Beyond Intergovernmentalism
In: Dilemmas of European Integration, S. 162-180
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In: Dilemmas of European Integration, S. 162-180
In: Shaping Europe, S. 51-74
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 14, Heft 2, S. 324-337
ISSN: 1741-2757
Slapin (2011) and Finke et al. (2012) represent the best theory-based book-length studies of the most active period of treaty reform in the history of the European Union – from the Treaty of Amsterdam to the Treaty of Lisbon. These works offer the opportunity to assess the extent to which liberal intergovernmentalism – a 'baseline' theory of regional integration – has withstood empirical scrutiny. I first address what I consider a misinterpretation of liberal intergovernmentalism – the presumed pre-eminence given to a country's relative capability. I then identify challenges to this framework. Methodologically, they concern the measurement of preferences, value of disagreement and opportunities for linkages in treaty negotiations. I then assess evidence of lower-than-unanimity thresholds for treaty reform, which may represent a theoretical challenge. Finally, I suggest that focal points and bargaining dynamics deserve greater scholarly attention.
In: The International Politics of EU-China Relations, S. 118-128
In: Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies, S. 19-34
In: International studies review, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 104-106
ISSN: 1468-2486
In: Journal of contemporary European research: JCER, Band 9, Heft 3
ISSN: 1815-347X
The functioning of the European Union (EU) has been explored extensively in recent years. The dominant prism through which to look at the EU is still one of locus: i.e. whether decisions are made in the capitals of its member states or in Brussels. This debate is contained in the dualism between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, but drawing the boundaries between the two concepts is still undone. This article attempts to contribute to solving this problem by investigating the restrictive measures policy of the EU in order to identify three conditions under which intergovernmentalism should be used. First, when EU institutions are dependent on EU member states for information and expertise; second, when decision-making powers rest mainly in EU capitals; and three, when there are no exclusive fora for decision-making in Brussels. The study of the restrictive measures of the European Union does not meet any of these three conditions; therefore the article argues that the concept of supranational intergovernmentalism offers useful insights to understand the EU security governance of CFSP sanctions. The article is divided into four parts. The first introduces the debate on security governance and justifies the selection of this specific approach to the study of sanctions. The second part presents the restrictive measures policy of the European Union and justifies its pertinence to the field of security. The third part of the article investigates the emerging patterns in security governance by testing the three conditions on the decision-making process for EU restrictive measures. Finally, the conclusion summarises the main argument and indicates ways forward in the study of EU sanctions from a governance perspective.
In: Foreign policy analysis, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 147-185
ISSN: 1743-8594
In general, ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) and its policy- and decision-making process pose a challenging puzzle for the theoretical research agenda of European integration studies. Even though ESDP is intergovernmentally constructed, classical (neo-) realist approaches seem to be unable to catch the full dynamics of the project. Institutionalist and social constructivist approaches, which underline the importance of norms, values and identity in the complex decision-making process of ESDP, add fruitful insights in many regards. This paper applies an institutionalist approaches based on the notion of socialisation and 'Brusselisation', which are analytically rich for analysing the ESDP decision-making process. The notion of Brusselisation is developed further into a theoretical concept that goes beyond the mere transfer of authority and expertise in the area of security and defence to the decision-making machinery in Brussels. This paper argues that socialisation processes of the involved actors constitute a completely new policy-making method and develops an approach to capture this new method. However, the fact that ESDP is intergovernmentally constructed and that the member states remain the main actors in this policy field is not contested. Particularly in the day-to-day management of ESDP, however, the Brussels-based bodies are increasingly in the driver's seat, gain a sort of de facto initiative power and conduct the European defence policy guided by a logic of appropriateness and a new style of decision-making. This new and 'brusselised' style of decision-making is understood as being situated 'between intergovernmentalism and socialisation processes'.
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In: Revue française de science politique, Band 62, Heft 1, S. 138-140
ISSN: 0035-2950
In: Foreign policy analysis: a journal of the International Studies Association, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 147-185
ISSN: 1743-8586
World Affairs Online
In: Maastricht journal of European and comparative law: MJ, Band 15, Heft 1, S. 35-42
ISSN: 2399-5548
In: Political studies review, Band 9, Heft 3, S. 431
ISSN: 1478-9299
In: Routledge/ECPR studies in European political science 67
In: KFG Working Paper Series, Band 25
For scholars and practitioners of European politics alike, the distinction between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism has always been fundamental. This distinction has underpinned the various schools of European integration theory, just as it has remained crucial for European governments keen to demonstrate that the member states remain in charge of key policy areas. Nowhere is this considered to be more central than in the area of foreign and security policy, which has consciously been set within the rigid intergovernmental framework of Pillar Two of the Maastricht Treaty and, under the Lisbon Treaty, remains subject to the unanimity rule. And yet, scholarship on the major decision-making agencies of the foreign and security policy of the EU suggests that the distinction is not only blurred but increasingly meaningless. This paper demonstrates that, in virtually every case, decisions are shaped and even taken by small groups of relatively well-socialized officials in the key committees acting in a mode which is as close to supranational as it is to intergovernmental. The political control of foreign and security policy, which is considered sacrosanct by member state governments, is only rarely exercised by politicians at the level of the European Council or Council of Ministers.