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President Carter will perhaps be remembered most for his perceived incompetence, an impression produced largely by his inability to forge coalitions in Congress, and by his failure as an 'outsider' to intervene effectively in the established policy-making processes in Washington. In his farewell address, Carter alluded to what he believed to be the source of his troubles – the fragmentation of power and decision-making exploited by influential special interests. Carter believed that he was trapped in a web of organized groups allied with well-placed congressional and bureaucratic sympathizers seeking to protect their narrowly defined interests and frustrating his own broader vision of the public good.

This paper tests the popular thesis that as a result of various changes over the past decade, the subsystemliron triangle model is no longer the central dynamic in federal water policymaking. A cross section of 30 authorities were interviewed on two aspects of this key dispute: (a) the extent to which iron triangle tenets were either central (traditional viewpoint) or secondary (revisionist viewpoint) to the Carter administrationls 1977 water projects "hit list" 81 defeat, 11 and (b) perceptions of the viability of the leading water alliances in the years since the hit list events. Major findings: (1) Although the two leading water subsystems are portrayed as having been weakened by recent challenges, they are viewed by subsystem insidersll and "outsiders" alike as the most powerful of six alternative explanations for the Carter "defeat." (2) The alliances are largely pursuing a strategy aimed at adapting (Ripley and Franklinls "adapting subsystems") to the threatening political climate based on extensive funding for operations and maintenance. (3) The argument is advanced that the traditional‐revisionist dispute is bridged by cyclical policy dynamics, labeled the policy pacing dimension.

ABSTRACTThis paper examines three distinct images of the policy process. Iron triangles emphasiże stable relations among a limited number of participants in a relatively closed policy area. Issue networks are fragmented, open and extraordinarily complex and are ill-structured for resolving conflicts and reaching authoritative decisions. The neo-corporatist literature posits a mechanistic interpretation of society: hierarchy, discipline, command and stability, though organized through sectors. These three images can be contrasted with an image of cabinet government which stresses the integrative capacities of central government. The United States can be seen to have moved to some degree from a pattern more closely captured by the iron triangle image to a looser, more complex one resembling features of the issue network image. In Britain, it is possible to detect some movement towards the complexity of the issue network approach. Despite some superficial plausibility, the corporatist image does not apply to Britain, which is best described by drawing on elements of the iron triangle and cabinet government images and some of the complexity of the issue network image. Finally, limits to the fragmentation implied by the issue network image are noted.