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AbstractSpiritual equality, responsibility, and accountability for both men and women are well‐developed themes in the Qur'an. Spiritual equality between men and women in the sight of God is not limited purely to religious issues, but is the basis for equality in all aspects of human endeavor. This article's main interest is in the woman's status, and her role within the Arab countries. Islam is the main religion—its principles, values, and practices are dominant in the region. Therefore, this article introduces and discusses the misinterpretation of women in Islam, with special consideration of Muslim women's rights and their roles within the Muslim society. This will help to enhance future discussions of social behavior, values, and attitudes toward women in Islam.In the last few decades there has been a great misunderstanding in many aspects of public consciousness about the role of women in Arabic society. There is a significant gap between the status of males and females. However, this gap is more evident in rural areas. The level of women's rights and roles in many Arabic countries prevents women from improving their economic growth and development. This gender gap is the result of social, religious, cultural, and gender inequality. More specifically, it results from structural constraints faced by women.Gender inequality is not a new issue, nor is it only Muslim women who are suffering from this inequality. There is gender discrimination almost everywhere.The Qur'an is the basis of Islam, and encompasses rules, legislation, examples, advice, history, and system of the universe. It draws a picture of the earth and describes the roles of human beings. The Qur'an is the answer to the spiritual and material needs of the Islamic society, and is an exposition and an explanation of all aspects of life.

Reza Aslan, one of the nation's most respected experts on Islam and the Middle East is a research associate at the University of Southern California's Center on Public Diplomacy. He serves as a Middle East commentator for National Public Radio's "Marketplace" and Muslim affairs analyst for CBS News. The author of the internationally acclaimed "No god but God: The Origins, Evolution, and Future of Islam," Aslan received critical acclaim from The New York Times, which described the work as a "grippingly narrated and thoughtfully examined . literate, accessible introduction to Islam." Aslan has written for the Los Angeles Times, New York Times , Slate, Boston Globe, Washington Post and The Nation, and has appeared on "Meet the Press," "Hardball," "The Daily Show," "Real Time with Bill Maher" and "Nightline." Aslan's career began in 1998 when was elected president of Harvard's chapter of the World Conference on Religion and Peace (WCRP), a United Nations organization committed to the cause of global understanding. After consecutive nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the WCRP, under Aslan's leadership, brought the ambassadors of the two countries to Harvard in order to discuss for the first time their shared nuclear future. Aslan's work with the WCRP led to a position as legislative assistant for the Friends Committee on National Legislation in Washington, D.C., where he served as a liaison to Congress on issues of arms control and the Middle East. He holds a bachelor's degree in religion from Santa Clara University, a master's in theological studies from Harvard and a master of fine arts degree in fiction from the University of Iowa. He is currently a doctoral candidate in history of religions at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

In this paper I wish to begin addressing a number of questions concerning Muslim religious authority, to which I do not have ready answers myself and which, I believe, have only incidentally been touched upon by earlier research. Given the fact that Islamic knowledge – by which I mean that which Muslims consider to be correct Islamic beliefs, values and practices — is inherently contested, how do certain forms of Islamic knowledge become authoritative among Muslims in Western Europe? There exists a range of would-be Muslim authorities, which are eager to define correct Islam for other Muslims as well as to represent it towards non-Muslims. There are also states as well as non-state actors in European societies that have a strong interest in favouring or rejecting certain interpretations of Islam. What are the strategies used by individuals and institutions to establish their authority or to delegitimatise that of others? Why have some of these strategies been successful or failed? To what extent does the European social, political and cultural context play a part in these strategies or in the forms of Islamic knowledge represented? Whereas these questions concern what may be called the "supply" side of religious knowledge, there is a corresponding series of questions concerning the "demand" side: How do Muslims in Europe, especially second- and third-generation immigrant Muslims, acquire their knowledge of Islam? Whom do they seek out as teachers, counsellors or role models, and on what grounds? What is the impact of their linguistic competence on the type of knowledge demanded or acquired? To what extent does the life-world of young Muslims in Western Europe give rise to new questions, new values, new practices, new interpretations?

The territories ruled by the Syrian opposition are being reorganised. The leaderless revolution has given way to a seizure of power by vanguardist and ideological organisations, be it the PYD in the northeast or HTS, the former local branch of AQ, in Idlib. However, these organisations cannot resist the regime's military threat to reconquer the territories or the Turkish intervention by themselves. They need to manage the internationalisation of the conflict to protect themselves and find space in the broader strategic game around Syria. This is the strategy of HTS. After emerging from the matrix of AQ's global jihad, since 2017 HTS has sought to 'institutionalise' the revolution by imposing its military hegemony and full control of the institutions of local governance. The group has thus marginalised the revolutionary milieu, other Islamists and the threat posed by AQ supporters and IS cells in Idlib. HTS's domination was followed by a policy of gradual opening and mainstreamisation. The group has had to open up to local communities and make concessions, especially in the religious sphere. HTS is seeking international acceptance with the development of a strategic partnership with Turkey and desires to open dialogue with Western countries. Overall, HTS has transformed from formerly being a salafi jihadi organisation into having a new mainstream approach to political Islam.

In this paper, we critically examine the scriptural images of heaven as captured in the Abrahamic religions from the existentialist perspective. The three dominant Abrahamic religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam opine that there is life beyond this earthly existence for all human beings and that God (their object of worship) has prepared a special place of eternal happiness for those who obey His commands on earth. This place is frequently referred to as the Kingdom of God, Heaven or Paradise. We argue that the above construct of heaven throws up a lot of problems, especially from the existentialist perspective. Some of these problems include the fact that these constructs of heaven eliminate all the challenges that stimulate human existentiality, throw into oblivion the scourging evils of boredom arising from the eternal passivity of existence in heaven and fail to lay down exactly the political structure and the legal status of the earthlings in heaven since a Kingdom presupposes a feudalist structure where there are kings, lords and serfs. We conclude by showing that the scriptures' constructs of heaven appear self-contradictory and fail to strike a chord with the contemporary image of the ideal society when perused from the existentialist perspective and should, therefore, be discarded.

Zunächst werden die wesentlichen Merkmale der algerischen Gesellschaft und die wichtigsten Phasen der modernen Entwicklung dargestellt, wie sie besonders die Stellung der Frau betreffen. Anschließend werden die Probleme der Alphabetisierung und die gesellschaftlichen Folgen der Kontinuität eines hohen Prozentsatzes von Analphabeten unter Frauen diskutiert. Deutlich gemacht wird, daß sich die Bildungspolitik in Algerien aufs engste mit den Zielen der Wirtschaftspolitik verband, die dem westlichen Modell der Modernisierung im Sinn von Industrialisierung folgte. Es werden die Gründe für das Scheitern verschiedener Alphabetisierungskampagnen untersucht. Seit den 70er Jahren hat sich das religiös-moralische Klima äußerst nachteilig für Frauen ausgewirkt. Das Verstärken traditionalistischer Werte (Islam) hinsichtlich des Frauenbildes und der Frauenrolle, das Fehlen eines Konzeptes der Erwachsenenbildung für Frauen bewirken eine zunehmende Marginalisierung der Frau in allen Bereichen des öffentlichen Lebens, vor allem auf dem Arbeitsmarkt und im politischen Leben. (GF)

Diversification of the economy has been propagated for years as a paramount task of Brunei policy-makers. According to the author, although this is obviously a sensible objective, it has proved to be a difficult goal to achieve in practice. It is his thesis that the issue in question is of political economy. The author discusses the development problem of Brunei Darussalam, its state institutions, Malay Islam monarchy and the political economy of Brunei. (DÜI-Sen)

"The issue of religious authority has long fascinated and ignited scholars across a range of disciplines: history, anthropology, the sociology of religion, and political science. Religious Knowledge, Authority, and Charisma juxtaposes religious leadership in premodern and modern Islam with examples from the Judaic tradition. By illustrating various iterations of authority in numerous historical and cultural contexts, this volume offers fresh insights into the nature of institutions of learning and other systems of establishing and disseminating authority, the mechanisms for cultivating committed adherents, and the processes by which religious leadership is polarized and fragmented. Contributors tease out the sources and types of authority that emerged out of the Sunni and Shi'i milieu and the evolution of Muslim elites who served as formulators and disseminators of knowledge and practice. Comparative insights are provided by the examination of ideological and historical developments among Jewish sages who inculcated similar modes of authority from within their traditions. The rigorous exploration of the dynamic interface of knowledge and power in Islam and Judaism serves to highlight a number of present tensions common to both religions. By intertwining a historical span that traces trajectories of continuity and change, integrative discussion of cross-sectional themes, and comparative perspectives, this volume makes a distinct contribution."--

Self-absorbed and disposed to muddle through even as their world is crumbling about them, the feudal elites who govern Pakistan are poorly equipped to resist the growing threat from radical Islamic forces. Having played the key role in the emergence of radical Islam in Pakistan by using jihadist groups to advance Pakistani foreign-policy interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir, Pakistani authorities have long since lost their ability to control them. The desultory Army performance against Pakistani Taliban forces in the tribal areas and the recent concessions made in Swat suggest they lack the will to decisively meet the radical Islamic threat. The consequence of their persistent failure to act may be the eventual collapse of the state. (Survival / SWP)

Dieses Buch untersucht die Wirtschaftsethik asiatischer und christlicher Traditionen und die dazugehörenden Rechtssysteme. Es geht aus von Max Webers Texten über China, Indien und das alte Judentum sowie vom verstreuten Material über den Islam und östliche und westliche Christenheit, außerdem von seiner Rechtssoziologie. Mithilfe von Webers Methodologie (Begriff der adäquaten Verursachung) wird gezeigt, dass die Ethik asiatischer Kulturen, außerdem ihr Gewohnheitsrecht und ihr nicht formal rationales Recht Webers Meinung nach nicht von selbst zum modernen Kapitalismus führen konnten, obwohl er natürlich von außen adoptiert werden konnte. Die Kultur des Okzidents erscheint so als das Produkt einer doppelten Rationalisierung, der formalen Rationalität der äußeren Umstände (Verwaltung und Recht) und der praktischen Rationalität der inneren Motive der Protestanten, unterstützt durch zielorientierte Technologie

Als Ehefrau eines niederländischen Diplomaten lebt(e) die Journalistin Udink in verschiedenen islamischen Ländern (zu Saudi-Arabien: "Hinter Mekka", ID 8/92); hier berichtet sie aus Pakistan. Aus einem Land, in dem unter dem Mantel des Islam Frauen rechtlos sind, wo Frauen der Besitz ihrer Väter, Bürder oder Ehemänner sind, wo Frauen aus Gründen der "Ehre" nach Belieben misshandelt oder getötet werden dürfen; wo Mädchen als Konkubinen verkauft werden oder auch als Arbeitssklavinnen, wo die Vergewaltigung von Jungen (organisiert durch Lehrer!) an der Tagesordnung ist, wo Kinder unmenschlich und seelenlos behandelt werden; wo Menschen ohne alle Rechte und ohne jeden Schutz leben. Und wo große Teile der Eliten des Landes dieser Unmenschlichkeit tatenlos zusehen und davon profitieren. Ein Buch mit einem unscheinbaren Titelbild und einem nicht wirklich passenden Titel, das furchtbar wütend macht. Ein Buch, das jeder lesen sollte. (1)

Zu den wichtigsten Spielarten des Terrorismus des 21. Jahrhunderts gehört der religiös motivierte und legitimierte Terror, der in allen Religionen vorkommt. Darunter ragt der Djihad-Terrorismus als neuer Totalitarismus hervor; er wird nicht von einem Staat, sondern von einer Bewegung getragen. Dieser islamistische Djihadismus bedient sich - so die These des vorliegenden Beitrags - des modernen Terrorismus nur als ein Instrument bei der Verwirklichung des politischen Zieles eines Kampfes gegen den Hegemonial- und Universalitätsanspruchs der westlichen Welt. Die zentrale Idee des vorliegenden Beitrags besteht darin, dass der Djihadismus, der aus dem Islamismus (wohl nicht dem Islam) hervorgetreten ist, die Weltpolitik des 21. Jahrhunderts verändert hat und die nächsten Jahrzehnte weiterhin bestimmen wird. Der Djihad-Islamismus wird als ein Terrorismus des irregulären Krieges gedeutet, dem mit einer passenden Countering-Strategie begegnet werden muss. Hierbei geht es nicht alleine um sicherheitspolitisch-militärische Belange, sondern auch um einen "Krieg der Weltanschauungen in einem Zivilisationskonflikt". (ICA2)

It is the sovereign's responsibility to bring prosperity, thus he is able to raise a tax, the proceeds of which enable him to maintain an army assigned to the defense of the kingdom. If nothing comes to stop the race this virtuous mechanism, this Circle of Justice, has a vocation to reproduce infinitely. The circle is omnipresent in the Iranian Mirrors of princes of the 11th and 12th centuries, and two of their most eminent specimens, the Sīyar al-Molūk and the Naṣīḥat al-Molūk capture in the Sasanid era a period when the rulers, elected by God and inhabited by justice, are instituted as models. The subsumed sequences of the circle actually predate the Sassanid period and, to keep us at Hammurabi of Babylon (1792-1750 BC), the "code" associated with it as a sovereign called by the gods to, pastor, bring prosperity and protection to the herd in his care. In this long history of the circle the role of the Sasanids will not have been negligible since it would have been their return to perpetuate the objectives assigned to them (prosperity and protection) through the royal treasury or tax. Would it be a product of royal ideology the circle deserves examination in that it testifies precisely to the time, the eras, which saw it invoked in principle of government. Our research thus proposed to identify references to the Circle of Justice during the Sasanid era, to re-establish them in their religious, political and social environments and to identify their scope, before following its evolutions in Iranian space during the first centuries of Islam until shortly before the Mongol invasion, a total of more than 9 centuries. ; Il incombe au souverain d'apporter la prospérité, il est ainsi à même de lever un impôt dont le produit lui permet d'entretenir une armée affectée à la défense du royaume. Si rien ne vient en enrayer la course ce mécanisme vertueux, ce Cercle de justice, a vocation à se reproduire à l'infini. Le cercle est omniprésent dans les Miroirs des princes iraniens des XIe et XIIe siècles et deux de leurs plus ...

It is the sovereign's responsibility to bring prosperity, thus he is able to raise a tax, the proceeds of which enable him to maintain an army assigned to the defense of the kingdom. If nothing comes to stop the race this virtuous mechanism, this Circle of Justice, has a vocation to reproduce infinitely. The circle is omnipresent in the Iranian Mirrors of princes of the 11th and 12th centuries, and two of their most eminent specimens, the Sīyar al-Molūk and the Naṣīḥat al-Molūk capture in the Sasanid era a period when the rulers, elected by God and inhabited by justice, are instituted as models. The subsumed sequences of the circle actually predate the Sassanid period and, to keep us at Hammurabi of Babylon (1792-1750 BC), the "code" associated with it as a sovereign called by the gods to, pastor, bring prosperity and protection to the herd in his care. In this long history of the circle the role of the Sasanids will not have been negligible since it would have been their return to perpetuate the objectives assigned to them (prosperity and protection) through the royal treasury or tax. Would it be a product of royal ideology the circle deserves examination in that it testifies precisely to the time, the eras, which saw it invoked in principle of government. Our research thus proposed to identify references to the Circle of Justice during the Sasanid era, to re-establish them in their religious, political and social environments and to identify their scope, before following its evolutions in Iranian space during the first centuries of Islam until shortly before the Mongol invasion, a total of more than 9 centuries. ; Il incombe au souverain d'apporter la prospérité, il est ainsi à même de lever un impôt dont le produit lui permet d'entretenir une armée affectée à la défense du royaume. Si rien ne vient en enrayer la course ce mécanisme vertueux, ce Cercle de justice, a vocation à se reproduire à l'infini. Le cercle est omniprésent dans les Miroirs des princes iraniens des XIe et XIIe siècles et deux de leurs plus ...