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Slapin (2011) and Finke et al. (2012) represent the best theory-based book-length studies of the most active period of treaty reform in the history of the European Union – from the Treaty of Amsterdam to the Treaty of Lisbon. These works offer the opportunity to assess the extent to which liberal intergovernmentalism – a 'baseline' theory of regional integration – has withstood empirical scrutiny. I first address what I consider a misinterpretation of liberal intergovernmentalism – the presumed pre-eminence given to a country's relative capability. I then identify challenges to this framework. Methodologically, they concern the measurement of preferences, value of disagreement and opportunities for linkages in treaty negotiations. I then assess evidence of lower-than-unanimity thresholds for treaty reform, which may represent a theoretical challenge. Finally, I suggest that focal points and bargaining dynamics deserve greater scholarly attention.

Slapin (2011) and Finke et al. (2012) represent the best theory-based book-length studies of the most active period of treaty reform in the history of the European Union -- from the Treaty of Amsterdam to the Treaty of Lisbon. These works offer the opportunity to assess the extent to which liberal intergovernmentalism -- a 'baseline' theory of regional integration -- has withstood empirical scrutiny. I first address what I consider a misinterpretation of liberal intergovernmentalism -- the presumed pre-eminence given to a country's relative capability. I then identify challenges to this framework. Methodologically, they concern the measurement of preferences, value of disagreement and opportunities for linkages in treaty negotiations. I then assess evidence of lower-than-unanimity thresholds for treaty reform, which may represent a theoretical challenge. Finally, I suggest that focal points and bargaining dynamics deserve greater scholarly attention. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

Most intergovernmentalist analyses of European integration focus on treaty bargaining among European Union member governments. Recent articles also have examined everyday decision making through power index analysis, an approach that asserts that a government's ability to influence policy is a function of all possible coalitions in the Council of Ministers to which it is pivotal. This approach suffers from two major weaknesses. First, it fails to take into account the policy preferences of governments; it overestimates the influence of governments holding extreme preferences and underestimates that of more centrist governments. Second, power index analysis fails to consider the important roles of the Commission of the European Communities and the European Parliament in legislative processes. Today's procedures affect the mix of agenda-setting and veto power, and this has systematic effects on policy outcomes. If intergovernmentalism is to explain choices made during treaty rounds, it must take into account these legislative dynamics.

Eine Vielzahl intergouvernmentaler Analysen, die sich mit dem Prozeß der europäischen Integration befaßen, stellen die Vertragsverhandlungen der Mitglieder in den Mittelpunkt ihrer Untersuchungen. Neue Forschungen bedienen sich zur Klärung des Entscheidungsverhaltens eines sogenannten "power index". Diese Analyse mißt die Einflußmöglichkeit einer Regierung in Relation zu allen möglichen Koalitionen im Ministerrat, die in einer bestimmten Sachfrage von Bedeutung wären. Besonders zwei Defizite sind hierbei zu erkennen. Erstens kann sie nicht die Präferenzen von Regierungen quantifizieren und daher ihren jeweiligen Einfluß messen. Ferner läßt diese Analyse den Einfluß der weiteren Akteure, wie Kommission und Parlament gänzlich außer Acht und reduziert das Entscheidungsverhalten auf die Exekutive unter Ausschluß legislativer Faktoren. (SWP-Krh)

AbstractThis introduction sets the stage for a special issue devoted to evaluating the contribution and continued relevance of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) – a theory first formulated 25 years ago in this journal – in today's politicized and crisis‐ridden European Union (EU). We review the debates prompted by LI's three core claims about national preference formation, intergovernmental bargaining and institutional choice, as well as by the theory's three policy‐relevant corollaries relating to the EU's democratic deficit, its constitutional settlement and its role in the world. Liberal intergovernmentalism, we argue, remains highly relevant in today's EU, offering important insights and serving to structure much of the academic debate about the prospects of the Union in a time of crisis. Nevertheless, a revitalized LI faces the dual challenges of theorizing both the causes and consequences of mass politicization of EU politics, as well as the prospect of endogenous change in the direction of greater integration or disintegration.

Please substitute the following for the definition on page 276 of our article in the Spring 1996 issue of International Organization (Volume 50, No. 2, pp.269–99):Definition. A coalition of m (out of n) members is nonconnected if there is a member i ε {N} – {M} that belongs in the Pareto set of {M}.

AbstractThis research note responds to recent debates about new intergovernmentalism and argues that the hypotheses of Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter overlook the roles non‐state actors play in the integration process. It intends to open up a debate about private power and the new intergovernmentalism, demonstrating that the concentration of powers of national governments has proceeded alongside the concentration of powers of transnational business interests in Europe. The note draws on the example of the civil security industry and Justice and Home Affairs policies in order to modify the six hypotheses of new intergovernmentalism.

The functioning of the European Union (EU) has been explored extensively in recent years. The dominant prism through which to look at the EU is still one of locus: i.e. whether decisions are made in the capitals of its member states or in Brussels. This debate is contained in the dualism between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, but drawing the boundaries between the two concepts is still undone. This article attempts to contribute to solving this problem by investigating the restrictive measures policy of the EU in order to identify three conditions under which intergovernmentalism should be used. First, when EU institutions are dependent on EU member states for information and expertise; second, when decision-making powers rest mainly in EU capitals; and three, when there are no exclusive fora for decision-making in Brussels. The study of the restrictive measures of the European Union does not meet any of these three conditions; therefore the article argues that the concept of supranational intergovernmentalism offers useful insights to understand the EU security governance of CFSP sanctions. The article is divided into four parts. The first introduces the debate on security governance and justifies the selection of this specific approach to the study of sanctions. The second part presents the restrictive measures policy of the European Union and justifies its pertinence to the field of security. The third part of the article investigates the emerging patterns in security governance by testing the three conditions on the decision-making process for EU restrictive measures. Finally, the conclusion summarises the main argument and indicates ways forward in the study of EU sanctions from a governance perspective.