Suchergebnisse

Research object. Lithuania's relations and their changes with NATO after occupation of the Crimea and decisions, taken by Lithuania in security and defence policy, impact to it. The aim of this paper is to reveal what determines small states relationships with alliance and on what they are based on; Lithuania's approach towards NATO and approach changes after the occupation of the Crimea. In order to achieve this aim, should be covered the following tasks: 1. Should be analysed definition of small states, identified their place in the international environment as well as to analyze the theoretical alliance formation and existence dilemmas, in order to form the basis of research. 2. Should be analysed factors, which determines strategy choice in relationship between Lithuania and alliance? 3. Should be analysed influence of choosed strategy to Lithuania and alliance relationships; should be analysed influence of Lithuanian security and defence policy to this relations after the occupation of the Crimea, and what should be further Lithuania's actions to ensure the further development of relations chosen strategy. Research methods. To ensure efficient and high-quality implementation of the tasks, ir paper is used comparison and analytical methods. Lithuania after accession to NATO, expands alliance cooperation strategy in respect of an alliance strategy. Declined abandonment and entrapment risks determined that after 10 years in NATO, Lithuania has become a free rider state, which develops defection strategy with respect to an alliance. Prevailing geopolitical (Russian aggression in Crimea) situation, relations inside alliance and increased abandonment risk, encouraged Lithuania to adjust its strategy of cooperation with an alliance and go from defect to cooperation strategy. Relevant Lithuanian security and defence policy decisions (compulsory military service in return of the rapid reaction force), largely in line with the provisions of this strategy.

Research object. Lithuania's relations and their changes with NATO after occupation of the Crimea and decisions, taken by Lithuania in security and defence policy, impact to it. The aim of this paper is to reveal what determines small states relationships with alliance and on what they are based on; Lithuania's approach towards NATO and approach changes after the occupation of the Crimea. In order to achieve this aim, should be covered the following tasks: 1. Should be analysed definition of small states, identified their place in the international environment as well as to analyze the theoretical alliance formation and existence dilemmas, in order to form the basis of research. 2. Should be analysed factors, which determines strategy choice in relationship between Lithuania and alliance? 3. Should be analysed influence of choosed strategy to Lithuania and alliance relationships; should be analysed influence of Lithuanian security and defence policy to this relations after the occupation of the Crimea, and what should be further Lithuania's actions to ensure the further development of relations chosen strategy. Research methods. To ensure efficient and high-quality implementation of the tasks, ir paper is used comparison and analytical methods. Lithuania after accession to NATO, expands alliance cooperation strategy in respect of an alliance strategy. Declined abandonment and entrapment risks determined that after 10 years in NATO, Lithuania has become a free rider state, which develops defection strategy with respect to an alliance. Prevailing geopolitical (Russian aggression in Crimea) situation, relations inside alliance and increased abandonment risk, encouraged Lithuania to adjust its strategy of cooperation with an alliance and go from defect to cooperation strategy. Relevant Lithuanian security and defence policy decisions (compulsory military service in return of the rapid reaction force), largely in line with the provisions of this strategy.

Research object. Lithuania's relations and their changes with NATO after occupation of the Crimea and decisions, taken by Lithuania in security and defence policy, impact to it. The aim of this paper is to reveal what determines small states relationships with alliance and on what they are based on; Lithuania's approach towards NATO and approach changes after the occupation of the Crimea. In order to achieve this aim, should be covered the following tasks: 1. Should be analysed definition of small states, identified their place in the international environment as well as to analyze the theoretical alliance formation and existence dilemmas, in order to form the basis of research. 2. Should be analysed factors, which determines strategy choice in relationship between Lithuania and alliance? 3. Should be analysed influence of choosed strategy to Lithuania and alliance relationships; should be analysed influence of Lithuanian security and defence policy to this relations after the occupation of the Crimea, and what should be further Lithuania's actions to ensure the further development of relations chosen strategy. Research methods. To ensure efficient and high-quality implementation of the tasks, ir paper is used comparison and analytical methods. Lithuania after accession to NATO, expands alliance cooperation strategy in respect of an alliance strategy. Declined abandonment and entrapment risks determined that after 10 years in NATO, Lithuania has become a free rider state, which develops defection strategy with respect to an alliance. Prevailing geopolitical (Russian aggression in Crimea) situation, relations inside alliance and increased abandonment risk, encouraged Lithuania to adjust its strategy of cooperation with an alliance and go from defect to cooperation strategy. Relevant Lithuanian security and defence policy decisions (compulsory military service in return of the rapid reaction force), largely in line with the provisions of this strategy.

In 2004 Lithuania implemented its two most important foreign policy goals -- became the member of the European Union & NATO. However, the country will now have to assert its status & position in the Euroatlantic community of liberal democracies. Lithuania faces an arguably more complex agenda, which has no clear end-goals or deadlines. The security challenges are difficult to identify & predict. The global & European strategic environment is best characterized by an ever-growing uncertainty: the transatlantic relations continue to be tense, Russia, paradoxically, is balancing between perspective of disintegration & re-emerging as an expansionist imperial power, & the European Union is under- going one of the most severe internal crisis in decades. At the same time, the major schools of international relations theory disagree on what to make out of the current world politics. Rationalist, neorealist authors tend to give alarmist, apocalyptic accounts of the future of the nation states if they despise the iron logic of geopolitics, whereas reflectivist, constructivist authors argue that the world is "what we make of it," & thus, can be changed. These two visions of international relations inevitably lead to different policy implications. The paper consists of two parts. In the first part, the authors address the current state of affairs in the two schools of international relations: rationalism (neorealism) & reflectivism (constructivism). In the second part, the authors interchangeably explore & compare the policy options that can be derived from the two different worldviews. The article concludes that international politics for a small state are more complex than either of the schools would suggest. Although the nature of the world politics is increasingly postmodern, a lot of actors still live in a modern world of geopolitics. Lithuanian decision makers will therefore have to "play" in accordance with postmodern rules when possible, but to remember geopolitics if necessary. Grounding their view on theoretical synthesis of constructivist & realist approaches to foreign policy, The authors asserts, that Lithuania's Euroatlantism should overshadow all other interests & problems of the society. The membership in the EU will have far reaching & long term consequences on Lithuanian society -- the same cannot be said about membership in NATO, or relations with the US. Lithuania must internalize the EU as a part of its corporate identity -- Lithuania is a part of Europe's collective identity. Therefore, Lithuanian political elite should cease to consider Europe as an object of Lithuanian foreign policy, rather it should become conscious itself as a subject of European policy contributing to its formation. Adapted from the source document.

The institute of marriage annulment is not new basis regarding the end of legal relations between spouses. Marriage annulment was first mentioned in Lithuanian historical sources in 16th century. The grounds and procedures for declaring Marriage Null and Void are provided in the Article 3.37 of the Civil Code of Lithuanian Republic. In this work by the help of systematic method there is developed the substance of marriage annulment and its distinguishing points extracting this institute from the others institutes declaring the end of legal relations between spouses. This institute is being determined as the rejection of the country to accept and guard the alliance of spouses and to acclaim such alliance as marriage. Different grounds of marriage annulment are being analysed by the help of comparative method. Marrying a foreigners and getting married in the foreign countries becomes more and more popular nowadays. But also with this, the institute of marriage annulment becomes more applicable in practice. In this work we analyse international conventions, agreements and other international documents regarding acknowledgement of the court ruling. The special place in this work is set for European Union Law concerning marriage annulment, especially the new Brussels II (Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility for the children of both spouses).

The institute of marriage annulment is not new basis regarding the end of legal relations between spouses. Marriage annulment was first mentioned in Lithuanian historical sources in 16th century. The grounds and procedures for declaring Marriage Null and Void are provided in the Article 3.37 of the Civil Code of Lithuanian Republic. In this work by the help of systematic method there is developed the substance of marriage annulment and its distinguishing points extracting this institute from the others institutes declaring the end of legal relations between spouses. This institute is being determined as the rejection of the country to accept and guard the alliance of spouses and to acclaim such alliance as marriage. Different grounds of marriage annulment are being analysed by the help of comparative method. Marrying a foreigners and getting married in the foreign countries becomes more and more popular nowadays. But also with this, the institute of marriage annulment becomes more applicable in practice. In this work we analyse international conventions, agreements and other international documents regarding acknowledgement of the court ruling. The special place in this work is set for European Union Law concerning marriage annulment, especially the new Brussels II (Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility for the children of both spouses).

Middle and Eastern European region is both historically and politically complicated. The effect of this we can also detect in countries understanding security. In order to countries to collaborate and reach mutual relations, and not only via international agreements, but also in bilateral relations, security priorities should be as identical as possible. It seems reasonable that same region should have same or identical security strategies. Purpose of research – analyse four different Middle and Eastern European countries, in particular – Lithuanian, Latvian, Polish and Hungarian – national security strategies. Research countries are part of defensive alliances such as NATO, and on surface of it, this means same basic principles regarding making national security strategies. However, during research it was discovered that same region – Middle and Eastern European – countires prioritise different risks, main difference being identifying Russia, as a risk, between Lithuania, Latvia and Poland. In a meantime, Hungary prioritises risk coming from illegal migration, and Russia is left further down in priorities. More over, Lithuania, Latvia and Poland carefully sees possibility for relationship improvement with Russia, but Hungary is rather warm in that regard. This means that Hungary's different perspective may lead to diffucult relations in both format as bilateral and international, especially then topic changes to Russia.

Middle and Eastern European region is both historically and politically complicated. The effect of this we can also detect in countries understanding security. In order to countries to collaborate and reach mutual relations, and not only via international agreements, but also in bilateral relations, security priorities should be as identical as possible. It seems reasonable that same region should have same or identical security strategies. Purpose of research – analyse four different Middle and Eastern European countries, in particular – Lithuanian, Latvian, Polish and Hungarian – national security strategies. Research countries are part of defensive alliances such as NATO, and on surface of it, this means same basic principles regarding making national security strategies. However, during research it was discovered that same region – Middle and Eastern European – countires prioritise different risks, main difference being identifying Russia, as a risk, between Lithuania, Latvia and Poland. In a meantime, Hungary prioritises risk coming from illegal migration, and Russia is left further down in priorities. More over, Lithuania, Latvia and Poland carefully sees possibility for relationship improvement with Russia, but Hungary is rather warm in that regard. This means that Hungary's different perspective may lead to diffucult relations in both format as bilateral and international, especially then topic changes to Russia.

The main purpose of this paper is to find out what is the impact of geoenergetic processes in Central and Eastern European countries on Lithuanian geoenergetics. In order to do this, several tasks were accomplished. First, theoretical model of geoenergetic interaction between states was constructed. This model is grounded on the causal relations between states-consumers of energy resources, transit states and states-producers in ceteris paribus conditions. The main outcome of this model is the conclusion that the comparative geoenergetic power of states depends on the quantity of actors in each part of geoenergetic chain of states-producers, states-consumers and transit states. The more actors exercise the same geoenergetic role, the less comparative power each of them has in relations with other actors, which perform different geoenergetic role. Second, the geoenergetic position of Central and Eastern European countries was identified. These countries are important actors in transporting energy resources from the East to the West, therefore, in geoenergetic relations with other countries they perform the role of transit states. However, despite being important transit states, they are dependent on one main energy supplier – Russia. Therefore, their comparative geoenergetic power is limited because of the lack of geoenergetic actors in the suppliers' part of geoenergetic chain. Third, Russian energy policy in Central and Eastern European countries was analyzed. There are tendencies, which indicate, that Russia applies different strategies of its energy policy in different Central and Eastern European countries. The strategy of geostrategic isolation is applied in Baltic states and Poland. Russia's strategy in Belarus and Ukraine is based on the aim to take over the transit infrastructure of these countries. Also, Russia is trying to keep its geoenergetic influence in Moldova. Finally, the strategy of geoenergetic involvement is applied in Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. Fourth, the tendencies of geoenergetic competition and cooperation in Central and Eastern European countries are analyzed. The conclusion that currently geostrategic competition is more typical for these countries than cooperation was made. The analysis of this paper showed that the main strategic role of Central and Eastern European countries is of potential geostrategic partners for diversifying their energy resources and looking for alternative routes for their energy imports. Also, Central and Eastern European countries could potentially be reliable strategic partners in pressing the European Union to create common and firm policy of energy security. The assumption that currently the most advantageous strategy for Lithuania is an initiation of creating strong geoenergetic alliance of transit strates in Central and Eastern Europe, according to this paper, is wrong. First, this alliance is hardly possible because of the tendencies of competition between Central and Eastern European countries. Second, among the opposing actors would be not only Russia, but also Western European countries, which would seek alternative routes for their energy imports from Russia avoiding this geoenergetic alliance. Third, the perspectives for Lithuania to become strong transit state in this alliance are low, because of the Russian strategy to isolate Lithuania as a transit country by cutting the flow of energy resources through this country and creating projects of alternative transit routes. Fourth, the geoenergetic influence of Russia in the region of Central and Eastern European countries is strong enough to persuade some countries in this region into becoming its geoenergetic allies. Currently, the best strategy for Lithuania would be the transformation from the state transporting energy resources from Russia to Western Europe to importing state in cooperation with other states-importers in Western Europe, along with the diversification of energy suppliers.

The main purpose of this paper is to find out what is the impact of geoenergetic processes in Central and Eastern European countries on Lithuanian geoenergetics. In order to do this, several tasks were accomplished. First, theoretical model of geoenergetic interaction between states was constructed. This model is grounded on the causal relations between states-consumers of energy resources, transit states and states-producers in ceteris paribus conditions. The main outcome of this model is the conclusion that the comparative geoenergetic power of states depends on the quantity of actors in each part of geoenergetic chain of states-producers, states-consumers and transit states. The more actors exercise the same geoenergetic role, the less comparative power each of them has in relations with other actors, which perform different geoenergetic role. Second, the geoenergetic position of Central and Eastern European countries was identified. These countries are important actors in transporting energy resources from the East to the West, therefore, in geoenergetic relations with other countries they perform the role of transit states. However, despite being important transit states, they are dependent on one main energy supplier – Russia. Therefore, their comparative geoenergetic power is limited because of the lack of geoenergetic actors in the suppliers' part of geoenergetic chain. Third, Russian energy policy in Central and Eastern European countries was analyzed. There are tendencies, which indicate, that Russia applies different strategies of its energy policy in different Central and Eastern European countries. The strategy of geostrategic isolation is applied in Baltic states and Poland. Russia's strategy in Belarus and Ukraine is based on the aim to take over the transit infrastructure of these countries. Also, Russia is trying to keep its geoenergetic influence in Moldova. Finally, the strategy of geoenergetic involvement is applied in Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. Fourth, the tendencies of geoenergetic competition and cooperation in Central and Eastern European countries are analyzed. The conclusion that currently geostrategic competition is more typical for these countries than cooperation was made. The analysis of this paper showed that the main strategic role of Central and Eastern European countries is of potential geostrategic partners for diversifying their energy resources and looking for alternative routes for their energy imports. Also, Central and Eastern European countries could potentially be reliable strategic partners in pressing the European Union to create common and firm policy of energy security. The assumption that currently the most advantageous strategy for Lithuania is an initiation of creating strong geoenergetic alliance of transit strates in Central and Eastern Europe, according to this paper, is wrong. First, this alliance is hardly possible because of the tendencies of competition between Central and Eastern European countries. Second, among the opposing actors would be not only Russia, but also Western European countries, which would seek alternative routes for their energy imports from Russia avoiding this geoenergetic alliance. Third, the perspectives for Lithuania to become strong transit state in this alliance are low, because of the Russian strategy to isolate Lithuania as a transit country by cutting the flow of energy resources through this country and creating projects of alternative transit routes. Fourth, the geoenergetic influence of Russia in the region of Central and Eastern European countries is strong enough to persuade some countries in this region into becoming its geoenergetic allies. Currently, the best strategy for Lithuania would be the transformation from the state transporting energy resources from Russia to Western Europe to importing state in cooperation with other states-importers in Western Europe, along with the diversification of energy suppliers.

The a rticle d iscusses conceptualisation of populism, Lithuania's party system a nd electoral dynamics and their relation to the sustainability of populist parties. Special attention is given to Party Order and Justice, a former populist and protest party, and its leadership, namely to the issues related to scope and competencies of a leader's intra-partisan power, leadership selection rules and history, development of leaders' political careers and their electoral activity. Th e L ithuanian party system now exhibits moderate fragmentation without centrifugal tendencies. Voter volatility is still relatively high, yet the share of new parties has dropped to zero. Th e protest and populist parties in Lithuania went into the margins of political establishment. Popularity of the Order and Justice party has long been connected to the formerly impeached president Rolandas Paksas. His long-term leadership in the face of plummeting electoral support and an emphasis on his political martyrdom resulted in poor electoral performances, ensuing internal squabbles and his departure. Party Order and Justice's internal regulations, however, remained favourable to strong leadership.

The a rticle d iscusses conceptualisation of populism, Lithuania's party system a nd electoral dynamics and their relation to the sustainability of populist parties. Special attention is given to Party Order and Justice, a former populist and protest party, and its leadership, namely to the issues related to scope and competencies of a leader's intra-partisan power, leadership selection rules and history, development of leaders' political careers and their electoral activity. Th e L ithuanian party system now exhibits moderate fragmentation without centrifugal tendencies. Voter volatility is still relatively high, yet the share of new parties has dropped to zero. Th e protest and populist parties in Lithuania went into the margins of political establishment. Popularity of the Order and Justice party has long been connected to the formerly impeached president Rolandas Paksas. His long-term leadership in the face of plummeting electoral support and an emphasis on his political martyrdom resulted in poor electoral performances, ensuing internal squabbles and his departure. Party Order and Justice's internal regulations, however, remained favourable to strong leadership.

The a rticle d iscusses conceptualisation of populism, Lithuania's party system a nd electoral dynamics and their relation to the sustainability of populist parties. Special attention is given to Party Order and Justice, a former populist and protest party, and its leadership, namely to the issues related to scope and competencies of a leader's intra-partisan power, leadership selection rules and history, development of leaders' political careers and their electoral activity. Th e L ithuanian party system now exhibits moderate fragmentation without centrifugal tendencies. Voter volatility is still relatively high, yet the share of new parties has dropped to zero. Th e protest and populist parties in Lithuania went into the margins of political establishment. Popularity of the Order and Justice party has long been connected to the formerly impeached president Rolandas Paksas. His long-term leadership in the face of plummeting electoral support and an emphasis on his political martyrdom resulted in poor electoral performances, ensuing internal squabbles and his departure. Party Order and Justice's internal regulations, however, remained favourable to strong leadership.

The a rticle d iscusses conceptualisation of populism, Lithuania's party system a nd electoral dynamics and their relation to the sustainability of populist parties. Special attention is given to Party Order and Justice, a former populist and protest party, and its leadership, namely to the issues related to scope and competencies of a leader's intra-partisan power, leadership selection rules and history, development of leaders' political careers and their electoral activity. Th e L ithuanian party system now exhibits moderate fragmentation without centrifugal tendencies. Voter volatility is still relatively high, yet the share of new parties has dropped to zero. Th e protest and populist parties in Lithuania went into the margins of political establishment. Popularity of the Order and Justice party has long been connected to the formerly impeached president Rolandas Paksas. His long-term leadership in the face of plummeting electoral support and an emphasis on his political martyrdom resulted in poor electoral performances, ensuing internal squabbles and his departure. Party Order and Justice's internal regulations, however, remained favourable to strong leadership.

The a rticle d iscusses conceptualisation of populism, Lithuania's party system a nd electoral dynamics and their relation to the sustainability of populist parties. Special attention is given to Party Order and Justice, a former populist and protest party, and its leadership, namely to the issues related to scope and competencies of a leader's intra-partisan power, leadership selection rules and history, development of leaders' political careers and their electoral activity. Th e L ithuanian party system now exhibits moderate fragmentation without centrifugal tendencies. Voter volatility is still relatively high, yet the share of new parties has dropped to zero. Th e protest and populist parties in Lithuania went into the margins of political establishment. Popularity of the Order and Justice party has long been connected to the formerly impeached president Rolandas Paksas. His long-term leadership in the face of plummeting electoral support and an emphasis on his political martyrdom resulted in poor electoral performances, ensuing internal squabbles and his departure. Party Order and Justice's internal regulations, however, remained favourable to strong leadership.