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AbstractBy focusing on processes and institutional change, EU citizenship emerges as a co-created institution. It is the product of institutional design and co-creation by actors at all levels of governance and is shaped by multilogues at the 'top', 'bottom' and 'sideways', as well as by citizens' formal and informal actions. A co-creation perspective leads us to reconsider state-centred assumptions about which form of citizenship should be predominant and the dualism of centralism (supra-nationalism) versus 'home-rule' (intergovernmentalism), and to embrace a genuinely citizen-centred perspective. The chapter develops the co-creation paradigm, examines its dimensions, various forms and patterns and, by discussing the post-RottmannandZambranocase law (McCarthy, Dereci, Iida, O, S and LandYmeraga) as well asTsakouridisandPI, sheds light onto the complex dynamics that make EU citizenship a vehicle of transformative institutional change but that can also work against it.

In an article previously published by the APSR, Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla claim that the decision making of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been constrained—systematically—by the threat of override on the part of member state governments, acting collectively, and by the threat of noncompliance on the part of any single state. They also purport to have found strong evidence in favor of intergovernmentalist, but not neofunctionalist, integration theory. On the basis of analysis of the same data, we demonstrate that the threat of override is not credible and that the legal system is activated, rather than paralyzed, by noncompliance. Moreover, when member state governments did move to nullify the effects of controversial ECJ rulings, they failed to constrain the court, which continued down paths cleared by the prior rulings. Finally, in a head-to-head showdown between intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, the latter wins in a landslide.

According to liberal intergovernmentalism the outcome of EU negotiations is determined by the constellation of member state interests without needing any formal leadership. This article reviews this 'self-clearing thesis' in the context of the 2003-04 IGC. It further examines what impact the European Convention, which prepared a comprehensive draft Constitutional Treaty, has had on these negotiations. Three roles of the Italian and the Irish Presidency leading the 2003-04 IGC are analysed: managing the scope of the negotiations' agenda, brokering efficient deals and promoting specific interests. Little evidence is found that the Presidencies really made a substantial difference in brokering the eventual deals or in promoting their own interests. However, the presence of the Convention's draft allowed the Presidencies to adopt an agenda management strategy that changed the nature of the negotiations and the power configuration of interests and thus radically departed from those normally applying at IGCs.

The predominant strategic-relational approaches to understanding multi-level governance within the context of the European Union are explored. An overview of the general strategic-relational approach to investigating both state government & the notion of governance is presented. Competing accounts of the European Union's transformation into a regional state or political entity are then examined; specific attention is dedicated to highlighting two state-oriented accounts (liberal intergovernmentalism & supranationalism) & two governance-based models (eg, multi-level governance & network polity). Three critiques of the state-oriented & governance-based accounts are subsequently offered; whereas the former accounts naturalize the sharp division between state & society, the latter perspectives have not achieved theoretical maturity. Consequently, a strategic-relational perspective that negotiates the aforementioned approaches' shortcomings is introduced & acknowledges changes to the structure of states in advanced capitalist societies is introduced. The alternative framework's implications for future research are also contemplated. J. W. Parker

The predominant strategic-relational approaches to understanding multi-level governance within the context of the European Union are explored. An overview of the general strategic-relational approach to investigating both state government & the notion of governance is presented. Competing accounts of the European Union's transformation into a regional state or political entity are then examined; specific attention is dedicated to highlighting two state-oriented accounts (liberal intergovernmentalism & supranationalism) & two governance-based models (eg, multi-level governance & network polity). Three critiques of the state-oriented & governance-based accounts are subsequently offered; whereas the former accounts naturalize the sharp division between state & society, the latter perspectives have not achieved theoretical maturity. Consequently, a strategic-relational perspective that negotiates the aforementioned approaches' shortcomings is introduced & acknowledges changes to the structure of states in advanced capitalist societies is introduced. The alternative framework's implications for future research are also contemplated. J. W. Parker

How to characterize the relationship between member governments & the European Commission has long been a matter of controversy among EU scholars. Although most now agree that traditional theoretical frameworks -- intergovernmentalism & supranationalism -- are inadequate to understand the complexities of EU governance, few viable alternatives have emerged. In this article, I provide a prospective look into a promising approach. The analytical framework is built on insights adapted from the new economics of organization (NEO). Specifically, I fuse the theoretical notion of incomplete contracting with principal-agent analytics to explain both the form & content of supranational delegation. The framework promises to offer scholars the means to get away from asking whether or not member governments dominate supranational institutions, to an inquiry wherein one can distinguish the conditions under which governments control supranational institutions from those where these institutions operate with a degree of autonomy. 114 References. Adapted from the source document.

Do supranational institutions matter—do they deserve the status of an independent causal variable—in the politics of the European Community (EC)? Does the Commission of the European Communities matter? Does the European Court of Justice (ECJ) or the European Parliament? Is the EC characterized by continued member state dominance or by a runaway Commission and an activist Court progressively chipping away at this dominance? These are some of the more important questions for our understanding of the EC and of European integration. They have divided the two traditional schools of thought in regional integration, with neofunctionalists generally asserting, and intergovernmentalists generally denying, any important causal role for supranational institutions in the integration process. By and large, however, neither neofunctionalism nor intergovernmentalism has generated testable hypotheses regarding the conditions under which, and the ways in which, supranational institutions exert an independent causal influence on either EC governance or the process of European integration.