Nations and by European Union.

Article treats a 2003-2004 political crisis in Lithuania as not confined to the Presidential institution. This is the crisis of an entire political system that had been maturing since long before. Four groups of factors are identified: 1) exhaustion of the intellectual resources of the political process & the lack of regularity, characteristic to the newly emerging political forces; 2) political anomie, which spans all levels of the political system; 3) entropy of the presidential institution, stimulating the redistribution of authority among separate state structures; & 4) populism & radicalism. The first three groups of factors may conventionally be called 'pre-Paksist', whereas the fourth was particularly activated during the Paksas's presidential tenure. The article argues that the impeachment of the President brought to an end anything but the first stage of the political crisis resolution process. That is why the author leaves the results of the Presidential impeachment aside in this research. The second stage commenced along with the early presidential elections. In general one must note that the political crisis in Lithuania is solvable by democratic & legal means. Adapted from the source document.

The controversial war in Iraq has revitalized the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU), which has been stagnant since Maastricht Treaty and the failure in the Balkans. The development of the CFSP is accumulating acceleration: the EU will soon have not only a common market, common institutions and a single currency, but also a common constitution, minister of foreign affairs and even a common army. The leaders of the larger states are especially enthusiastic about a stronger CFSP as a counterweight to the US dominance in the international security affairs. The authors of this article contend that clearly articulated and globally projected CFSP will not be possible unless common European interests stemming from as common European identity and implemented by common supranational institutions will emerge. The impact of the CFSP on Lithuanian foreign and security policy will depend on the pace of European integration in this area and the strength of European identity within the political elite of Lithuania and the society itself. Will this impact be of a positive nature? It will depend on the way Europe will choose: creation of an independent defence structure as an alternative to NATO or development of a cohesive strategic partnership with the US and NATO. In any case, Lithuania will have to constantly seek for a subtle balance between her commitments to NATO, implications of the EU membership and the strategic partnership with the US. In this. [to full text]

The controversial war in Iraq has revitalized the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU), which has been stagnant since Maastricht Treaty and the failure in the Balkans. The development of the CFSP is accumulating acceleration: the EU will soon have not only a common market, common institutions and a single currency, but also a common constitution, minister of foreign affairs and even a common army. The leaders of the larger states are especially enthusiastic about a stronger CFSP as a counterweight to the US dominance in the international security affairs. The authors of this article contend that clearly articulated and globally projected CFSP will not be possible unless common European interests stemming from as common European identity and implemented by common supranational institutions will emerge. The impact of the CFSP on Lithuanian foreign and security policy will depend on the pace of European integration in this area and the strength of European identity within the political elite of Lithuania and the society itself. Will this impact be of a positive nature? It will depend on the way Europe will choose: creation of an independent defence structure as an alternative to NATO or deve¬lopment of a cohesive strategic partnership with the US and NATO. In any case, Lithuania will have to constantly seek for a subtle balance between her commitments to NATO, implications of the EU membership and the strategic partnership with the US. In this. [to full text]

The controversial war in Iraq has revitalized the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU), which has been stagnant since Maastricht Treaty and the failure in the Balkans. The development of the CFSP is accumulating acceleration: the EU will soon have not only a common market, common institutions and a single currency, but also a common constitution, minister of foreign affairs and even a common army. The leaders of the larger states are especially enthusiastic about a stronger CFSP as a counterweight to the US dominance in the international security affairs. The authors of this article contend that clearly articulated and globally projected CFSP will not be possible unless common European interests stemming from as common European identity and implemented by common supranational institutions will emerge. The impact of the CFSP on Lithuanian foreign and security policy will depend on the pace of European integration in this area and the strength of European identity within the political elite of Lithuania and the society itself. Will this impact be of a positive nature? It will depend on the way Europe will choose: creation of an independent defence structure as an alternative to NATO or deve¬lopment of a cohesive strategic partnership with the US and NATO. In any case, Lithuania will have to constantly seek for a subtle balance between her commitments to NATO, implications of the EU membership and the strategic partnership with the US. In this. [to full text]

The controversial war in Iraq has revitalized the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU), which has been stagnant since Maastricht Treaty and the failure in the Balkans. The development of the CFSP is accumulating acceleration: the EU will soon have not only a common market, common institutions and a single currency, but also a common constitution, minister of foreign affairs and even a common army. The leaders of the larger states are especially enthusiastic about a stronger CFSP as a counterweight to the US dominance in the international security affairs. The authors of this article contend that clearly articulated and globally projected CFSP will not be possible unless common European interests stemming from as common European identity and implemented by common supranational institutions will emerge. The impact of the CFSP on Lithuanian foreign and security policy will depend on the pace of European integration in this area and the strength of European identity within the political elite of Lithuania and the society itself. Will this impact be of a positive nature? It will depend on the way Europe will choose: creation of an independent defence structure as an alternative to NATO or deve¬lopment of a cohesive strategic partnership with the US and NATO. In any case, Lithuania will have to constantly seek for a subtle balance between her commitments to NATO, implications of the EU membership and the strategic partnership with the US. In this. [to full text]