Do teachers and the public disagree on education reform? We use data from a nationally representative survey conducted in 2011 to identify the extent of the differences between the opinion of teachers and the general public on a wide range of education policies. The overall cleavage between teachers and the general public is wider than the cleavages between other relevant groups, including that between Democrats and Republicans. At least with respect to patterns of opinion on education reform, school politics is largely a conflict between producers within the system and consumers outside it – a classic iron triangle theme.
Abstract. The paper addresses five constructs of policy making: policy curtain, iron triangle, issue network, policy community and an iron duet. The five constructs are distinguished on the basis of two variables: exclusion, denoting the degree of openness to new participants, and interdependence, pertaining to relationship between participants. A policy curtain prevails in the pre‐agenda stage denoting both exclusion and lack of dependence. Iron triangle is characterized by exclusion and interdependence; issue network portrays inclusion and lack of interdependence; a policy community features inclusion and interdependence. A fifth construct — an iron duet combines characteristics of an iron triangle, an issue network and a policy community. The paper suggests that the five constructs of policy making are not only products of political environment but are affected by distribution of resources and primacy of values within a specific issue‐area. It further argues that a sequential development may take place following alterations in the division of power between state agencies and organized groups. The involvement of powerful groups of professionals in a policy community, produced by mutual dependence of state and association, may lead to formation of a policy (iron) duet. The historical evolution of specialization entitlement in Israeli health policy serves as a case study to illustrate the major arguments of the paper.
Mit der zugrundeliegenden Frage, wie spezifische Politik-Formationen zwischen Staat und Interessengruppen entstehen, untersucht der Beitrag fünf theoretische Policy-Modelle (policy-curtain, iron-triangle, issue-network, policy-community, iron-duet) auf der Basis der Variablen der Exklusion und Interdependenz. Die historische Entwicklung der Spezialisierungsberechtigung in der israelischen Gesundheitspolitik dient dabei als Fallstudie zur Illustration der Hauptargumente. Im Ergebnis wird die These untermauert, daß verschiedene Formationen und Konstrukte eines Politikprozesses nicht nur Produkt der politischen Umgebung sind, sondern auch der Verteilung von Ressourcen und Werteprimaten innerhalb ihres spezifischen Fall-Bereiches unterliegen. (AuD-Ber)
Evaluation literature has paid relatively little attention to the specific needs of evaluating large, complex industrial and infrastructure projects, often called 'megaprojects'. The abundant megaproject governance literature, in turn, has largely focused on the so-called 'megaproject pathologies', i.e. the chronic budget overruns, and failure of such projects to keep to timetables and deliver the expected social and economic benefits. This article draws on these two strands of literature, identifies shortcomings, and suggests potential pathways towards an improved evaluation of megaprojects. To counterbalance the current overemphasis on relatively narrowly defined accountability as the main function of megaproject evaluation, and the narrow definition of project success in megaproject evaluation, the article argues that conceptualizing megaprojects as dynamic and evolving networks would provide a useful basis for the design of an evaluation approach better able to promote learning and to address the socio-economic aspects of megaprojects. A modified version of 'network mapping' is suggested as a possible framework for megaproject evaluation, with the exploration of the multiple accountability relationships as a central evaluation task, designed to reconcile learning and accountability as the central evaluation functions. The article highlights the role of evaluation as an 'emergent' property of spontaneous megaproject 'governing', and explores the challenges that this poses to the role of the evaluator.
In response to increasing globalization, new models that show how factors & actors interact are being suggested. One of the older models, the iron triangles, symbolically represent the Second Industrial Revolution & its three sides represent politicians, bureaucrats, & interests. That model is being replaced with the golden pentangles model that includes the three sides from the iron triangles but also includes the highly institutionalized activities of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, & the World Trade Organization as one of the new sides, & the interlocking web of governance composed of mixed public/private sector quasi-institutions & nonstate actors as the remaining. This model has a tendency to be more elitist because the actors will be transnationally linked but at the same time increases competition between the groups that limits the chances for a monolithic state. Research will further the understanding of the structure of the golden pentangles. R. Larsen
This article examines the economic regulation of a hub European airport and the relationship system between actors involved in, or subjected to, this regulation. Studying the case of Aéroports de Paris, it is argued that airport economic regulation is produced by the strong conjunction of interests between the hub airport's operator, the dominant airline, and public authorities. These three categories of actors form an "iron triangle" framing and shaping the terms of economic regulation to satisfy their interests, and the shift from a cost-plus to a price-cap regulation does not dramatically threaten the maintenance of the triangle. All other actors (nondominant, domestic airlines, and international air carriers) are excluded from the iron triangle even if they remain deeply affected by its decisions. Finally, this article calls for an analytical generalization of this theorization for semiprivatized European hub airports.
