Suchergebnisse

Si la mort individuelle et collective peut être représentée, les réflexions restent plus rares en ce qui concerne le devenir des institutions permettant à une société de durer et de fournir du sens aux individus qui la composent. C'est pourtant en envisageant la mort possible des institutions qu'une société est capable de s'adapter en créant d'autres institutions. La mort, en tant que caducité de certaines formes de vie collective, est alors nécessaire pour qu'une société s'imagine un avenir. Il faut pour cela qu'elle soit capable de se donner des limites et ne pas verser dans la démesure. Selon Castoriadis, l'acceptation de la mort est l'une des caractéristiques d'un mouvement d'autoréflexion de la société sur ses propres limites.

Norms guide multi-agent systems away from being potentially anarchic towards a coordinated and collaborative society. Institutions provide an explicit, external representation of norms as well as the means to detect violations and other conditions. Each institution can be crafted individually to capture their designers' goals, but this creates a challenge at higher levels of authority in guiding the institutional design to be coordinated with other institutions and not imposing unacceptable limits on agents' rights. We propose to use institutions to govern and to revise institutions, following a principle widely encountered in the social world, where treaties, primary legislation, framework agreements and subsidiarity establish a regulatory space by defining norms on the form of a body of regulation. We set out a formal and computational framework, building on the InstAL model and implementation, to construct tiers of institutions, where the norms at each tier are governed by those at the tier above. Thus, agents' behaviour is governed and monitored by a tier-1 institution, whose norms are governed and monitored by a tier-2 institution, etc. This allows us to check the compliance of an institution with the tier above. Compliance failure generates the necessary negative examples for automatic norm-revision.

This paper introduces the notion of surprising institutions. Because we often carry incorrect beliefs about the world surrounding us and we are therefore often mistaken about the nature of the institutional structure facing us. The story told in this paper shows that an institution may come as a surprise, even though its origins lies some 500 years back, and that the information we receive as feedback on our actions does not necessarily improve our understanding of the institutional structure. It turns out that it is possible for an "ordinary citizen" to win a case against a multinational corporation, and against a government agency with more than 350 years on its neck (what a surprise!) but it also transpires that even if you win, you lose (not quite a surprise).

Ova konferencija postavlja osnovu razmatranja teorije moći i teorije delanja, kako za bioetička razmatranja tako i za ona na poljima analize diskursa i narativnosti, o kojima će biti reč na naredim konferencijama (Darmstadt, Banja Luka), organizovanim u okviru projekta Biopolitički aspekti institucionalnog delanja (DAAD).

Institutions of autonomy in ethnically heterogeneous states have been conceived as a compromise between a desire to safeguard state unity and to partially accommodate the grievances of ethnolinguistic minorities. However, in practice, the institutions of autonomy often turn into a nucleus of a proto state of the ethno-linguistic minority. Instead of resolving the minority issue and stabilising the central state, they strengthen the local nationalism and secessionism, acting as centrifugal forces, or "subversive institutions". Recently these processes have been noticed in several ethnically heterogeneous, developed Western democracies. The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether, and how, the institutions of autonomy influence the rise of peripheral nationalism and secessionism.

This thesis studies the link between institutions, gender and politics. Three questions are studied: can institutions undo gender norms? Would institutions be more gender-egalitarian if they were headed by women? Why are women absent from positions of power?The first chapter of this thesis tests whether institutions can undo gender. In particular, we study the consequences of institutions on the perpetuation of gender norms. We study the norm according to which a woman should earn less than her husband. Using the German division as a natural experiment, we show that East German institutions have undone gender. East German women can earn more than their husband without increasing their number of housework hours, put their marriage at risk, or withdraw from the labor market. By contrast, the norm of higher male income and its consequences are still prevalent in the West.The second chapter studies whether institutions would be more gender-egalitarian if more women were heading them. In particular, I test whether female politicians have the same priorities than their male counterparts. The context studied is the French Parliament from 2001 to 2017. Using text analysis and quasi-experimental variations to randomize legislators' gender, this chapter shows that women are twice more likely to initiate women-related amendments in the Lower House. Women's issues constitute the key topic on which women are more active, followed by health and childhood issues whereas men are more active on military issues. I provide supporting evidence that these results are driven by the individual interest of legislators. Finally, I replicate these results in the Upper House by exploiting the introduction of a gender quota.The third chapter studies the reasons behind the underrepresentation of women in positions of power. I investigate whether the persistence of incumbents hinders female access to political positions when incumbents are predominantly men. I exploit regression discontinuity from close electoral races in French ...

This thesis studies the link between institutions, gender and politics. Three questions are studied: can institutions undo gender norms? Would institutions be more gender-egalitarian if they were headed by women? Why are women absent from positions of power?The first chapter of this thesis tests whether institutions can undo gender. In particular, we study the consequences of institutions on the perpetuation of gender norms. We study the norm according to which a woman should earn less than her husband. Using the German division as a natural experiment, we show that East German institutions have undone gender. East German women can earn more than their husband without increasing their number of housework hours, put their marriage at risk, or withdraw from the labor market. By contrast, the norm of higher male income and its consequences are still prevalent in the West.The second chapter studies whether institutions would be more gender-egalitarian if more women were heading them. In particular, I test whether female politicians have the same priorities than their male counterparts. The context studied is the French Parliament from 2001 to 2017. Using text analysis and quasi-experimental variations to randomize legislators' gender, this chapter shows that women are twice more likely to initiate women-related amendments in the Lower House. Women's issues constitute the key topic on which women are more active, followed by health and childhood issues whereas men are more active on military issues. I provide supporting evidence that these results are driven by the individual interest of legislators. Finally, I replicate these results in the Upper House by exploiting the introduction of a gender quota.The third chapter studies the reasons behind the underrepresentation of women in positions of power. I investigate whether the persistence of incumbents hinders female access to political positions when incumbents are predominantly men. I exploit regression discontinuity from close electoral races in French ...

Firms across the globe are affected by red tape, but there is little academic research on how country-level institutions shape red tape perceptions. Drawing on institutional theory, we argue that a variety of formal and informal country-level institutions affect perceptions of red tape in the private sector. We test our hypotheses using six data sources, including the World Economic Forum and the World Bank. Our results indicate that red tape is weakly associated with a country's level of formalization and rule enforcement effectiveness and more prevalent in federal as opposed to unitary states. As for informal institutions, we find that red tape perceptions are more pronounced in countries with an increased conservative political ideology, higher levels of corruption, and cultures that emphasize individualism and uncertainty avoidance. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for theory and practice.

This thesis studies the link between institutions, gender and politics. Three questions are studied: can institutions undo gender norms? Would institutions be more gender-egalitarian if they were headed by women? Why are women absent from positions of power?The first chapter of this thesis tests whether institutions can undo gender. In particular, we study the consequences of institutions on the perpetuation of gender norms. We study the norm according to which a woman should earn less than her husband. Using the German division as a natural experiment, we show that East German institutions have undone gender. East German women can earn more than their husband without increasing their number of housework hours, put their marriage at risk, or withdraw from the labor market. By contrast, the norm of higher male income and its consequences are still prevalent in the West.The second chapter studies whether institutions would be more gender-egalitarian if more women were heading them. In particular, I test whether female politicians have the same priorities than their male counterparts. The context studied is the French Parliament from 2001 to 2017. Using text analysis and quasi-experimental variations to randomize legislators' gender, this chapter shows that women are twice more likely to initiate women-related amendments in the Lower House. Women's issues constitute the key topic on which women are more active, followed by health and childhood issues whereas men are more active on military issues. I provide supporting evidence that these results are driven by the individual interest of legislators. Finally, I replicate these results in the Upper House by exploiting the introduction of a gender quota.The third chapter studies the reasons behind the underrepresentation of women in positions of power. I investigate whether the persistence of incumbents hinders female access to political positions when incumbents are predominantly men. I exploit regression discontinuity from close electoral races in French municipalities to randomize the eligibility of incumbent mayors for reelection. Despite a context increasingly favorable to the election of women, I find that the persistence of incumbents does not block female access to the position of mayor. I investigate the mechanisms and show that it is more difficult for a woman to replace a female incumbent than a male one. ; Cette thèse vise à étudier le lien entre institutions, genre et politique. Elle cherche à répondre à trois questions: les institutions peuvent-elles défaire les normes de genre ? Les institutions seraient-elles plus égalitaires si elles étaient dirigées par des femmes ? Pourquoi les femmes sont-elles absentes des positions de pouvoir ? Le premier chapitre de cette thèse vise à étudier le rôle des institutions dans la création des normes de genre. La norme étudiée est celle selon laquelle une femme doit gagner moins que son mari. En utilisant, la division de l'Allemagne comme une expérience naturelle, nous montrons que les institutions égalitaires est-allemandes ont défait le genre. Après la réunification, une femme est-allemande peut gagner plus que son mari sans augmenter son nombre d'heures de travail domestique, risquer de divorcer ou de se retirer du marché du travail. A l'opposé, en Allemagne de l'Ouest, ces comportements sont toujours observables.Le deuxième chapitre étudie si les institutions seraient plus égalitaires avec des femmes à leur tête. En particulier, nous cherchons à déterminer si les femmes politiciennes ont les mêmes priorités que leurs collègues masculins. Le contexte étudié est celui du Parlement Français durant la période 2001-2017. En combinant des méthodes d'analyse de texte avec des variations exogènes dans le sexe des politiciens, ce chapitre montre que, relativement à leurs collègues masculins, les femmes politiciennes à l'Assemblée Nationale défendent plus les intérêts des femmes dans la population. Le thème où les différences sexuées d'activité parlementaire sont les plus marquées est précisément celui de l'égalité femmes-hommes, suivi des thématiques liées à l'enfance et à la santé. Les hommes sont plus actifs sur les thématiques militaires. Nous montrons que ces différences proviennent de l'intérêt individuel des législateurs. Enfin, nous répliquons ces résultats au Sénat en exploitant l'introduction d'une réforme qui a imposé la parité.Le troisième chapitre s'intéresse aux raisons derrière la sous-représentation des femmes dans les positions de pouvoir. Il cherche à déterminer si dans un contexte où les politiciens sont majoritairement des hommes, la "prime aux sortants" lors d'élections réduit le nombre de femmes élues. Le contexte étudié est celui des municipalités de moins de 1000 habitants en France. Nous montrons que contrairement à ce qu'on peut s'attendre, lorsque les politiciens ne sont pas éligibles à leur réélection, la part de femmes élus n'augmente pas. C'est parce qu'il est plus difficile pour une femme de remplacer une femme que de remplacer un homme.

This thesis studies the link between institutions, gender and politics. Three questions are studied: can institutions undo gender norms? Would institutions be more gender-egalitarian if they were headed by women? Why are women absent from positions of power?The first chapter of this thesis tests whether institutions can undo gender. In particular, we study the consequences of institutions on the perpetuation of gender norms. We study the norm according to which a woman should earn less than her husband. Using the German division as a natural experiment, we show that East German institutions have undone gender. East German women can earn more than their husband without increasing their number of housework hours, put their marriage at risk, or withdraw from the labor market. By contrast, the norm of higher male income and its consequences are still prevalent in the West.The second chapter studies whether institutions would be more gender-egalitarian if more women were heading them. In particular, I test whether female politicians have the same priorities than their male counterparts. The context studied is the French Parliament from 2001 to 2017. Using text analysis and quasi-experimental variations to randomize legislators' gender, this chapter shows that women are twice more likely to initiate women-related amendments in the Lower House. Women's issues constitute the key topic on which women are more active, followed by health and childhood issues whereas men are more active on military issues. I provide supporting evidence that these results are driven by the individual interest of legislators. Finally, I replicate these results in the Upper House by exploiting the introduction of a gender quota.The third chapter studies the reasons behind the underrepresentation of women in positions of power. I investigate whether the persistence of incumbents hinders female access to political positions when incumbents are predominantly men. I exploit regression discontinuity from close electoral races in French municipalities to randomize the eligibility of incumbent mayors for reelection. Despite a context increasingly favorable to the election of women, I find that the persistence of incumbents does not block female access to the position of mayor. I investigate the mechanisms and show that it is more difficult for a woman to replace a female incumbent than a male one. ; Cette thèse vise à étudier le lien entre institutions, genre et politique. Elle cherche à répondre à trois questions: les institutions peuvent-elles défaire les normes de genre ? Les institutions seraient-elles plus égalitaires si elles étaient dirigées par des femmes ? Pourquoi les femmes sont-elles absentes des positions de pouvoir ? Le premier chapitre de cette thèse vise à étudier le rôle des institutions dans la création des normes de genre. La norme étudiée est celle selon laquelle une femme doit gagner moins que son mari. En utilisant, la division de l'Allemagne comme une expérience naturelle, nous montrons que les institutions égalitaires est-allemandes ont défait le genre. Après la réunification, une femme est-allemande peut gagner plus que son mari sans augmenter son nombre d'heures de travail domestique, risquer de divorcer ou de se retirer du marché du travail. A l'opposé, en Allemagne de l'Ouest, ces comportements sont toujours observables.Le deuxième chapitre étudie si les institutions seraient plus égalitaires avec des femmes à leur tête. En particulier, nous cherchons à déterminer si les femmes politiciennes ont les mêmes priorités que leurs collègues masculins. Le contexte étudié est celui du Parlement Français durant la période 2001-2017. En combinant des méthodes d'analyse de texte avec des variations exogènes dans le sexe des politiciens, ce chapitre montre que, relativement à leurs collègues masculins, les femmes politiciennes à l'Assemblée Nationale défendent plus les intérêts des femmes dans la population. Le thème où les différences sexuées d'activité parlementaire sont les plus marquées est précisément celui de l'égalité femmes-hommes, suivi des thématiques liées à l'enfance et à la santé. Les hommes sont plus actifs sur les thématiques militaires. Nous montrons que ces différences proviennent de l'intérêt individuel des législateurs. Enfin, nous répliquons ces résultats au Sénat en exploitant l'introduction d'une réforme qui a imposé la parité.Le troisième chapitre s'intéresse aux raisons derrière la sous-représentation des femmes dans les positions de pouvoir. Il cherche à déterminer si dans un contexte où les politiciens sont majoritairement des hommes, la "prime aux sortants" lors d'élections réduit le nombre de femmes élues. Le contexte étudié est celui des municipalités de moins de 1000 habitants en France. Nous montrons que contrairement à ce qu'on peut s'attendre, lorsque les politiciens ne sont pas éligibles à leur réélection, la part de femmes élus n'augmente pas. C'est parce qu'il est plus difficile pour une femme de remplacer une femme que de remplacer un homme.

This thesis studies the link between institutions, gender and politics. Three questions are studied: can institutions undo gender norms? Would institutions be more gender-egalitarian if they were headed by women? Why are women absent from positions of power?The first chapter of this thesis tests whether institutions can undo gender. In particular, we study the consequences of institutions on the perpetuation of gender norms. We study the norm according to which a woman should earn less than her husband. Using the German division as a natural experiment, we show that East German institutions have undone gender. East German women can earn more than their husband without increasing their number of housework hours, put their marriage at risk, or withdraw from the labor market. By contrast, the norm of higher male income and its consequences are still prevalent in the West.The second chapter studies whether institutions would be more gender-egalitarian if more women were heading them. In particular, I test whether female politicians have the same priorities than their male counterparts. The context studied is the French Parliament from 2001 to 2017. Using text analysis and quasi-experimental variations to randomize legislators' gender, this chapter shows that women are twice more likely to initiate women-related amendments in the Lower House. Women's issues constitute the key topic on which women are more active, followed by health and childhood issues whereas men are more active on military issues. I provide supporting evidence that these results are driven by the individual interest of legislators. Finally, I replicate these results in the Upper House by exploiting the introduction of a gender quota.The third chapter studies the reasons behind the underrepresentation of women in positions of power. I investigate whether the persistence of incumbents hinders female access to political positions when incumbents are predominantly men. I exploit regression discontinuity from close electoral races in French municipalities to randomize the eligibility of incumbent mayors for reelection. Despite a context increasingly favorable to the election of women, I find that the persistence of incumbents does not block female access to the position of mayor. I investigate the mechanisms and show that it is more difficult for a woman to replace a female incumbent than a male one. ; Cette thèse vise à étudier le lien entre institutions, genre et politique. Elle cherche à répondre à trois questions: les institutions peuvent-elles défaire les normes de genre ? Les institutions seraient-elles plus égalitaires si elles étaient dirigées par des femmes ? Pourquoi les femmes sont-elles absentes des positions de pouvoir ? Le premier chapitre de cette thèse vise à étudier le rôle des institutions dans la création des normes de genre. La norme étudiée est celle selon laquelle une femme doit gagner moins que son mari. En utilisant, la division de l'Allemagne comme une expérience naturelle, nous montrons que les institutions égalitaires est-allemandes ont défait le genre. Après la réunification, une femme est-allemande peut gagner plus que son mari sans augmenter son nombre d'heures de travail domestique, risquer de divorcer ou de se retirer du marché du travail. A l'opposé, en Allemagne de l'Ouest, ces comportements sont toujours observables.Le deuxième chapitre étudie si les institutions seraient plus égalitaires avec des femmes à leur tête. En particulier, nous cherchons à déterminer si les femmes politiciennes ont les mêmes priorités que leurs collègues masculins. Le contexte étudié est celui du Parlement Français durant la période 2001-2017. En combinant des méthodes d'analyse de texte avec des variations exogènes dans le sexe des politiciens, ce chapitre montre que, relativement à leurs collègues masculins, les femmes politiciennes à l'Assemblée Nationale défendent plus les intérêts des femmes dans la population. Le thème où les différences sexuées d'activité parlementaire sont les plus marquées est précisément celui de l'égalité femmes-hommes, suivi des thématiques liées à l'enfance et à la santé. Les hommes sont plus actifs sur les thématiques militaires. Nous montrons que ces différences proviennent de l'intérêt individuel des législateurs. Enfin, nous répliquons ces résultats au Sénat en exploitant l'introduction d'une réforme qui a imposé la parité.Le troisième chapitre s'intéresse aux raisons derrière la sous-représentation des femmes dans les positions de pouvoir. Il cherche à déterminer si dans un contexte où les politiciens sont majoritairement des hommes, la "prime aux sortants" lors d'élections réduit le nombre de femmes élues. Le contexte étudié est celui des municipalités de moins de 1000 habitants en France. Nous montrons que contrairement à ce qu'on peut s'attendre, lorsque les politiciens ne sont pas éligibles à leur réélection, la part de femmes élus n'augmente pas. C'est parce qu'il est plus difficile pour une femme de remplacer une femme que de remplacer un homme.

The last few decades have seen a proliferation of constitutional institutions, especially in the Global South, that do not neatly fit within any of three traditional branches of the state. These supposedly 'fourth branch' institutions may include electoral commissions, human rights commissions, central banks, probity bodies such as anti-corruption watchdogs, knowledge institutions such as statistics bureaus and census boards, information commissioners, auditors general, attorneys general and so on. In this paper, I will argue that some of these new institutions are best understood as "guarantor institutions". I will show that in a given political context, a guarantor institution is a tailor-made constitutional institution, vested with material as well as expressive capacities, whose function is to provide a credible and enduring guarantee to a specific non-self-enforcing constitutional norm (or any aspect thereof). Section I explains why polities need credible and enduring guarantees for specific norms, and claims that the expertise, independence, and accountability of guarantor institutions are likely to be key ingredients that determine their effectiveness in serving that purpose. It also argues that constitutional entrenchment of the guarantor institution is entailed in the independence requirement. Section II shows that in order to credibly and enduringly guarantee a norm, certain primary and secondary duties need to be discharged by relevant actors in relation to the norm's content as well as its impact. It further argues that while some of these duties may be performed by institutions that possess expressive capacity alone (roughly, the capacity to speak, express, communicate), others require material capacity (i.e. the physical capacity to effect material changes in the world). Guarantor institutions, unlike integrity institutions, can shoulder primary as well as secondary duties. Furthermore, they are typically vested with expressive as well as material capacities, which is key to their ...

Inhalt 1 Einleitung 2 Transplantation und Effektivität/Effizienz von Institutionen 2.1 Institutionen und institutioneller Wandel 2.2 Pfadabhängigkeit der institutionellen Entwicklung 2.3 Inkonsistenz der institutionellen Entwicklung 2.4 Determinanten der Effektivität 2.5 Effizienz transplantierter Institutionen 3 Wettbewerbspolitik als Institution in Russland 3.1 Die institutionelle Verankerung der Wettbewerbspolitik 3.2 Marktstruktur und Wettbewerbspolitik 3.3 Maßnahmen der Wettbewerbspolitik 3.3.1 Kartellverbot 3.3.2 Missbrauchsaufsicht über marktbeherrschende Stellungen 3.3.3 Zusammenschlusskontrolle 3.4 Verstöße gegen das Wettbewerbsgesetz 3.5 Probleme der Wettbewerbspolitik 4 Welche Fehler hat Russland bei der Transplantationder Wettbewerbspolitik gemacht? 5 Ist eine mangelnde Effektivität von transplantierten Institutionenunvermeidlich? 6 Abschließende Bemerkungen

INSTITUTIONES METAPHYSICAE Institutiones Metaphysicae ( - ) Einband ( - ) Titelseite ( - ) Widmung ( - ) Epistola Dedicatoria. ( - ) Præfatio Ad Lectorem. ( - ) Nomina Dnn. Auditorum. ( - ) Fortunante Deo! Institutiones Metaphysicæ Continuis Exemplis [.] Illustratæ [.]. Caput Præliminare De Metaphysices Natura, Constitutione ac Usu. (1) Institutionum Metaphysicarum Pars Prior, quæ agit De Realiter Abstractis a materia sensibili Secundum Indifferentiam. (48) Caput Primum De Ente Et Non Ente, variisque utriusque distinctionibus. Item De Ente Per Accidens. (48) Caput Secundum De Existentia Et Absentia. (235) Caput Tertium De Essentia, item de Ratione Formali. (259) Caput Qvartum De Notionis: Formaliter usu receptis ac frequentibus significationibus, item de huic notioni oppositis notionibus. (270) Caput Qvintum De Notionis: Formaliter non adeo frequentibus, nec tamen infrequentibus significationibus. (383) Caput Sextum De Communibus Ad Unum [.] (432) Caput Septimum De Principio & Principiato, item de Ordine. (493) Caput Octavum De Causa Et Causato, ac de utriusque Necessariis Reqvisitis, cum primariis, tum secundariis. Item de Notione τδ Aliud. (524) Caput Nonum De Potentia Et Actu, inprimis illa potentia, quam Causativam; & actu, quem Causalitatem appellant. Item de Actu Primo Et Actu Secundo [.] (560) Caput Decimum De Possibili. ejusq[ue] necessariis & usu frequentioribus acceptionibus & divisionibus. (611) Caput Undecimum De Notionis Metaphysicæ causæ Genuino Discriminea Notione causæ Analytica. Item de Causa Virtuali, quam vocant. (699) Caput Duodecimum. De Causa Per Se Et Per Accidens. Item de Causato Per Se Et Per Accidens. (744) Caput Decimum Tertium De Generibus Causarum. (777) Caput Decimum Qvartum De Usu Practico Doctrinæ De Generibus Causarum In Omnibus Disciplinis cumprimis vero Practicis Et Facultatibus, ceu vocantur, Superioribus. (785) Einband ( - ) Caput Decimum Qvintum De Causa Efficiente In Communi Deque Effectu, ut & utriusque cum primariis tum secundariis requisitis. (867) Caput Decimum Sextum De Causa Efficiente Principali Et Causa Efficiente Instrumentali, Item De Instrumento ejusque divisionibus. (904) Caput Decimum Septimum De Causa Efficiente Libera Et Naturali. Item De Libertate Et Necessitate. (938) Caput Decimum Octavum, Quo docetur, Qvot In Universum Et Qvænam Causæ Efficientes Sint Liberæ a necessitate? (950) Caput Decimum Nonum, Quo evidenter deducitur, Voluntatem Eamqve Solam Esse Potentiam Liberam a necessitate. (972) Caput Vigesimum De Libertatis Determinatione, Usu, Limitibus Et Participatione. (984) Caput Vigesimum Primum De Voluntario spectato ut est effectus causæ efficientis liberæ. (1006) Caput Vigesimum Secundum De Causa Efficiente Immediata Et Mediata, Item De Causa Physica Et Morali. [.] (1022) Caput Vigesimum Tertium De Discrimine Causæ Moralis Ab Agente Morali. [.] (1053) Caput Vigesimum Qvartum De Modo Investigandi Varias Causæ Moralis Qvasi Species Aut [.] Modos. Item De Ipsis Causæ Moralis Modis Aut Qvasi Speciebus. (1073) Caput Vigesimum Qvintum De Causis Moraliter Moventibus. (1106) Caput Vigesimum Sextum De Causis Moralibus Per Commissionem Absqve Morali Motione. (1170) Caput Vigesimum Septimum De Causa Efficiente Per Se Et Per Accidens. Item De Effectu Per Se Et Per Accidens. (1205) Caput Vigesimum Octavum De Usu Practico Doctrinæ De Causa Efficiente. (1351) Caput Vigesimum Nonum De Causa Finali Deque Medio, ut & utriusque requisitis & distinctionibus. Item De Usu Practico harum doctrinarum. (1467) Caput Trigesimum De Causa Materiali, Ejusque Doctrinæ Usu Practico. (1552) Caput Trigesimum Primum De Causa Formali, hujusque doctrinæ usu practico. (1602) Caput Trigesimum Secundum De Causa Impulsiva hujusque doctrinæ usu practico. (1622) Caput Trigesimum Tertium De Præcipuis Divisionibus Istis Causarum, Qvæ Per Omnia causarum Genera Vagantur. (1667) Caput Trigesimum Qvartum De Unius, Veri, Boni ac Perfecti Notionibus. (1684) Caput Trigesimum Quintum De Distinctione Reali & Rationis, item de Genuinis Et Spuriis Signis Realis Distinctionis. (1690) Caput Trigesimum Sextum De Distinctionis Distinctionibus, Qvarum Freqvens Ac Necessarius Usus Est In Theologia. (1705) Caput Trigesimum Septimum De Simplicis & Compositi, item Totius & Partis Notionibus. Ut Et De Unione & Communicatione. (1724) Caput Trigesimum Octavum De Necessario Et Contingente. (1749) Caput Trigesimum Nonum De Universali Et Singulari. (1763) Caput Qvadragesimum De Dependente & Independente. (1775) Caput Qvadragesimum Primum De Τω Esse In Se Et Esse In Alio. Item de Substantia Et Accidente. Ut & de receptissimis substantiæ divisionibus. ([1784]) Caput Qvadrages. Secundum De Supposito Et Subsistentia. (1797) Caput Qvadragesimum Tertium De Quantitate. (1804) Caput Qvadragesimum Qvartum De Qvalitate. (1810) Caput Qvadragesimum Qvintum De Relatione. (1818) Caput Qvadragesimum Sextum De Actione & Passione. (1826) Caput Qvadragesimum Septimum De Duratione. (1831) Caput Qvadrages. Octavum De Notione Ubietatis Seu Ubicationis, ceu a Scholasticis dicitur. (1840) Caput Qvadragesimum Nonum De Signo & Signato, hujusque doctrinæ usu practico. (1846) Caput Qvinqvagesimum De Mensura Et Mensurato. Item de Norma Et Normato, harumque doctrinarum usu practico. (1861) Caput Qvinqvagesimum Primum De Imagine, Idea Et Exemplari, Et Qvæ Relative Illis Opponuntur, eorumque usu practico. (1869) Caput Qvinqvages. Secundum De Fundamento Et Fundato, hujusque doctrinæ usu practico. (1885) Institutionum Metaphysicarum Pars Posterior, quæ agit De Realiter Abstractis a materia sensibili Secundum Excellentiam. (1889) Seqvitur Duplex Index, Alter Capitum, Alter Rerum Et Exemplorum Practicorum, hoc est, Theologicorum, Juridicorum, Moralium, Politicorum. ( - ) Index Capitum. ( - ) Index Rerum Et Exemplorum Practicorum. ( - ) Benivole Lector, Errores Sive Typothetæ, Sive Calami, Ita Emendabis. ( - )

Cheung Kin Hang. ; Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. ; Includes bibliographical references (leaves 76-97). ; Abstracts in English and Chinese. ; Chapter Chapter 1: --- Introduction ; Divergent meanings of trust and institution --- p.1 ; Research questions --- p.1 ; Structure of thesis --- p.3 ; Chapter Chapter 2: --- Trust and Bounded Rationality ; Meaning and the four key elements of trust --- p.5 ; Plausible loss due to lack of certainty --- p.7 ; Positive expectation by a trusting party --- p.8 ; Relevance to human interaction --- p.9 ; Intentionality --- p.10 ; Trust and Rationality --- p.13 ; Herbert Simon's bounded rationality --- p.13 ; "Bounded rationality, use of authority, and trust" --- p.18 ; Chapter Chapter 3: --- Theory of Institution ; Institutionalisms in Politics and Exchange of Insights --- p.23 ; Understanding of North's Works --- p.25 ; North's understanding of human rationality and economic performance --- p.25 ; "Core idea, major traits of institution and its relationship with actors" --- p.30 ; Learning and Accumulation of Experiences --- p.38 ; Plasticity of human brain --- p.44 ; Path dependence and change of institution --- p.47 ; Chapter Chapter 4: --- Trust and Institution ; Divergent understandings of relationship of trust and institution --- p.54 ; At the neural level: institutionalized experience and neural systems for trust --- p.57 ; At interpersonal and organizational level: reciprocal trust and impacts of empowerment --- p.62 ; At organizational and macro-social level: deprivation experience and social violence --- p.68 ; Chapter Chapter 5: --- Conclusion --- p.73 ; References --- p.76