Suchergebnisse

Mit Intergouvernementalismus nimmt sich die Untersuchung einem Phänomen an, das sich gehäuft in Reaktion auf die sogenannte Eurokrise zeigte. Es harmoniert prima facie nicht mit dem überkommenen europäischen Integrationsmuster der Supranationalität. Die Arbeit zergliedert den Gegensatz, um Analyseinstrumente anzubieten. Sie zeigt, dass die Krise in Abkehr von intergouvernementalen Strukturen eigentlich Supranationalität verlangte und fragt, welche Lösungen der Krisen-Intergouvernementalismus bei dieser Ausgangslage fand sowie welche Bedeutung dies für den Stellenwert der Supranationalität hat. So ist keineswegs eine Abkehr von Letzterer festzustellen, vielmehr eine neue strukturelle Supranationalität. Unter Würdigung der »Pringle«-Entscheidung geht die Arbeit auf das Verhältnis zwischen den Integrationsmustern ein, zeigt (fehlende) Alternativen und freiwillige Supranationalität auf. Im Ergebnis steht ein Plädoyer, Intergouvernementalismus als Chance, nicht als Rückschritt zu werten. / »Intergovernmentalism and Supranationality as Communicating Models of European Integration« -- With intergovernmentalism the study takes up a phenomenon that became increasingly apparent in reaction to the European debt crisis. It creates a feeling of disruption, as it seems not to harmonise with European supranationality. The crisis also called for the latter in a departure from intergovernmental structures within EMU. The work thus seeks to reveal the relationship between the models. It closes with a plea to consider intergovernmentalism as an opportunity and not as a step backwards.

The explanatory value & predictive strength of the two classical transnational integration theories -- liberal intergovernmentalism & neofunctionalism -- are assessed to determine how they need to be improved to provide an effective & tenable account of the failure to ratify EU treaties & other policies by voters in national referendums held in member countries; references are made in particular to the rejection of the constitution project for the EU in a referendum held in France on 29 May & the Netherlands on 1 June of 2005. Both models are outlined, examining how they incorporate inner state actors' role in the EU integration processes. The applicability of Robert Putnam's (1988) two-level approach & Leon N. Lindberg & Stuart A. Scheingold's (1970) notion of permissive consensus to the European multilevel decision making pattern is explored. It is concluded that the liberal intergovernmentalism & neofunctionalism treat international integration in terms of representative rather than plebiscitary democracy & view national & transnational elites as primary agents of European integration. If referendums become a dominant instrument of ratifying EU policies, both theories will lose their dominant descriptive-explanatory position since they are ill-equipped for dealing with direct democracy patterns. References. Z. Dubiel

The euro crisis was undoubtedly the most serious crisis in the history of the EU. Nevertheless, not only the EU has proved to be crisis-stable - the traditional integration theories may find further support in the conduct and outcome of the crisis. During the crisis, showed patterns and mechanisms, which are typical for European integration and are described by intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism. Adapted from the source document.

Zusammenfassung Summary Gliederung Vorwort Verzeichnis der Abkürzungen I Einleitung Erklärung des Scheiterns der Erdgasverhandlungen als ergänzender theoretischer Rahmen Die Struktur der vorliegenden Dissertation II Eine bilaterale Verhandlung über Erdgas und der dazugehörige theoretische Engpass 1) Fallbeschreibung 2) Fallbegrenzung und Fragestellung 3) Die Relevanz und Irrelevanz einzelner externer Akteure 3.1) Die chilenische Verhandlungsposition als Konstante 3.2) Die zwei Abnehmer: USA und Mexiko 3.3) Das doppelte Konkurrenznachbarland: Peru 3.4) Der Einfluss einer regionalen Macht: Venezuela 3.5) Der Einfluss des internationalen Finanzsystems: Der Washington-Konsens 4) Warum ist der Blick auf die subsystemische Ebene nötig? 4.1) Allgemeines über den Liberalen Intergouvernementalismus 4.2) Erklärungsdefizite des Liberalen Intergouvernementalismus im Falle der Erdgasverhandlung 5) Bedarf einer Theorieergänzung durch die Einführung konstruktivistischer Elemente III Theoretischer Rahmen: Das vorgeschlagene ergänzende Modell 1) Allgemeines zum Bau eines ergänzenden theoretischen Rahmens 2) Theoretischer Rahmen: Strategisches Framing, Mobilisierung von Identitäten, Entstehung von Reputationskosten und kognitiver Dissonanz 2.1) Nationale und kollektive Identitäten 2.2) Mobilisierung von Identitätskonstruktionen 2.3) Entstehung von Reputationskosten und kognitiver Dissonanz 2.4) Anwendung der theoretischen Rahmen auf den empirischen Fall 3) Auf der Suche nach Kausalerklärungen 3.1) Zur Festlegung der abhängigen Variable 3.2) Das strategische Framing der Erdgasverhandlungen in der Öffentlichkeit als entscheidender Erklärfaktor 4) Methodische Vorgehensweise 4.1) Die Kenntnis eines strategischen Framing und der Reputationskosten 4.2) Konstellation der Akteure 4.3) Schematischer Verlauf der Erdgasverhandlungen 4.4) Ausgewählte Quellen a) Literatur und amtliche Publikationen b) Printmedien c) Die Interviews IV Empirischer Teil 1) Kurze historische Einführung 1.1) Unabhängigkeit und Salpeterkrieg im lateinamerikanischen ...

The fact that the ECJ is a powerful institution may be uncontested, but how it is to be explained? Of course, general functional requirements Highest and Constitutional Courts have to fulfill do not explain the whole success story of the enormous authority the supranational court enjoys. In this article I will therefore present a rather unorthodox historical-institutionalist explanation: I argue that the power of the ECJ is a non-intended consequence of a very unique system of checks and balances for which the founding fathers of the Union set the course at the outset of the integration project. This institutional set-up regarding the way the powers are separated within the Union not only developed in a path-dependant way, it basically still exists today and is difficult to change. Therefore, the institutional arrangement of the European Union still provides favorable conditions for an ambitious Court with a consistent preference for promoting deeper European integration. Like no other highest court in the world of western democracies, the ECJ is able to benefit from these special conditions that are singularly characteristic, at least in degree, of the European Union. In developing my argument, I will first revisit the two competing standard explanations for the Court's power -- neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. As I will show, the core question that divides these two approaches is whether the Court acts under the credible threat of non-compliance and override. Secondly, I will discuss the relation between the balances of power doctrine and the role of highest and constitutional courts in national constitutional democracies before I analyze this relationship within the supranational political system of the European Union. Finally, I will show that this >checks and balances approach<, in combination with some of the premises of both intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, can best explain why the European Court is such a powerful one. Adapted from the source document.

Mit den Vertragsänderungen des Amsterdamer Gipfels (1997) wurde die Beschäftigungspolitik offizieller Teil der Politik der EU. Mit ihr erhielten nicht nur europäische Institutionen Einfluss auf einen Politikbereich, der zuvor in nationaler Verantwortung lag, sondern mit der "offenen Methode der Koordinierung" wurde ein neues Politikinstrument eingeführt, das seither auch in anderen Politikbereichen Anwendung findet. Das vorliegende Papier möchte zeigen, welche Erklärungen verschiedene integrationstheoretische Ansätze für diese Entwicklung liefern können, indem vier Perspektiven miteinander verglichen werden: Institutionalistische politische Ökonomie, Neofunktionalismus, Intergouvernementalismus sowie der Governance-Ansatz. Diese sollen daraufhin geprüft werden, wie sie Ursprung, Form und Inhalt der Europäischen Beschäftigungspolitik jeweils erklären. Die oft unausgesprochen bleibende Entscheidung für einen theoretischen Ansatz hat weit gehende Folgen für das Verständnis europäischer Politik. Während Governance- Ansatz und Neofunktionalismus Politik als Antwort auf entstandene Probleme verstehen, betonen Intergouvernementalismus und politische Ökonomie Interessenkonflikte im Politikprozess. Auf Grundlage des vorgenommenen Vergleichs erweist sich die letztgenannte Sicht als überzeugender, und die mit ihr verbundenen Perspektiven besitzen eine höhere Erklärungskraft für die Europäische Beschäftigungspolitik. ; Treaty changes at the Amsterdam summit (1997) established employment policy as an official part of EU policy. European institutions not only gained influence in a policy area that formerly had been a national prerogative but, furthermore, the open method of coordination was introduced as a new policy tool which has since been applied in other arenas as well. This paper deals with the question of how different theoretical approaches - institutional political economy, neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism and the governance perspective - account for these developments and aims at comparing their explanations. More specifically, it shows how these approaches explain the origins, development, and form of European Employment Policy. While a decision in favor of a particular approach is often taken implicitly, its impact on how European political processes are perceived can be great. Whereas the governance perspective and neo-functionalism think of policies as answers to actual problems, intergovernmentalism and political economy think of them as the outcome of political conflicts of interest. Based on the present comparison, the latter view seems more convincing, and the approaches connected with it gain higher salience in explaining the European Employment Policy.

What is the nature of the European Union? Does it have the characteristics of a state, and if so, which? We employ a simple image -- a poster that won a Marshall Plan competition in 1950 -- to examine the various legal perspectives of the EU that have emerged over the past six decades. Created as a symbol of European unity at the outset of European integration, the image was used half a century later on the book cover of Andrew Moravcsiks instant classic on intergovernmentalism. Here, we interpret the image yet again -- in four different basic ways. This attempt to sort out the legal perspectives of the EU was inspired by the Lisbon Treaty Case that has been decided by the German Constitutional Court in 2009 by employing a "container state" conceptualization of Germanys political and constitutional situation. Adapted from the source document.

In recent years, governance has become well established in research regarding European integration. Governance theory goes beyond classical assumptions of international political theory, expanding the focus of intergovernmentalism by including supranational & private players in their analysis & expanding neofunctionalistic assumptions by acknowledging that subnational public players take part in political development. While this use of the approach is most widespread in political areas of the common market & regional policies, external relationships generally remain in the hands of traditional integration theory. This article reports on the "EU Governance & External Relations" conference, attended by scientists throughout Europe & the US who are occupied with various aspects of foreign administration in the EU. In various fields, but particularly expansion & neighbor policies, a characteristic EU policy can be described & analyzed as "foreign administration," although the present contributions show that there is no uniform or unbroken trend. 3 References. L. Kehl

This article reviews the current state of regional integration efforts in East Asia. So far the disparate membership of APEC and the relatively more focussed ASEAN have, in striking contrast to their summit rhetoric, failed to make any significant substantial progress in integration. The reasons for this failure are seen to lie not only in the vast cultural, ethnic, political and economic disparities and the continuing hegemonic conflicts in Asia, but equally in the unwillingness of most of the political classes to reduce prevailing nationalist tensions and to address seriously the core issue of shared sovereignty with all its implications. Hence, intergovernmentalism with its principles of unanimity, non-commitment and non-interference prevails as an exclusive and ultimately paralyzing mode of elite cooperation. Civic participation, supranational initiatives, majority decisions and contractual, enforceable commitments remain effectively excluded. As things stand, even the long-term deadlines for ambitious East Asian Free Trade Areas and on variously configured East Asian Economic Communities are unlikely to be met.