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"The Judicialization of Politics Disentangled" published on by Oxford University Press.

This article examines the politics of judicialization in Thailand between 2006 and 2014, looking at the ways in which the judiciary became regularly embroiled in politics during this extremely contentious period. It takes as its starting point important royal speeches of 2006, and the interpretation of those speeches offered by the prominent academic and social critic Thirayudh Boonmee. Several key judicial decisions which had lasting political consequences are closely examined, including the 2006 election annulment, the 2007 banning of Thai Rak Thai, the removal of pro-Thaksin Shinawatra prime ministers Samak Sundaravej and Yingluck Shinawatra in 2008 and 2014, Thaksin's conviction on corruption-related charges in 2008 and the judicial seizure of his assets in 2010. Some of the questions posed in this paper are as follows: Does judicialization inevitably mean conservative attempts to curtail the power of politicians and undermine electoral politics? Are judges working on behalf of Thai society, or in alignment with certain vested interests? Could greater judicial activism serve progressive social and political causes in the Thai context? The paper argues that Thailand's "judicialization" is a complex phenomenon: judgements made by different courts, in different cases and at different times need to be scrutinized on their individual merits. (Contemp Southeast Asia/GIGA)

IT SEEMED UNLIKELY THAT JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS WOULD OCCUR IN FRANCE WHERE THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS WAS SO FORCEFULLY PROCLAIMED IN 1789. YET, NOTWITHSTANDING ITS CONDEMNATION BY CLASSICAL THEORY, JUDICIALIZATION HAS CHARACTERIZED ALL FORMS OF LAW. TWO EXAMPLES SHOW CLEARLY THE EVOLUTION THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE. IN CIVIL LAW, JUDICIALIZATION HAS BEEN GRAFTED ON THE CODE OF 1804, WHILE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, WHICH APPEARED EX NIHILO, IS BEING INCREASINGLY CODIFIED. A BALANCE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN REACHED BETWEEN LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE.

"Over the last two decades courts have become major players in the political landscape in Asia. This book assesses what is driving this apparent trend toward judicialization in the region. It looks at the variations within the judicialization trend, and how these variations affect political practice and policy outcomes."--Publisher's description

Judicialization of politics means that more and more political questions are decided by courts and thereby political alternatives are reduced. In Germany it is the Federal Constitutional Court that is most involved in this process of judicialization. Members of Parliament contribute to this development by litigating far too often a lawsuit before the Constitutional Court and by carrying too far the consideration of legal arguments in legislation. Judges of the Constitutional Court contribute to the judicialization by sometimes exceeding their competences and by becoming involved in power politics. As the Constitutional Court has only a limited democratic legitimacy, it is detrimental to a democracy when such a court frequently decides on policy-making.

AbstractThe judicialization of politics in Taiwan is particularly evident in three domains: the expansion of judicial power, a shift in political equilibrium, and litigation for social change. Yet it is not altogether clear why politicians and social groups are willing to transfer decision-making powers from the political branches to the judiciary, particularly the Constitutional Court. This paper endeavours to fill this academic lacuna by suggesting that the judicialization of politics occurs in Taiwan because both politicians and citizens choose the judiciary as another agent to implement their preferred policies. Nevertheless, Taiwan does not become a juristocracy and, indeed, the pace of the judicialization has slowed down since the second party turnover. The development of the judicialization of politics in Taiwan may shed new light on many old topics, such as judicial supremacy and the relationship between judicial power and political uncertainty.

This chapter reviews the transformation of court systems in Southeast Asia with particular attention to their growing role in governance-part of a general trend towards the 'judicialization of politics.'

The judicialization of politics has probably proceeded further in Israel than in any other democratic country. In the strong sense of the definition propounded by Torbjörn Vallinder (1992: 1), the civil judiciary in Israel, particularly the Supreme Court justices sitting as members of the High Court of Justice, are exercising power at the expense of politi cians and administrators. The justices now claim the authority even to review the internal workings of the theoretically sovereign Knesset (parlia ment). This situation represents a marked change from the norms of 46 years ago when the state came into existence. Then, power and authority were concentrated in the elected agencies, the Knesset and, particularly, the Government. Rampant partisanship, arbitrary and self-interested policies, and, worst of all, an inability to deal with crucial problems beset ting Israeli society, corroded that authority and, ultimately, the power of the elected leadership. The default of Israel's democratically elected leadership has led to the judicialization of politics.

As to judicial intervention in politics, Sweden sides with skepti cal states like the United Kingdom or Third and Fourth Republic France. The Social Democrats, in power for more than four decades, have consis tently defended a majoritarian and popular sovereignty view of democracy, hostile to built-in checks on the elected representatives. But judgments of the European Court on Human Rights at Strasbourg, and a gradual weakening of the Social Democratic dominance in Swedish politics, have initiated a slow but steady process toward a more significant role for court litigation and the judicial branch. This judicialization of the political process will probably accelerate now that interest organizations have discovered this "American" way of influencing politics.

As judicial review has expanded in Asia during the last quarter century, new studies have emerged that seek to move beyond the traditional scholarly approach to the region to draw attention to judicial review from a more political perspective. Surveying this literature, this article addresses three central questions that have recently arisen: (1) What is driving countries in the region to adopt judicial review? (2) Under what conditions do courts exert these new powers assertively-and successfully? (3) Now that they are empowered, how do judges decide cases as they do, and what forces, other than an independent judgement on how the law applies to the facts before the court, are likely to influence their decisions? Arguing that the region poses considerable challenges to current models, the article also draws attention to recent scholarly analyses of the informal dynamics of judicial politics, some of which take a distinct relational approach that seems well suited to a better understanding of how judicial review operates in this diverse, dynamic, region. 2