Suchergebnisse

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU) faces an identity crisis to which the member states do not seem eager to put an end. Making incremental changes without defining the objectives will not rise the trust in the EU as a strong international actor. Thus, this paper aims to indicate the supranational and intergovernmental characteristics of the CFSP in order to highlight that the neofonctionalist model of governance has also shaped a policy area believed to belong exclusively to the member states' power. The paper analyses the supranational and intergovernmental dimensions of the CFSP in order to provide a better understanding of how this policy is constructed.

Over the years EU member states favored an intergovernmental approach to policy-making within the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This approach emphasized the role played by national authorities, as member states' representatives, within a "soft governance" framework. In this framework, national representatives voluntarily participated in various coordinative networks and committees, which relied on interstate negotiations to create policies. However, the Euro area crisis highlighted the shortcomings of the intergovernmental approach to policy-making, such as divergent implementation of policies and regulatory arbitrage, which undermined the EMU's stability. After the crisis, we are witnessing a centralization of policy creation processes and decision-making within the EMU, with apparently limited room for "old intergovernmentalism". New actors such as the European Supervisory Authorities, perfectly embody this development since they require from member states to commonly agree "under the shadow" of non-majoritarian institutions, at times even against their own policy preferences. This raises important questions on the role of "old" conceptual frameworks in explaining current EU integration. Therefore, this paper explores the concept of intergovernmentalism (and also, "liberal intergovernmentalism") as one the key driving forces within EMU's governance, offering further insight into raised questions as well as arguing in favor of its political and integrationist potential in the years to come.

In general, ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) and its policy- and decision-making process pose a challenging puzzle for the theoretical research agenda of European integration studies. Even though ESDP is intergovernmentally constructed, classical (neo-) realist approaches seem to be unable to catch the full dynamics of the project. Institutionalist and social constructivist approaches, which underline the importance of norms, values and identity in the complex decision-making process of ESDP, add fruitful insights in many regards. This paper applies an institutionalist approaches based on the notion of socialisation and 'Brusselisation', which are analytically rich for analysing the ESDP decision-making process. The notion of Brusselisation is developed further into a theoretical concept that goes beyond the mere transfer of authority and expertise in the area of security and defence to the decision-making machinery in Brussels. This paper argues that socialisation processes of the involved actors constitute a completely new policy-making method and develops an approach to capture this new method. However, the fact that ESDP is intergovernmentally constructed and that the member states remain the main actors in this policy field is not contested. Particularly in the day-to-day management of ESDP, however, the Brussels-based bodies are increasingly in the driver's seat, gain a sort of de facto initiative power and conduct the European defence policy guided by a logic of appropriateness and a new style of decision-making. This new and 'brusselised' style of decision-making is understood as being situated 'between intergovernmentalism and socialisation processes'.

This paper contributes to a new understanding of the role and influence of the EU institutions in dealing with major EU reforms. Many have argued that, due to successive crises, Eurozone, Refugee and Brexit, EU decision making has become more intergovernmental. The role of the main intergovernmental body, the European Council, has been enhanced. Moreover, at various moments during these crises, the political leaders chose to by-pass the Community framework, and opt for intergovernmental solutions. However, in the literature, intergovernmentalism also refers to a dominance of the member states vis-à-vis the institutions in shaping these agreements. This paper looks at the process-level implications of this increased intergovernmentalism. We analyse and compare the role and influence of the institutions in five major reform negotiations: EFSF/ESM, Fiscal Compact, banking union, EU-Turkey deal and British renegotiation. An exploration of these empirical micro-foundations reveals more institution-driven processes and outcomes than the label intergovernmentalist suggests.

This contribution asks whether a new type of intergovernmentalism has emerged in financial services regulation and Banking Union. Since financial services are a key area of the single market, the chapter concludes by reflecting on whether the governance trends in the financial sector can be generalised to other areas of the single market. It is argued that the single market for financial services, which encompasses financial regulation and the plan for Banking Union, provides an interesting mix of 'old' (community) method and 'new' intergovernmentalism.

The point of this article is to understand how actions directed by a central government can undermine policies, sub-national programs and projects related to local development in the tourism context. In this sense, the main objective is to analyze the interference of a national project of tourism regionalization in the planned actions of subnational governments in the touristic cities (destinations) in Brazil. Theoretically, issues have been addressed related to Tourism Management and Public Policies. We conducted documental and field research in Brazil, specifically 16 Minas Gerais State touristic destinations, whose data were processed using the content analysis technique. It was discovered that the analyzed national project contributed to the destabilization of a current state policy and centered on regionalization, presenting an intergovernmentalism problem, with weaknesses in coordination and planning.

What is the form of government of the EU? And, how is the institutional governance of the Eurozone evolving? These questions have become pressing during the last years. On the one hand, the Euro-crisis and the legal and institutional responses to it have had major implications on the constitutional architecture of the EU and the Eurozone. On the other hand, the May 2014 elections for the European Parliament and the ensuing struggle to form the European Commission have brought to the fore new tensions in the EU political system. The purpose of this book - which brings together the contributions of EU lawyers, comparative constitutional lawyers, and political scientists, from all over Europe and the United States - is to offer a new look at the form of government of the EU and the Eurozone and to consider its potential for future development. While offering a plurality of perspectives on the form of government of the EU and the Eurozone, the book emphasizes how the Euro-crisis represents a watermark in the process of European integration. It makes the case for a more legitimate and effective form of government for the EU and the Eurozone. Additionally, it identifies possible windows of opportunity for future treaty reforms. The book will provide food for thought to scholars, policy makers, and the public at large, as they continue debating about the most apt form of government for the EU and the Eurozone.

1\. Introduction 5 2\. What Does the Literature Tell Us about Decision-Shaping and Decision-Taking in CSDP? 8 3\. The Role of the PSC in CSDP Policy-Shaping 17 4\. Conclusions 23 Literature 25 ; For scholars and practitioners of European politics alike, the distinction between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism has always been fundamental. This distinction has underpinned the various schools of European integration theory, just as it has remained crucial for European governments keen to demonstrate that the member states remain in charge of key policy areas. Nowhere is this considered to be more central than in the area of foreign and security policy, which has consciously been set within the rigid intergovernmental framework of Pillar Two of the Maastricht Treaty and, under the Lisbon Treaty, remains subject to the unanimity rule. And yet, scholarship on the major decision-making agencies of the foreign and security policy of the EU suggests that the distinction is not only blurred but increasingly meaningless. This paper demonstrates that, in virtually every case, decisions are shaped and even taken by small groups of relatively well-socialized officials in the key committees acting in a mode which is as close to supranational as it is to intergovernmental. The political control of foreign and security policy, which is considered sacrosanct by member state governments, is only rarely exercised by politicians at the level of the European Council or Council of Ministers.

The literature strongly suggests that the creation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was largely influenced by the "power of ideas", an accommodation to international markets challenges. The outcome was EMU's political-economy inspired by the monetarist school, a considerable disempowerment of national governments. Put in the perspective of European integration theories, EMU seemed to reject liberal intergovernmentalism claims that member states' interests are the major input to European integration developments. However, since the monetary union was launched several events showed that national governments re-captured the influence they theoretically lost with EMU. Notably the persistent breach of the Stability and Growth Pact might be the evidence that EU institutions (especially the Commission) and other societal actors lost ground to national governments. The paper asks whether the operation of EMU reflects a paradigm change in terms of European integration theories: how liberal intergovernmentalism emerged as the theory with greater explanatory potential of EMU in motion.

This paper examines the transition from the "era of the health accords" (from 2000 to 2017) to the new regime of individual bilateral agreements between Ottawa and each of the provinces and territories, allocating federal health transfers and setting agreed-upon health-reform priorities in each jurisdiction. The paper argues that the health accords of 2000, 2003 and 2004 were essentially unsuccessful for a number of reasons. First, they tended to raise expectations among the public, health system actors and health policy experts about the ability to transform health care in Canada in a relatively short period of time. This was, in part, a result of the accords' very broad and general commitments to change, but also their lack of recognition of the barriers to change that exist within the system. Second, and related to the first, attention was paid mostly to the amount of the transfer from the federal government to the provinces and territories, rather than to how those dollars were to be spent. At best, governments bought only a modest amount of change in the system, despite the billions of dollars of new investment. Unlike other industrialized federations, Canada appears to be the only one that relies on an ongoing, highly politicized process of intergovernmental diplomacy to negotiate the fiscal relationship in health care. This, combined with a somewhat amorphous and changeable understanding of the federal government's overall role in health care, complicates the process of reform and heightens the political stakes around the negotiations. The new model of bilateral agreements negotiated under an umbrella statementof common principles around health-reform priorities may yet prove to be an improvement in both process and outcomes. Bilateralism can serve to de-escalate the political stakes inherent in the federal-provincial diplomacy around Canada's most popular social program, by moving away from the "grand bargains" that characterized the accords. In short, there will be less opportunity for the kind of political rhetoric that unduly raises expectations of rapid change. More importantly, the bilateral agreements, although far from perfect, may actually better serve to focus attention on the specific health-service organization and delivery issues the provinces and territories intend to improve, restructure or expand. Under very broad principles such as "improving access to mental health and community care," the bilateral agreements articulate some very clear plans about specific approaches, programs and policies on which the transfers will be spent. This should provide amuch greater opportunity for the Canadian public to hold governments to account for progress in those areas, something the accords never really managed to do. Going forward, there is still room for improvement. Some provincial plans are decidedly vague, and governments should be urged to be more specific in their commitments and intentions. Common indicators continue to be difficult to develop, although big strides have been made in recent decades. Governments would be well advised to talk seriously and openly about the challenges and barriers to change that exist within the system and, in doing so, marshal public support to dismantle them. And the federal government itself needs to actively engage in assisting jurisdictions in learning from and adapting the successful reforms and initiatives of other jurisdictions. This could be an act of true system stewardship.

The main objective of this chapter is to show, in accordance with the editedvolume's conceptual framework, how the economic and financial crisis has producedinstitutional change in the EU and how this change had impacted thetheoretical debate. It is structured in three sections. In section 1, I will map the main features of supranationalism and intergovernmentalismas institutional methods (and not theories) to demonstrate that, in the long term, the EU polity can be explained as a recurrent balancing actbetween the two methods. In section 2, I will show how the economic and financial crisis between 2008and 2012 has produced change in the power of the EU member states, reinforcingthe power of some and decreasing the power of others. The fluctuated powerof the member states is one dimension of what Sabine Saurugger and FabienTerpan name institutional density, conceived as 'a dynamic concept, implyingfluidity and movement'. In section 3, I will show how the economic and financial crisis forces the EUscholars to reassess their theoretical approaches. The emergence of de novo institutionscreated by the member states to respond and manage the crisis makes theargument of a new intergovernmentalist theory valid. In this case, the substantiveintergovernmentalism is not used to describe an institutional method, but isa theoretical account to explain the EU institutional change.

The main objective of this chapter is to show, in accordance with the editedvolume's conceptual framework, how the economic and financial crisis has producedinstitutional change in the EU and how this change had impacted thetheoretical debate. It is structured in three sections. In section 1, I will map the main features of supranationalism and intergovernmentalismas institutional methods (and not theories) to demonstrate that, in the long term, the EU polity can be explained as a recurrent balancing actbetween the two methods. In section 2, I will show how the economic and financial crisis between 2008and 2012 has produced change in the power of the EU member states, reinforcingthe power of some and decreasing the power of others. The fluctuated powerof the member states is one dimension of what Sabine Saurugger and FabienTerpan name institutional density, conceived as 'a dynamic concept, implyingfluidity and movement'. In section 3, I will show how the economic and financial crisis forces the EUscholars to reassess their theoretical approaches. The emergence of de novo institutionscreated by the member states to respond and manage the crisis makes theargument of a new intergovernmentalist theory valid. In this case, the substantiveintergovernmentalism is not used to describe an institutional method, but isa theoretical account to explain the EU institutional change.

European Parliament elections are frequently held to be insufficient for conferring democratic legitimacy on the EU's policy process. This has led a growing number of actors to suggest that deriving legitimacy from national parliaments offers a suitable remedy for the EU's democratic deficit, following the principles of 'democratic intergovernmentalism'. Yet little attention has been paid to the effect such reforms might have on representation in practice. This article presents a novel way of visualising the problem by recalibrating the balance of power in the European Parliament between 2009 and 2024 to reflect the composition of national parliaments and the results of national elections. It finds that actors within the Greens/EFA group would be particularly vulnerable to a loss of influence. This raises important questions about the potential representative costs associated with democratic intergovernmentalist approaches.

As the politicization of European integration is channeled through the media, it fundamentally implies a discursive power distribution between actors and institutions based on who and what type of argument is promoted. Scholars have started to hypothesize who will benefit from this expansion of debates to wider publics, predominantly using media logics to conclude with the notion of 'discursive intergovernmentalism': where media spotlights enter, executives benefit. In this paper, we contribute to these nascent studies into the discursive empowerment of actors and institutions, by adding a critical notion. Taking our cue from Critical Discourse Analysis, we argue that media output should not only be theorized based on news values, but equally by accounting for existing institutional power (im)balances. To evaluate this argument, we draw on new intergovernmentalist theory, and empirically delve into the Spanish and Dutch media coverage of the (run-up to the) July 2020 NextGenerationEU recovery package.

As the politicization of European integration is channeled through the media, it fundamentally implies a discursive power distribution between actors and institutions based on who and what type of argument is promoted. Scholars have started to hypothesize who will benefit from this expansion of debates to wider publics, predominantly using media logics to conclude with the notion of 'discursive intergovernmentalism': where media spotlights enter, executives benefit. In this paper, we contribute to these nascent studies into the discursive empowerment of actors and institutions, by adding a critical notion. Taking our cue from Critical Discourse Analysis, we argue that media output should not only be theorized based on news values, but equally by accounting for existing institutional power (im)balances. To evaluate this argument, we draw on new intergovernmentalist theory, and empirically delve into the Spanish and Dutch media coverage of the (run-up to the) July 2020 NextGenerationEU recovery package.